Space mission industrial policy

Seconded

Abandon all hope, ye who enter here

We need to see FIDs, but Trump’s attacks on Canada may have formally ended the Biden & earlier era of 🇨🇦 allegiance to the North American business model of ICE SUVs and trucks, with a fast transition towards the global trend to Chinese based transnational EV makers.

Whether or not you think Fortress North America was a good idea, Canada tried pitching it in the early months of Trump II, got cross-border economic warfare in return, and here we are.

“Electrification will be the shock absorber” Dr. Tim Sahay and the @nzpolicylab.bsky.social in the NYT today.

One of those things that just would not be happening without Trump. Biden had closed ranks on China, but with chaos in the WH, countries like Canada look to hedge.

Time to check in on American Hegemony

Nvidia’s Huang calls China ‘formidable’ in robotics as firm bets on physical AI China’s microelectronics, motors, rare earth and magnets – which are foundational to robotics – are the world’s best, says Huang.

Jensen Huang: US robotics industry will have to rely on China’s supply chain:

“... because their microelectronics, motors, rare earth and magnets – which are foundational to robotics – are the world’s best. So ... our robotics industry relies deeply on their ecosystem and their supply chain”

For a granular view of who is poised to win and lose in this new order, dig in to our Clean industrial capabilities explorer: cice.netzeropolicylab.com

The New Metabolic World Order Opposing the petrostates will be the Green Entente.

The central faultline of the emerging post-liberal international order will be a geopolitical struggle over what metabolic-industrial system will dominate the 21st century — with smaller powers struggling to avoid total alignment with either bloc. My latest: foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/23/c...

A new world order

So far so good

That’s a standard rider to all posts yes.

If I was Arsenal I would just win all the remaining games.

A New Compass for Clean Energy Competitiveness - Johns Hopkins - Ralph O’Connor Sustainable Energy Institute As countries race to build clean energy industries, many face the same dilemmas: Where to invest, and how to avoid costly...

Where should nations invest in clean energy industries? The Clean Industrial Competitiveness Explorer from the Net Zero Industrial Policy Lab, which ROSEI's @bentleyallan.bsky.social is co-director of, helps identify where nations can compete. #HopkinsEnergy

energyinstitute.jhu.edu/a-new-compas...

Who could have predicted

Fertilizer shortage Iran war: Hormuz block could create global food crisis. Even if the Iran war stops, restarting production and transport for fertilizers and their components could take weeks—at a crucial moment for planting.

With the Strait of Hormuz almost entirely closed, fertilizer producers face major disruptions during a critical time of planting season.

@noahjgordon.bsky.social and Lucy Corthell break down the potential strain on the global food system: carnegieendowment.org/emissary/202...

Aaaand the link to CICE itself: cice.netzeropolicylab.com

Big thanks to @jonasnahm.com for excellent comments on the piece.

Charting Pathways in a Chaotic World Insights from the Clean Industrial Capabilities Explorer

In short, countries need to invest in their industrial base if they want to compete, and CICE gives countries a map and a strategic compass to navigate this terrain. Check out the full piece: neiscenter.substack.com/p/charting-p...

For example, the U.S. imposed anti-dumping duties on Chinese wind towers in 2012-13. But something unexpected happened: Chinese imports fell, but US competitiveness also declined. Tariffs increased the cost of U.S. manufacturing and US products were no longer competitive in a global market.

4. Tariffs aren't a substitute for capability-building. Tariff variables have low predictive power in our model. Industrial depth is the key factor. In a world of escalating trade restrictions, building domestic capabilities offers more strategic certainty than engaging in tariff wars.

The idea is that each technology requires a different combination of capabilities. Each technology has its own profile. Solar competitiveness is driven by metals and chemicals. Wind depends on heavy industrial machinery, iron and steel.

3. Upstream capabilities drive competitiveness more than final assembly. We found that five capabilities predict clean tech export competitiveness across technologies: electronics, machinery, metals, industrial materials, and chemicals.

These findings matter not just for industrial strategy focus, but for strategies designed to build overseas supply chains. For example, US investments in India may be well-placed to generate durable diversification away from China.

The US has real strengths in batteries, nuclear, and biofuels but lags peers in most other clean tech. India is top-10 in solar, wind, and nuclear, suggesting its manufacturing push is more successful than recognized.

2. Not every country should chase the same technologies.
Industrial strategy must be selective and focused. Attempting to compete across all clean technologies without the requisite industrial base risks spreading resources thinly and undermining competitiveness in areas where advantages are real.

China's high-speed rail strategy is a great example. They had no "natural" advantage, but they built strong "absorptive capacity." They acquired foreign technology, then placed it in cities with technologically related industrial clusters. The existing industrial base made the project viable.

1. Build on strengths, but don't be bound by them.
The old liberal view said: stick to your comparative advantage. Industrial policy advocates argued in response that comparative advantage is made not found. CICE operationalizes the latter view, but without letting countries get delusional.