Great conversation with @sranderson.bsky.social and Missy Ryan on @npr.org's 1A today about President Trump's threats to target electricity-generating stations and other civilian infrastructure--and why carrying out those threats would be a war crime.
the1a.org/segments/if-...
On Lawfare Daily, 2 intelligence community veterans, @chipusher.bsky.social and Aaron Faust, joined @sranderson.bsky.social to discuss the national security threats that Iran presents and where the Trump administration—and Iran—may take the conflict from here. youtu.be/nJy9dZhxBpU
I haven’t but have heard good things! Will put it on my list…
I never have!
The first two episodes of "Who Blew Up the Guidestones?" — our six-part audio investigation into the strange Georgia monument — are out TODAY.
It's a wild ride, with a fair share twists and revelations along the way. So grab your tin foil hat and join me by subscribing below 👇🎧🪦🍑
Otherwise, standbys 600T, Sidedoor, and All Souls Bar always good!
Alegria at Bryant Street market (a food hall) is an excellent but unconventional choice.
Service Bar on U Street is very good, especially for Tiki.
The Golden Age also very good for pre-prohibition classics.
Daru and Tapori on U Street are great Indian riffs on drinks (and food).
John, sorry for the slow reply (and apologies if I missed your window)!
My favorite place is Morris Bar, but it’s closed for renovations.
…
The Washington Post—for which I wrote editorials for nearly a decade—has closed its Kyiv bureau.
@lawfaremedia.org has not—and we will not.
We now employ more people in Kyiv than the Washington Post.
Let me tell you about what we have done in Ukraine over the past year and why we are not leaving
Now up on @lawfaremedia.org: my extraordinarily deep dive with @alexzerden.bsky.social into how the Trump administration is handling Venezuela's oil revenue.
Long story short, the scheme they've set-up—and the short-term fix they pursued through Qatar—both make more sense than they might seem.
After removing dictator Nicolas Maduro from power, President Trump issued an executive order setting up a mechanism for managing Venezuelan oil revenue. @sranderson.bsky.social and @alexzerden.bsky.social explore why the administration is channeling the revenue from the first oil deal through Qatar.
A classic! Braulio also makes for a great shakerato, with a pinch of salt and/or a lemon twist.
And if you do it gently, you can fold the shakerato into the Palpable Apathy, which makes it a bit sweeter and lighter.
Article explaining this forthcoming shortly! Less sketchy than it seems at first blush.
It would be abdicating one of the few tools senators have left to force the Senate to weigh in on major matters of war and peace over the objections of leadership.
It’s a mistake for Hawley to be open to it. Hopefully Young, Collins, Paul, and Murkowski know better.
Rs in Senate can just vote not to move forward on this resolution if they oppose it.
This proposal is trying to remove the mechanism that allows senators opposed to military action to bring it in the first place, both in regard to Venezuela and other contexts.
This could also make it impossible for the Senate to resurrect this resolution later if the Trump administration’s assurances prove false, until after the admin initiates a “second wave” of military action.
Re: Venezuela resolution, this could set a precedent that would generally limit the availability of WPR expedited procedures outside ongoing hostilities.
Resolutions like those Congress passed in 2019-2020 re: Yemen and Iran could no longer be eligible.
www.politico.com/live-updates...
Hah! I've been considering inviting the other Scott Anderson on a podcast to have a Scott Anderson off. Maybe it's time...
You know it, buddy. Wrote this back in 2019 about the Yemen resolutions, but it all still applies.
tnsr.org/roundtable/p...
Then this live panel discussion just now with @suzannemaloney.bsky.social, Vanda Felbab-Brown, @marcelaescobari.bsky.social, and @tomjwright.bsky.social, moderated by the always insightful @verambergen.bsky.social of @wsj.com.
www.brookings.edu/events/what-...
A busy day at @brookings.edu talking Venezuela.
First, this phenomenal podcast conversation with @proftalmadge.bsky.social for The Current (recorded yesterday but just published):
www.brookings.edu/articles/wha...
Role of a lifetime.
As for why the self-defense arguments are themselves problematic, see these earlier pieces:
www.lawfaremedia.org/article/did-...
www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-...
I also had a longer piece on this ready to go for @lawfaremedia.org post-holidays, which will now need to be a bit…retooled.
Here’s a brief excerpt on the Panama precedent I recently wrote on the topic as part of a broader symposium on recognition for @ajil.bsky.social.
Note the quote from the then-legal adviser on why consent wouldn’t have been sufficient absent effective control.
www.cambridge.org/core/journal...
This is why I suspect the Trump admin will keep relying on its (very problematic) drug-related self-defense arguments from its maritime strikes, even as it also claims to have consent from the opposition.
But if they emphasize the latter, that would be a departure from past U.S. practice.
In the Panama context, this is why the U.S. didn’t actually rely on consent from the recognized government-in-exile as international legal justification for deposing Noriega (though it cited it as a source of political legitimacy).
Other cases I’m aware of took a similar approach.
But as the National Assembly isn’t in effective control of Venezuela at all, it’s not the regime that would have that status under international law (i.e., the de facto government). And relying on it for consent to take actions that would otherwise violate international law raises big questions.
It’s true that the U.S. (like many other countries) has more or less recognized the 2015 National Assembly as Venezuela’s de jure government since 2019.
This lets it exercise various state functions contingent on the U.S. domestic legal system, like control of Venezuelan state assets.
