Exciting!

Knowledge: A Human Interest Story In this book the author argues for a groundbreaking perspective that knowledge is inherently interest-relative. This means that what one knows is influenced not just by belief, evidence, and truth, bu...

My book on Knowledge is out today (World Philosophy Day) with Open Book Publishers.

It's freely downloadable in PDF and Epub form, and cheap to order in hardback or paperback. #philsky

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Interested? More details on: deonconferences.org

Lingnan-60 Global Talent Recruitment: multiple positions in a variety of areas (all things AI esp welcome). More information here: www.ln.edu.hk/hr/lingnan-6...

Without thinking too far ahead, I think the kinds of principles I like wouldn’t generate reasons to not take the vitamin from reasons to not A in this case. Am I going to get in trouble if I have those commitments?

I don’t know if there is a standard line though about this. To answer your question. I think there are different approaches.

I think whether the reasons to not X also give you reason to not take the vitamin depend in part on whether taking the vitamin is in tension with doing not X. If they are, then I think subject to some restrictions there can be reasons to not take the vitamin

I’m a little unclear on the set up. Is the idea the vitamin helps you conform to each of the things you have a reason to do or just the helps you do X?

This stuff about evidentiality at the end of your book sounds fun. I have the book so need to dig in….

Had a great time talking to Carrie Figdor about my book for the New Books in Philosophy podcast. I can't re-listen to it because it'll wreck my mind to think about all the things I could have explained better. But it was enjoyable and, I hope, informative:
newbooksnetwork.com/the-modal-fu...