"Multipolarity" has become a central but highly ambiguous point of reference in debates about the future world order. A new SWP Research Paper analyses the ideas and objectives associated with the concept of multipolarity in select countries. www.swp-berlin.org/en/publicati...
Lots of Russian regions are raising their sign-on bonus right now, indicating recruitment problems. Just in the last weeks:
Volgograd 2.6m
YaNAO 3.6m
Astrakhan 2.6m
Rostov 3m
Khabarovsk 2.1m
Magadan 3.6m
Sakha/Yakutia 2.1m
KhMAO 3.55m
Kab-Balk 2.4m
Karach-Cherk 2.4m
Novosibirsk 2.9m
Sevastopol 1.5m
Meanwhile, payouts for killed soldiers are continuing at a rapid rate. I only have data for 17 regions (22% of Russia's population), so treat this information with caution. There is also greater uncertainty surrounding the timing of KIA, i.e. the time lag between KIA and payout.
The slowdown is not a result of "less demand" by the Ministry of Defense. Otherwise, Russia's regions would not continue increasing their bonuses. But the average regional bonus has reached a new record of ~1.5 million rubles.
Recruitment in Russia is slowing down. In Q1 of 2026, numbers were down by 20% compared to last year. This change is evident in both official statements and budget data. On average, it was 800 new contract soldiers per day this year.
1\ Very hopeful new evidence from the excellent @jakluge.de for 2026Q1.
"Despite further increases in sign-on bonuses...Russian recruitment was significantly slower than in the previous year. Both official information and estimates based on regional budget data confirm"
Unsere Hörempfehlung der Woche 🔊
@felixheiduk.bsky.social & @jakluge.de diskutieren das Konzept „Multipolarität“ in der neusten SWP-Podcast Folge⬇️
Russian recruitment is down 20% in recent months, will write a Substack on Q1 on the weekend.
Your podcast for the Easter weekend:
@jakluge.de & I discuss the implications of the #IranWar for #Russia, its economy, foreign policy, and war against #Ukraine.
We join hosts @maxbergmann.bsky.social and @msnegovaya.bsky.social on another episode of Russian Roulette:
www.csis.org/podcasts/rus...
Relative to GDP, revenues in Q1 are even more disastrous.
Russian oil+gas revenues in March were 617 billion rubles, the lowest since 2021. Russia's tax rate is based on the previous month, so these numbers don't reflect the Iran war yet. Unfortunately, the next month will.
Links
Youtube: www.youtube.com/watch?v=1wkA...
Spotify: open.spotify.com/episode/6wdN...
Web: www.csis.org/podcasts/rus...
The Iran war has huge implications for Russia, for its foreign policy, its economy and the war against Ukraine. Listen to @hannanotte.bsky.social and me discussing what it all means for the Kremlin, and what it may lead to, in Russian Roulette with @maxbergmann.bsky.social & @msnegovaya.bsky.social.
SWP gibt's jetzt auch bei Youtube:
www.youtube.com/watch?v=xin_...
Danke! Diese Titel immer 🙈
Wenn die Blockade bestehen bleibt, kann es in den nächsten Monaten auch zu höheren Preisen führen, wenn jetzt Reserven freigegeben werden (Preis-Signal wird vorübergehend verzerrt, nicht genug demand destruction - und die Reserven fallen).
Im Grunde nicht relevant, nein. Der Preisdeckel ist de facto aufgegeben.
Zur Lockerung der US-Sanktionen / Irankrieg:
- Russland profitiert wirtschaftlich (Hunderte Mio. € pro Tag)
- aber für Putin ist der Krieg auch eine Zwickmühle
- ukrainische Drohnen-Erfahrung sehr gefragt
Das ganze Interview (6 min) gibt es hier: www.tagesschau.de/video/video-...
»Multipolarität« ist zum zentralen, aber ambivalenten Begriff der Debatten über die künftige Weltordnung geworden. Eine neue SWP-Studie zeigt, welche Ordnungsvorstellungen und Ziele in ausgewählten Staaten mit dem Begriff Multipolarität verbunden werden. www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/...
Correction: 3.7%.
Germany's intelligence service BND says Russia's federal deficit was actually 3.6% of GDP in '25, not 2.6%. This was exactly my final estimate in December, based on past spending patterns (random but funny: I estimated 8.02 trillion). If true, the deficit was probably hidden in other public budgets.
Link to official data:
minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistic...
Link to nominal GDP: rosstat.gov.ru/folder/313/d...
Russia Finance Ministry data now officially confirms: Russia's consolidated budget deficit was 3.9% of GDP in 2025 (8291.5 billion RUB).
More on the background: janiskluge.substack.com/p/russias-co...
Dmitry Peskov says the main goal of Russia's war is to "ensure the safety of the people in Donbas who used to be in mortal danger..."
Plus: Recruits that don't have relatives. But I think that the total number of these groups - relative to "official" recruitment of 400k per year - are a smaller share. Maybe 10%?
Russia’s recruitment numbers look steady, but regional funding is reaching a breaking point. How much longer can Putin avoid another mobilization? We asked researcher @jakluge.de. meduza.io/en/feature/2...
Russia relies on high bonuses to recruit soldiers to fight in Ukraine, but with costs soaring, is there a looming risk of another mobilization?
“Recruitment is clearly the Achilles’ heel of Russia’s war,” says @jakluge.de. My latest Q&A for @meduza.io. meduza.io/en/feature/2...
I am tracking 15 Russian regions covering 20% of the total population, and they paid out compensation for 19,500 killed soldiers in 2025. This supports estimates of up to 100,000 Russian KIA last year. (Changes from month to month don't show battlefield dynamics, rather budget dynamics).
Yes, regions are spending a lot on these bonuses. Of course, if you die before you get them, your family is entitled. There are some court cases linked to payout issues, but I have not seen evidence of massive issues...
