Russian advances in Pokrovsk resulted not from a sudden breakthrough but rather from months of dedicated battlefield shaping.
Read more in the November 14, 2025, report by @katstepanenko.bsky.social: isw.pub/RussianBAIBST
This amendment, however, does not likely presage a large-scale involuntary reserve call up similar to the one that brought hundreds of thousands of Russians into the military in 2022.
Compulsory rolling mobilization of reservists may enable Russia to generate forces more cheaply as Russia’s main method for generating manpower through high financial incentives and price surging is reportedly losing momentum.
The amendment will likely allow the Kremlin to deploy active reservists into combat more rapidly than was possible under the previous mechanism that required a formal declaration of war or mobilization order.
The Kremlin remains unlikely to declare general mobilization of the inactive reserve (“zapas”) due to concerns over the impacts on regime stability, the Russian economy, and the administrative capacity of Russia’s military bureaucracy.
The Kremlin will likely use the amendment to centralize control over the Russian Combat Army Reserve (BARS) units, which have been largely functioning as irregular formations and often under the supervision of Russian businessmen and officials.
The Kremlin will likely use the amendment to involuntarily call up personnel in Russian irregular formations whom Moscow has been treating as an informal active reserve.
The Kremlin will likely misrepresent the mobilized reservists as members of the professional reserve who volunteered to fight in Ukraine to prevent Russian society from opposing increased deployments of mobilized reservists.
The new regulation approved on October 13 only concerns members of Russia’s active reserve, not Russia’s larger ”zapas.”
Russia also retains an inactive reserve (also known as the human mobilization resource or “zapas” in Russian), which includes Russian men with a military registration age as old as 65-70 (in certain circumstances) who are not actively affiliated with the Russian Armed Forces.
Russia has two types of reserves. Russia retains a higher-readiness “human mobilization reserve,” an active reserve, in which Russians sign a contract w/ MoD on a voluntary basis to serve in the reserve in exchange for compensation while remaining civilians except when called up.
The draft amendment also creates a new category of force assemblies called “special assemblies,” during which mobilized reservists would train for no more than two months before being deployed abroad.
The Russian Cabinet of Ministers’ Commission on Legislative Activity approved a MoD draft amendment to permit the military to use reservists from the “human mobilization reserve” in expeditionary deployments outside of Russia without an official Kremlin declaration of mobilization or a state of war.
The Kremlin will likely formally amend restrictions on mobilizing Russia’s active reserve to conduct rolling partial mobilization without declaring war on Ukraine or formally announcing that it is conducting a partial involuntary call up.
A🧵on our latest with @georgewbarros.bsky.social
NEW: Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov outlined 10 priority objectives for the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) during the Russian MoD Collegium on August 29. 🧵(1/5)
Read more:
@thestudyofwar.bsky.social also regularly covers Russia's efforts to condition Russian society and youth for military service and raise societal support for Russian war efforts in weekly Force Generation & Technological Adaptations reports. www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder...
Check out our recent primer on Russian cognitive warfare with @nataliyabugayova.bsky.social, in which we assess that cognitive warfare is Russia’s way of war, governance, and occupation. bsky.app/profile/thes...
Russian global and domestic cognitive warfare, therefore, are deeply connected and cannot be understood in isolation from one another -- as the Kremlin relies on domestic conditioning to continue its war efforts abroad.
The Kremlin is using military-patriotic propaganda and education to indoctrinate children into eventual military service; offering high financial rewards to attract Russian volunteers; & conditioning Russian society to accept greater sacrifices.
The Kremlin’s cognitive warfare inside Russia is not just about regime stability as the Kremlin uses cognitive warfare inside Russia to generate resources for its external military efforts.
Russia will reportedly conduct this neurological profile testing through August 2025 and then will hold the seminar in September 2025, during which the organizer will identify leaders and anti-leaders who are prone to destructive behavior.
Persona Head Vladimir Kozlov claimed that neurological profiling can help discover motivated Russian patriots.
Rospatriotstentr partnered with the private Russian company Persona that specializes in DeepTech and human potential management using neurological profiling and AI technologies & sells neurological tests that claim to increase team building via subconscious cognitive perceptions of visual symbols.
Russian government documents showed that Rospatriotstentr is attempting to create neurological profiles of 10,000 children and teenagers aged 12 to 18 from different regions in order to identify 50 with “pronounced positive profiles,” who will then attend a five-day seminar in occupied Sevastopol.
@rferl.org.web.brid.gy found that Rospatriotstentr of Russian Federal Youth Affairs Agency (Rosmolodezh) launched a neuro profiling project under the federal We Are Together program to advance "traditional, spiritual, and moral values" & to educate "a harmoniously developed personality" among youth.
The Kremlin launched an initiative to neurologically profile 10,000 Russian children to identify leaders and anti-leaders & improve patriotism among the Russian youth.
This initiative is likely part of the Kremlin's cognitive warfare effort aimed at garnering support for Russia's war efforts.🧵
NEW: Russian Drone Innovations are Likely Achieving Effects of Battlefield Air Interdiction in Ukraine
Read the Special Report by ISW Russia Analyst and Deputy Team Lead @katstepanenko.bsky.social: isw.pub/Russiandrone...
Key Takeaways ⬇🧵(1/6)
"All of these components — new military districts, changes in mobilization and defence spending — are suggesting that Russia is preparing for a protracted war, not just in Ukraine but also against NATO," ISW's @katstepanenko.bsky.social told @kyivindependent.com kyivindependent.com/russias-new-...
Russian and Ukrainian drones use cellphone internet networks to operate, so shutdowns are one way authorities try to counter the attacks, said @katstepanenko.bsky.social, a Russia analyst at the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War.
