Over the next two weeks, I'll present a two-part series on the operational realities of the war in Ukraine and the strategic challenges for the rest of 2025. I look forward to the discussion; see you there!
Hello, thank you for your question. The other fronts have not stabilized. It is a common theme in news reports, but that is untrue. The fronts remain fluid. The ZSU used its strategic reserve in Kursk, hindering its ability to stem the advance of Russian forces in Donetsk Oblast and in the south.
I will join Jim Dingeman on the Noisy Reality Podcast this Sunday, March 9, at 1 p.m. EST to discuss the War in Ukraine and its global implications. I look forward to the Q&A session. See you there.
I would like to thank @philipwblood.bsky.social and @warmatters.bsky.social for providing the opportunity to discuss the conflict in Ukraine on Fallout. I am excited to contribute to future talks about the war in Ukraine and other global conflict areas on Fallout.
The Daily Tactical Update for the Donetsk Front is posted to the link below. I appreciate your patience as I build a format that is more compatible with BlueSky for your news feeds. x.com/JominiW/stat...
8/ This open-source operational summary of the Kursk OD is based on information from the ZSU and VSRF daily briefs, various Telegram channels, Western intelligence agencies' statements, military analysts, and my professional experience. Any errors in the information are strictly my own.
7/ Ukraine clearly intends to hold its lodgment in Kursk; however, it is becoming apparent that the combat power needed to hold the lodgment is having a detrimental effect on other critical fronts.
6/ Although media outlets and military bloggers have characterized recent Ukrainian combat actions in the Sudzha lodgment as offensive, they do not meet the criteria for such a classification. Combat actions were limited in scope and scale and remained at the small-unit level.
5/ Southern Sudzha Lodgment: On January 5, Russian forces supported by DPRK infantry entered Makhnovka. Despite fierce Ukrainian resistance and heavy use of FPVs, Russian troops secured Makhnovka by January 8. Fighting remains fierce for control of the village.
x.com/JonHallin/st...
4/ Western Sudzha Lodgment: By January 06, the 76th Guards Air Assault Division had captured Leonidovo. Heavy ZSU mining of the area required Russian troops to assault in small detachments. ZSU forces advanced toward the critical choke point of Zelyonyi Shlyakh.
x.com/RALee85/stat...
3/ Northeast Sudzha Lodgement: On January 5, ZSU forces initiated a series of assaults along the 38K-04 Highway toward Bolshoe Soldatskoe. EWS and infantry supported armored columns led by tanks fitted with mine-rollers.
x.com/NOELreports/...
2/ Operational Terms. Here is a list of commonly used terms and their definitions to help you understand the thread's graphics.
1/ Daily Tactical Update (DTU), Ukrainian TVD Day 1054: Today's DTU focuses on actions in the Kursk Operational Direction from January 05-12, 2025. #Kursk #UkraineWar #RussiaUkraineWar #Sudzha
20/ This open-source operational summary is based on information from the ZSU and VSRF daily briefs, Ukrainian and Russian Telegram channels, Western intelligence agencies' statements, military analysts, and my professional experience. Errors in information and translation presented here are my own.
19/ Strategic Aerospace Operations (SVKO) in the TVD: VKS activity continues to focus on country-wide cruise missile/air strike attacks to severely damage the Ukrainian Power Grid, support civilian infrastructure, target key military points of communication, and degrade PSU air defenses.
18/ Black Sea Theater of Military Action (OTMO): No naval activity has changed. The Black Seas Fleet remains largely focused on force protection of vessels, facilities, and personnel rather than offensive operations or active patrolling of sea lanes in the Black Sea and its littoral.
17/ Kherson Operational Direction: The SVRF and ZSU maintain a general defense along the Dnipro River. The SVRF offensive action aims to seize control of the Dnipro Delta, which is crucial to preventing the use of the Kherson port to bring vital economic, humanitarian, and military aid into Ukraine.
16/ Orikhiv Operational Direction: Activity in Orikhiv has been static throughout 2024, with positional engagements and artillery barrages characterizing the bulk of Russian and Ukrainian actions. Since September 2024, the 58GCAA has increased offensive action south and west of Orikhiv.
15/ Velyka Novosilka Operational Direction: OSUV Tavriva's situation continues to deteriorate. OTU Krasnohorivka failed to halt recent Russian advances. The 29GCAA has secured the south bank of the Sukhi Yaly River from Uspenivka to Zelenivka, threatening ZSU's withdrawal from Kurakhove.
14/ Southern Strategic Direction: VSRF activity throughout this SD is defensive and primarily focused on continuing to strengthen the Surovikin Line. Ukrainian Intelligence (HUR) and Open-Source reporting indicate that the SOGRV-Ukraine is preparing to conduct an offensive in this SD.
13/ Pokrovsk-Kurakhove Operational Direction: OTU Donetsk struggles to manage delaying operations effectively. The 90th Guards Tank Division continues progressing toward the T05-15 HWY. OTU Donetsk is trading space for time to slow down Russian momentum without becoming decisively engaged.
12/ Toretsk/Nui-York Operational Direction: Although the SVRF has intensely assaulted Toretsk, the ZSU has prevented deep penetration of its defensive lines. Even though the 41GCAA has resumed major operations, it is unlikely to seize all of Toretsk during the 2024-25 winter season.
11/ Operational Direction Chasiv Yar: The Chasiv Yar Operational Direction has yielded little gain for the SVRF. OTU Luhansk(?) has managed to operationally block OSV Yug from advancing towards Kostyantynivka. The Siverskyi-Donets Canal has been an effective barrier inhibiting Russian maneuver.
10/ Operational Direction Siversk: Siversk is a central position within the OSUV Khortytsia Area of Responsibility and a coordination point between OTU Lyman and OTU Luhansk for defending the Slovyansk / Kramatorsk urban conglomerate, the decisive strategic point of the Donbas SD.
9/ Operational Direction Donetsk: OUGRV-Ukraine's main effort is to conquer southern Donetsk Oblast, setting conditions for an advance into western and central Donetsk Oblast. OSUV Tavriya will likely complete its delayed withdrawal from the Kurakhove area to establish a new western defensive line.
8/ Operational Direction Kreminna: Operations in Kreminna have stagnated, with only marginal gains made by the 20GCAA in recent months. The 67MRD will likely not complete the capture of Torske before 2024 ends. The division’s focus has shifted to assaulting through the Serebryanski Forest.
7/ Operational Direction Kupyansk: The pace of operations in this OD remains fluid while concurrently remaining Russia’s most vulnerable region in the Donbas SD. 1GTA will continue to reinforce its drive to the Oskil River. OTU Kupyansk will seek opportunities to counterattack 2GMRD in Dvorichna.
6/ Donbas Strategic Direction: The Donbas is the decisive SD of the TVD. The SVRF will maintain its Main Effort toward Pokrovsk, focusing on penetrating the Ukrainian defensive lines between Selydove and Velyka Novosilka. OSVs Tsentr and Vostok will continue coordinated actions in southern Donetsk.
5/ Operational Direction Kharkiv: Kharkiv remains a low-priority Operational Direction. Russian attacks remain small in scale. ZSU activity is limited chiefly to localized defense supported by indirect fire attacks, FPV strikes, and positional assaults when opportunities arise.
4/ Operational Direction Kursk: Ukraine's situation in Kursk is becoming increasingly serious. The 106th Guards Airborne Division, likely augmented by DPRK troops, continued to attack Malaya Loknya. However, the ZSU is unlikely to withdraw from the region but maintain its presence.