Very nice to see Andrew Gelman - who helped develop the "Gelman-King" bias of district maps - conceding that the metric doesn't work in uncompetitive states.
Other scholars defended the measure's use in Utah, but the court saw through these claims.
statmodeling.stat.columbia.edu/2026/03/13/c...
This major new volume on campaign finance is now out.
My contribution (papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers....) argues that, even if legislative quid pro quos are rare, quintessential corruption remains common in the context of government contracts.
global.oup.com/academic/pro...
You can now explore different electoral scenarios on
@planscore.org.
For Dems to capture the House, they need to win the popular vote by about 1 point.
The House's bias is tiny if 2026 is like 2024 (or more pro-Rep), but grows if 2026 is a better Dem year.
electionlawblog.org?p=154769
This NPR segment on which population counts for redistricting (www.npr.org/2026/03/09/n...) quotes a 2021 paper I wrote with Jowei Chen.
We found that changing the unit of apportionment would have significant racial -- but more muted partisan -- effects.
www.californialawreview.org/print/democr...
If only there was some way we could know what the Court was thinking -- some process through which the Court could justify its actions. Ah well.
3. The Court could think that any remedial district drawn *here* -- where the trial court never considered whether a reasonably-configured crossover district could be created -- would be unlawful. But why should a shoddy trial court ruling have any constitutional significance?
2. The Court could think that claims for "crossover" districts are inherently unconstitutional. A plurality flirted with this idea in Bartlett. But why would a court-ordered, reasonably-configured, crossover district necessarily be unlawful? It's far from clear.
What explains the Court's stay in the Staten Island case?
1. The Court could think that race-conscious districting is inherently unlawful. That's what Alito says in his concurrence (contradicting his own opinion in, e.g., Milligan). But no other justice joined Alito.
Check out this very cool update to @planscore.org: You can now move a slider back and forth to simulate how a map would perform under any electoral environment.
For more, see this post by @mike.teczno.com:
medium.com/planscore/pl...
How much worse can gerrymandering get? Will the Supreme Court strike down a landmark voting rights law? We asked two experts.
An informative interview with @justinlevitt.bsky.social & @profnickstephan.bsky.social.
Among other things, they discuss how the Supreme Court could make seemingly small changes to the Voting Rights Act that make VRA§2 redistricting lawsuits virtually impossible without deeming it unconstitutional
After Bost, standing could largely disappear as an issue in election law cases -- at least if plaintiffs can get a candidate to join the suit.
If only we had known this in Whitford, the whole history of partisan gerrymandering might be different.
I wrote this essay for NYU's democracy project on the critical need to curb "misalignment" in American politics.
Notably, misalignment is pervasive even when (as in 2024) the presidential candidate preferred by voters wins the election.
democracyproject.org/posts/curbin...
In policy terms, the usual absence of tradeoffs means that line-drawers can often have it all—maps that simultaneously comply with traditional criteria, treat the major parties fairly, lead to competitive elections, and properly represent minority voters.
Legally, it bolsters plaintiffs alleging partisan gerrymandering or racial vote dilution, because their objectives can typically be achieved without sacrificing other goals.
In most cases, progress along one dimension (like compactness, partisan fairness, or minority representation) requires no regression along another axis. This conclusion has sweeping implications for redistricting law and policy.
These ensembles cover all electoral levels for seven priority states as well as congressional maps for all states with two or more U.S. House districts.
The Article finds that, contrary to the conventional wisdom of courts and scholars, redistricting tradeoffs are generally weak to nonexistent.
This Article is the first to rigorously analyze the existence and extent of redistricting tradeoffs. The Article relies on ensembles of billions of district maps generated randomly by cutting-edge computer algorithms.
Here's the abstract:
The law of redistricting is built on the assumption that tradeoffs among line-drawing criteria are pervasive. This view helps explain crucial elements of partisan gerrymandering, racial vote dilution, and racial gerrymandering doctrine.
I just posted "Redistricting Without Tradeoffs," forthcoming in @columlrev.bsky.social, on SSRN.
The article relies on huge sets of computer-generated district maps to show that tradeoffs between redistricting criteria are much less common than is often thought.
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers....
Watch how gerrymandering has changed the partisan skew of the U.S. House and state legislatures with the newest PlanScore update!
Check out this cool new feature on PlanScore, showing the U.S. House's aggregate bias over time.
Here's 2024 (with estimated scores for the states that have redrawn their maps since then):
planscore.org#!2026-ushouse
PlanScore has been updated to include 2024 scores for all congressional, state senate, and state house plans. Check it out:
planscore.org#!2024-stateh...
Victory in our New York VRA case against Newburgh!
The Court of Appeals unanimously held that the town lacks capacity to facially challenge the statute.
So our case continues to trial, and the dilution of the town's minority voters' influence may still be fixed.
www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/Decis...
What an irony it would be if Republicans, by initiating this unnecessary and unprecedented mid-decade redistricting war, ended up costing themselves the House.
Possibly of more interest to election law folks: The court really understood the various measures of partisan fairness. It correctly dismissed the state's preferred metrics, partisan bias and the mean-median difference, as inapplicable in an uncompetitive state like Utah.
My response to Sachs and Kleinfeld's article advocating parents voting for their children is now up.
My idea is to have young adults -- not parents -- vote on behalf of children due to their greater partisan and ideological similarity.
ndlawreview.org/give-young-a...
- More in the weeds, but the plaintiffs say the third Gingles precondition isn't satisfied in CA because minority-preferred candidates often win statewide races. But this analysis is always regional, not statewide, and the plaintiffs offer no more localized data.
- The plaintiffs want CA to return to its 2022 map. But their own argument is that 14 of that map's districts are unlawful racial gerrymanders! So that map is almost as bad, under the plaintiffs' theory, as the new map -- and can't be a valid remedy to any legal problem.
- Where's the plaintiffs' alternative map? CA's obvious defense is that its primary goal was partisan, not racial. Alexander says that, to refute a partisan defense, plaintiffs need a map that achieves the state's partisan aim without fixating on race. So where's their map?
