🔴RISK ADVISORY: If you are communicating with or transacting with any entity using a .YE domain (including .gov.ye), there is a high probability you are dealing with the Houthi militia.
Due diligence is critical to avoid engaging with a militia responsible for gross human rights violations.
This is just sad..
In 2015, Internet Society - Yemen Chapter was about keeping the internet open.
In 2024, it's about amplifying Houthi propaganda from the militia's own news agency and Ministry of Communications.
What changed? Funny you should ask.
#FreeDotYE
UPDATE on #FreeDotYE: IANA has responded. They are now requesting our evidence and have agreed to a procedural call, a necessary step forward.
They also state their evaluation is a "confidential process." Our commitment to public transparency remains.
Read:
freethedotye.org/corresponden...
What if a militia owned your country's internet?
In Yemen, Houthis seized .YE in 2014, weaponizing .ye for threats & phishing, even costing kids' lives via botched aid.
ICANN calls it a "local issue." Our new blog exposes the digital ghost state & demands action.
freethedotye.org/blog/when-mi...
For 10 years, #ICANN has allowed a militia to control Yemen's .YE domain.
The result? Fake .gov.ye emails threatening ships & online surveillance turned into kidnappings.
This would be unthinkable for .fr or .uk. The silence must end.
#FreeDotYE
freethedotye.org
More than 10 days have passed since we submitted our formal request to #ICANN #IANA regarding the hijacked .YE domain. So far, we've received only silence.
🔗 Our formal letter: freethedotye.org/letter
Houthis, a sanctioned terrorist group, control Yemen’s telecoms and .YE domain, gaining money and power.
Since 2015 ICANN & IANA ignored RFC1591 & ICP-1, leaving .YE in militia hands. This legitimizes repression.
#FreeDotYE #Yemen #ICANN #IANA
ICANN says it is “deeply committed to fostering a globally diverse and inclusive organization”
Yet since 2015 it has stayed silent while Houthis militia hijack Yemen’s .YE, domain excluding Yemenis from their digital identity.
True inclusion means domains serve people, not militias.
In #Nepal Gen Z protested corruption and internet restrictions.
In #Yemen we cannot protest. Houthis control telecoms, censor the internet, and turned .YE into their tool.
#ICANN and #IANA have stayed silent since 2015 while a militia owns Yemen’s digital identity.
Our only protest is online.
I am Yemeni.
My country’s domain (.YE) does not belong to me, or to any citizen.
It belongs to an armed group.
This is why we launched #FreeDotYE.
Join us: freethedotye.org
Houthis have detained UN staff, hacked activists, and silenced journalists.
And yet they control Yemen’s official Internet domain, .YE.
Technical governance must not normalize terrorism.
#ICANN would never allow a militia to run .fr or .uk.
So why is .YE - a national identity - left in Houthi hands?
This isn’t just Yemen’s problem. It undermines global DNS credibility.
Did you know Yemen’s .YE domain was delegated in 1996 to TeleYemen as trustee for the Yemeni people?
Today, it’s monopolized by Houthis.
The principle of ccTLD stewardship in RFC 1591 is clear: domains must serve their whole community.
#FreeDotYE #DNS
We demand #IANA and #ICANN:
1️⃣ Review of .YE delegation (per RFC 1591, ICP-1)
2️⃣ Redelegation to a neutral trustee until stability returns
3️⃣ Protection of Yemen’s digital sovereignty
If the state won’t act, people must.
✍️ Petition: www.change.org/FreeTheDotYE
This isn’t just Yemen. If militias can hijack national domains, the credibility of the global DNS collapses.
Would the world accept a militia running .fr or .uk? Then why is .YE different?
Independent journalists in Houthi areas have been kidnapped, disappeared, or killed. UN & NGO staff have been detained.
Yet the same group runs Yemen’s national domain.
A ccTLD run by abusers is unacceptable.
#FreeDotYE #Yemen #Journalism
Control of .YE = control of Yemen’s Internet:
- Censorship
- Surveillance through TeleYemen
- Hacking of activists & NGOs
- Silencing the press
ICANN’s silence = complicity.
#FreeDotYE #HumanRights
The recognized government abandoned .YE.
They now rely on .org .com .net domains.
Result: the national domain is entirely in militia hands. Weak leadership left Yemen’s digital identity vulnerable.
We cannot wait for them. #FreeDotYE
Houthis use .YE to project false legitimacy.
Sites like saba.ye and mmy.ye pose as state outlets but are propaganda platforms. Meanwhile, real journalists are censored, silenced, or worse.
#FreeDotYE #Yemen #PressFreedom
🚨 Yemen’s national domain .YE is hijacked. Since 2015, Houthis have controlled it via TeleYemen, running every .ye, .com.ye, .net.ye, .gov.ye, .edu.ye site.
The recognized government failed to reclaim it. Civil society must raise its voice.
🌍 freethedotye.org
#FreeDotYE #Yemen #DigitalRights