NEW | The RSF captured el Fasher after an 18-month siege, solidifying a de facto partition in Sudan.
The Emirati-backed RSF is committing war crimes that are likely crimes against humanity & possibly acts of ethnic cleansing.
Details in the Africa File: www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/sud...
"Analysis by the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) outlined how Russia is filling a vacuum left by former colonizers, France, and capitalizing on recent conflicts and autocratic regimes that mirror Moscow's." @newsweek.com newsweek.com/russia-afric...
With the United States looking to restart its peace efforts in Sudan, @liamkarr.bsky.social writes that the US has an opportunity to secure a key security objective and humanitarian victory. 🧵
Read more here: realclearworld.com/articles/202...
NEW | Al Qaeda's Sahelian affiliate JNIM overran Djibo on May 11 in one of its largest ever attacks in Burkina Faso.
JNIM is strengthening while civilians are bearing the brunt of Russian-backed junta leader Ibrahim Traoré's brutal & ineffective regime. 🧵
NEW | Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate, JNIM, carried out its deadliest-ever attack in Benin as it continues to increase the lethality of its operations in Benin in 2025.
More on the JNIM campaign and its implications from this week's Africa File: www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/afr... 🧵
NEW | Al Shabaab captured two key areas in central Somalia as it continues to gain momentum.
Al Shabaab's gains have set conditions to undo the US-backed Somali counterterrorism offensive in 2022.
More from this week's Africa File: www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/afr... 1/8 🧵
NEW | The Rapid Support Forces has committed war crimes as it has intensified efforts to consolidate control over western Sudan.
RSF atrocities include attacks on the Zamzam refugee camp and are possibly constituent acts of ethnic cleansing or genocide. www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/afr...
NEW | External meddling in Sudan shows no signs of stopping amid the country’s now two-year civil war.
US partners such as the UAE, as well as US adversaries such as Iran and Russia, threaten US interests in the Red Sea by fueling the war. (1/6)
These tradeoffs can only be effectively compared within a clear critical minerals strategy.
The U.S. should develop such a strategy and seek out partnerships that best suit this strategy, not build a strategy around external offers.
US officials must compare these costs and risks against several other factors, such as:
- Mineral substitution and recycling efforts (supply)
- Domestic production boosts (supply)
- Alternative partners (supply)
- Potential shift from green energy (consumption)
US officials will need to consider the potential risk to American service members, billions in risky and possibly short-term unprofitable investments, and the challenging political situation in the DRC that has made the DRC a difficult partner for decades.
The DRC has several "critical" minerals used in smartphones & defense systems vital for national security.
Still, the U.S. should minimize the risks of a partnership, clearly define American mineral needs, and explore possible alternatives to make sure a deal is worth the cost.
Check out my op-ed for @thehill.com on the "security-for-minerals" discussions between the Democratic Republic of the Congo & the United States.
The potential risks & costs are high, and the extent of the benefits is unclear. Here's what US officials should consider: thehill.com/opinion/inte... 🧵
The Alliance of Sahel States (AES) juntas lashed out against China in their latest crackdown on allegedly exploitative international investment.
This move marks an expansion of the juntas' pro-sovereignty economic campaign beyond Western mining companies. www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/afr... 🧵
The Congolese army & allied militias recaptured the district capital Walikale town after M23 withdrew. The retreat reduces M23’s leverage entering Qatari-mediated negotiations with the DRC and could indicate the group is facing capacity and supply challenges.🧵 www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/afr...
It's worth keeping in mind the reports that Trump wants to scrap AFRICOM altogether: africa.businessinsider.com/local/leader...
You can read Gen. Langley's last two posture reviews here.
2025: armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/to-...
2024: www.africom.mil/about-the-co...
Russia was mentioned (or alluded to) 14 times in Gen. Langley's 2024 posture statement. Zero in 2025.
Langley mentioned China nine times in 2024, mostly discussing the Horn. The 2025 statement mentions China more than 20 times and covers Chinese activity across the continent.
The minerals talk comes with Trump's special advisor and other admin officials in the DRC to discuss a possible minerals-for-security partnership with the DRC: www.theafricareport.com/380621/boulo...
Some notable takeaways from Gen. Langley's posture statement to the US Senate today that shed light on the Trump admin's priorities in Africa:
- Russia is not mentioned. China got a whole section.
- A paragraph is devoted to AFRICOM's efforts to support US investment in critical minerals. 🧵
NEW | The Kremlin is strengthening its strategic relationship with the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)—Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.
The AES helps the Kremlin supplant Western influence, pose as a great power, and possibly threaten NATO's southern flank. www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/afr... 🧵
NEW | The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) fully retook central Khartoum from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), marking a major military and political victory for the SAF.
What it means for Sudan's civil war: www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/afr...
I would expect the current offensive to culminate in the next few weeks with the end of Ramadan and the onset of the Gu rainy season.
It will be important to see what areas the group holds/continues operating in before forecasting future operations in the dry season (~June).
They've tried to overturn the 2022 CT gains in central Somalia for years, and this offensive finally stuck.
A full return to pre-2022 would cut the roadway linking Mogadishu to central Somalia and create a staging ground for an assault on Mog.
In central Somalia, however, Shabaab successfully established themselves on the east bank of the Shabelle River, re-entered areas of central Somalia they haven't been since 2022, and temporarily overran some pretty big population centers.
There also hasn't been a significant change in foreign personnel movements around Mog that would signal the international community expects an imminent collapse.
The activity around Mog is notable for its brazenness, but it's not like Shabaab is operating in areas where it hasn't already been present.
It would almost be more surprising if al Shabaab wasn't doing attention-grabby operations during Ramadan.
Lots of talk about the deteriorating situation in Somalia lately.
I think the immediate threat to Mogadishu may be overstated, but the backsliding in central Somalia is setting conditions for AS to encircle Mog & generate an existential threat in the medium term.
More below⬇️
NEW | The Democratic Republic of the Congo & Rwanda agreed to a Qatari-mediated ceasefire, but fundamental disagreements and obstacles remain.
Rwandan-backed M23 advanced westward & captured a key district capital on March 19 despite ceasefire efforts. www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/afr... 🧵
Renewed conflict in Tigray or between Ethiopia and Eritrea would generate an economic, humanitarian, and security crisis that would have reverberations across Africa and even into Europe.🧵
Read the full update here: www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/afr...
NEW | Rwandan-backed M23 rebels continued their advance along the RN2 road southwest of Bukavu in central South Kivu and entered Mwenga district.
M23 has advanced over 30 miles along the RN2 since March 1.
Today's Congo War Security Review and maps: criticalthreats.org/briefs/congo... 🧵⬇️