It was a privilege to report this story, to read the files, and to go deep into Taiwan's unresolved past. And only possible through brilliant research by Constance Chang, photography by An Rong Xu, and editing by @abbiefs.bsky.social. I hope you will read and enjoy:
www.economist.com/1843/2025/05...
In the meantime Taiwan is still dealing with spying, infiltration, and distrust - only now it's the Communist Party that's co-opting members of Taiwanese society as informants. And those who were spied on worry that they people they trust most could sell them out again.
But the results for Taiwan, so far, have been troubling. Opening up a partial and unreliable record of the past caused so much harm and hurt that the surveillance files have been made private again. Now only those targeted for surveillance, or their descendants, can see them.
Having just moved from a similar surveillance state across the strait, only with its methods updated and supercharged by 21st-century technology, I also wanted to imagine what might happen if that kind of surveillance regime ever fell apart and we got to look inside.
I was fascinated by the methods of Taiwan's former regime - how it used people against each other, using fear and surveillance for control - and how the lack of complete reckoning with that past still affects Taiwan's society today.
But he also denied ever receiving payment for informing. And he had been open with his friend Yang the whole time. Both were upset that the files had been opened so late and so partially, and seemed to be causing more scandal and division than accountability.
Ang Kaim, a historian at Academia Sinica, is listed as one of Yang's informants in the files. He told us how he was recruited - by an agent threatening him just after a prominent dissident had been interrogated and then died on a university campus - and why he complied.
That's the tricky thing about the files. Even when they were made public, they were incomplete. Security agencies insisted on blacking out the agents' names. Informants were also given code names for anonymity. Some of the information in the files was also fabricated.
Another target was Fan Yun, a current legislator who was involved in student democracy movements in the late 1980s. She found more than 1,000 pages of notes on her stretching over 9 years. Several of her fellow activists had been informants. She still doesn't know who they are.
One target who looked at their files was Yang Bi-chuan, a dissident who used to teach underground classes on Taiwan's history. He spent 7 years imprisoned on Green Island. He found that a favourite student, one who'd risen to become a prominent DPP politician, was an informant.
They are full of secrets. Salacious details about broken marriages, exploitable vices, and worst of all, betrayals. Agents recruited informants across Taiwanese society to spy on suspected communists or dissidents. They could be your neighbour, your nanny, or your best friend.
The files are kept in an earthquake-proof, temperature-controlled vault on the outskirts of Taipei. They're part of Taiwan's "political files", all the records relating to rights abuses from its one-party era. Stacked together, they would create a tower nearly 6x higher than 101
Two years ago, I heard that Taiwan's govt had unearthed surveillance files from the secret police of its authoritarian era. They were finally becoming open to the public, nearly four decades after Taiwan's democratisation. I wanted to see what was inside:
www.economist.com/1843/2025/05...
Thank you so much for reading and listening!
Superb and important piece from @aliceysu.bsky.social about the long and painful process of truth and reconciliation in Taiwan.
A pointed reminder about what "unification" with the People's Republic of China actually demands of the Taiwanese people.
www.economist.com/1843/2025/05...
What if China & India became friends? I join @aliceysu.bsky.social on The Economist's Drum Tower podcast this week to discuss whether India & China can grow closer economically after their October border deal -- and what that might mean for Asia and the world. www.economist.com/podcasts/202...
This is the 5th disruption to Taiwan's undersea cables this year. Some of the breakages are natural. TW authorities suspected Chinese involvement in another cut near Keelung in January, but couldn't board the ship to inspect. This time around they may get more info
focustaiwan.tw/politics/202...
Taiwan has detained a Chinese-crewed ship for investigation after another one of its undersea cables, this time connecting Taiwan to Penghu, was cut this morning. Coast guard says the ship was sailing under Togo flag but Chinese-funded, and could be a grey-zone actor
www.cna.com.tw/news/asoc/20...
Most of the recent spy cases have been uncovered through internal reporting. Taiwan's defence ministry says that's a sign its anti-spy education is working. But a govt report says Chinese intelligence made more than 1,700 online recruitment attempts in 2.5 years. It is hard for Taiwan to keep up
Defeatism is part of China's recruiting strategy too. Some soldiers and officers collaborate in exchange for the promise of protection when war happens. One lieutenant allegedly agreed to work w China in exchange for Thai passports for his family, according to the prosecutor
In a time of crisis, surrender videos might weaken Taiwanese society's will to resist. "They can be used to tell ordinary Taiwanese people, ‘Look, even your army is not loyal to your country,’” says a lawyer who' worked on many military-espionage cases.
In return they get reductions on their debt or payment through cryptocurrency. Some also get money through middlemen running fraudulent e-commerce accounts. Naive soldiers think it's easy cash. But the content they're making may serve psychological purposes
Some of the soldiers will allegedly wear their Taiwanese military uniforms and pose with a PRC flag, promising not to fight. Or they'll sign oaths vowing loyalty to the motherland if a war breaks out
I spoke w a special prosecutor who deals with national-security cases in Taiwan. He told us China is targeting younger soldiers through underground lending networks and online gaming platforms. They're offered starting payments of 1-200,000NTD ($3-6k) for military intelligence or surrender videos
Taiwan's armed forces have a Chinese spy problem. Prosecutions for Chinese espionage have jumped fourfold in the last 4 years. 2/3 of alleged spies last year were current or retired military personnel. China is also using new tactics to recruit younger collaborators
www.economist.com/asia/2025/02...
I'm hearing a lot from the media NGO sector about the impact of USAID cuts. A lot of small investigative media organisations across the globe are facing imminent closure as the funding they've budget for has vanished overnight, and the funder community has no capacity to absorb the shock.
The great irony is that America is finishing off a job that China has wanted to accomplish for decades. These cuts are a blatant dismissal of democratic values as a meaningful part of the US-China competition. And Chinese activists who care about those values are the first to suffer
These rights groups are fearful of speaking up because admitting US govt funding makes them targets of China's state security - but also bc criticising a Trump decision might make them targets for retaliation from the current US administration. Pressure from both sides means many will just shut down
It has been hard for groups like these to find financial support ever since China passed an overseas NGO law in 2017 requiring police registration, a govt-approved sponsor, and no political work. Many foreign donors moved away from China-focused groups that worked on politically sensitive issues
They use personal connections and networks developed over decades to do things like monitor labour protests, track re-education camps and detention campaigns, and support journalists, lawyers, and activists inside China. They often are the first to break news on new forms of state repression