I hope they stay safe, Somayeh.
Posts by Jon Williamson
We show that while standard first-order inductive logic is not decidable, a large class of inferences in objective Bayesian inductive logic is decidable. Decidability is achieved by reducing the general inference problem to a quantifier-free problem. We show that for any inference, if the quantifier-free reduction of the premisses is satisfiable, then the original inference is decidable. We go on to show that Bayesian networks offer the potential to provide a computationally tractable inference procedure for objective Bayesian inductive logic. We also consider inferences with infinitely many premisses and explore some properties of the logic.
A new paper with Jurgen Landes and Soroush Rafiee Rad: A decidable class of inferences in first-order objective Bayesian inductive logic. Available free until March from this link: authors.elsevier.com/c/1mYJscCqwz...
Rani Lill Anjum - Combining evidence for establishing causality. Online talk, 23 February 2026, 3-4.30pm UK time. All welcome! jonwilliamson.uk/mosep
Upcoming online talks on Evidential Pluralism: Lindley Darden, Rani Lill Anjum, Caterina Marchionni, Isabel Hanson, Nancy Cartwright, Jacob Stegenga. All welcome. jonwilliamson.uk/mosep
Proud to launch an international multidisciplinary project to look deeper into causality and evidence assessments regarding uses of psychedelics in medicine www.ipeawg.org
🧪 🧠📈 #philsci
I am happy to be part of the organization of the next Causality in the Sciences conference in Sevilla, focusing on cases from medicine. Mark your calendars for October 8-9th 2026. Deadline for abstract submission: March 8th. More details here: eventos.us.es/142286/secti...
This new paper puts forward a counterexample to orthodox Bayesianism - the "red faces" example: academic.oup.com/analysis/adv...
13 November 2025: workshop on Qualitative Evidence in Systematic Review, University of Manchester. All welcome.
jonwilliamson.uk/conferences/...
Online talk, 21 October. Miriam Solomon (Temple University). How to be an Evidential Pluralist. All welcome! jonwilliamson.uk/mosep
1/3 Full house in Aula Baratto at Ca' Foscari University for Day 2 of #ENPOSS2025. Morning sessions include a symposium chaired by @mjbuedo.bsky.social on 'Pros and Cons of Evidential Pluralism in the Social Sciences'
Online talk, 29 September. Jonathan Fuller (Pittsburgh). An argument framework for evidence synthesis and evidence-to-decision analysis. All welcome! jonwilliamson.uk/mosep
Many thanks to Jie Gao, Rosa Runhardt, Erik Weber and Michael Wilde for a very nice symposium on the book Evidential Pluralism in the Social Sciences. Both the book and most of the papers are available open access. link.springer.com/collections/... #philsky #philsci
21 July, 3-4.30pm. Rosa Runhardt (Radboud) & Jon Williamson (Manchester). Evidential Pluralism and educational ethnography. All welcome! jonwilliamson.uk/mosep
Online talk, 30 June. 3-4.30pm. Federica Russo (Utrecht). How is Who. Evidence as Clues for Action in Participatory Research Interventions. All welcome. jonwilliamson.uk/mosep
On 16 June, an online talk by Phyllis Illari (UCL). Epistemic games and causal problems: a framework for teaching the evaluation of scientific information. All welcome! jonwilliamson.uk/mosep
A nice introductory podcast on EBM+ by the UK Centre of Excellence on in-silico Regulatory Science and Innovation @afrangi.bsky.social : www.podbean.com/media/share/...
PhD Timeline xkcd.com/3081
That's a great question. Evidential Pluralism tries to show constructively that diverse evidence can be integrated in a coherent way in causal evaluation. A good example of how this works well in practice is the carcinogenicity evaluation procedure of IARC: monographs.iarc.who.int/iarc-monogra...
Yes short arguments are often more secure. Nothing substantial written up I'm afraid, but I have some brief remarks at the end of this editorial riviste.unimi.it/index.php/th...
Plus, technical causal inferences often rest on unjustified modelling assumptions and tenuous presuppositions of the formal framework. Applied causal inferences can be more secure precisely because of their lack of technical sophistication.
14 April, 3-4.30pm UK time. Online talk. Alexandra Trofimov (Manchester). *How Evidential Pluralism mitigates epistemic injustice in evidence-based evaluation*. All welcome! jonwilliamson.uk/mosep
AI is that drunk bloke who's always in the pub, jumping into other people's conversations and talking absolute bollocks.
Perhaps it's possible to formalise evidence evaluation *and* combine different types of evidence. Here's a shameless plug for a recent paper that attempts this to some extent: www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....
Not humanities enough. Perhaps the aim of a medical humanities paper is to provide an interesting perspective or interpretation, while philosophy of medicine theorises about medicine in a more analytical or general way.
I was told by someone working in medical humanities that philosophy of medicine doesn't qualify for medical humanities funding. I was a bit put out by this, but it does seem that most philosophy of medicine papers are different in kind from medical humanities papers.