A risk assessment built entirely on interviews is just a collection of assumptions.
The Armada team breaks down why traditional assessments fail, and how a "technical overlay" exposes the ground truth: youtube.com/shorts/JKG4r...
If your organization relies on SaaS, your users' browsers are the front lines of your identity perimeter. You cannot secure a modern network without locking down the extension ecosystem.
#ZeroTrust #CyberSecurity #BrowserSecurity #InfoSec #RedTeam #Armada #Google #GoogleChrome
Attackers do not need to diversify their exploit toolsets. They can focus entirely on weaponizing Chrome extensions, knowing a single malicious payload can achieve stealth session hijacking at scale.
Google Chrome is no longer just a browser. With 3.4 billion users and 65% of the global market share, it is the world's largest enterprise attack surface.
For threat actors, this dominance creates the ultimate target of opportunity.
If 65% of your targets wear the exact same armor, you only need to engineer one weapon to pierce it.
The Armada team breaks down the operational risk of the Google Chrome monoculture: youtube.com/shorts/Yinx_...
This is the reality of operational security. You rarely eliminate the threat.
But by raising the bar, Chrome forced a stealth adversary to make operational noise. Process injection triggers EDR. By hardening the perimeter, defenders forced the enemy into the light.
This defensive shift broke the infostealer ecosystem overnight. But threat actors adapted.
To bypass the DPAPI validation, malware must now rely on highly overt techniques like Process Injection, injecting malicious code directly into the active Chrome process.
Historically, malware quietly scraped saved Chrome passwords and decrypted them offline.
Google neutralized this by tying decryption to the Windows DPAPI and the user's NTLM identity, enforcing a strict check that the decrypting process is Chrome itself.
When you harden a target, the adversary does not retreat. They escalate.
The Armada team breaks down how Google Chrome forced infostealers to fundamentally change their tactics overnight: youtube.com/shorts/_JArf...
Agreed. Continuous testing, in our opinion, is the next step once you've achieved a certain outcome from repeated penetration tests.
Defending a modern enterprise requires continuous operational security. You have to identify exposures, test your resilience, and adapt 24/7. Continuous ASM is the required evolution for securing a shifting perimeter.
Your attack surface is not static. Engineers spin up new cloud infrastructure daily, M&A introduces unknown networks, and highly innovative threat actors constantly change their exploit paths.
An annual penetration test is a static defense against a dynamic threat.
Physical base security requires 24/7 monitoring. You have to evaluate changes in the landscape and adapt to adversary tactics in real-time. Checking the fence line once a month guarantees a breach.
Your digital perimeter operates under the exact same rules.
You would never secure a military base by checking the perimeter once a year. Why are you doing it to your corporate network?
The Armada team breaks down the military case for continuous Attack Surface Management (ASM): youtube.com/shorts/Yinx_...
Don't forget to check us out over on Youtube: www.youtube.com/@armadaops
#BlueHammer #ZeroDay #ThreatIntelligence #CyberSecurity #RedTeam #VulnerabilityManagement #InfoSec #MSRC #Armada
Attackers are already recompiling the public C code to evade basic EDR signatures. Because BlueHammer weaponizes Windows Defender against itself, defenders must rely on strict behavioral anomaly hunting until Microsoft issues an emergency patch.
The community is blaming the researcher, but the actual vulnerability is vendor bureaucracy. Treating security researchers like unpaid QA leads directly to public 0-day drops. Full disclosure forces action.
The exploit targets a TOCTOU symlink race condition in Windows Defender's signature update mechanism. Because Defender runs with the highest privileges, the exploit reliably grants an attacker SYSTEM-level access from a standard user account.
The "BlueHammer" Windows zero-day just proved that "responsible disclosure" is failing.
A frustrated researcher leaked the unpatched Local Privilege Escalation (LPE) exploit on GitHub after MSRC allegedly mishandled the bug report.
The technical guide covers the exact methodology for:
• Converting file structures and targeted Makefiles.
• Linking external Windows libraries (like wininet).
• Porting MASM assembly to GAS.
• Optimizing compiler flags for payload size and symbol stripping.
Booting up a Windows VM just to compile a Visual Studio payload disrupts your workflow.
If you operate from Linux, you need to know how to cross-compile Windows PoCs directly from your host. Read the Armada team's guide to using MinGW-w64 here: risk3sixty.com/blog/transfe...
They also achieve total DOM takeover, manipulating the SaaS application in real-time.
If your organization relies on a SaaS-first identity perimeter, a compromised browser extension completely neutralizes your Zero Trust controls.
Watch the full video here: youtube.com/live/nlDT1Bb...
Because extensions operate natively at the browser level, they act as an authorized insider threat.
They bypass these flags to silently scrape local storage and all cookies, resulting in a frictionless MFA bypass.
Security teams rely on HttpOnly attributes to protect session tokens from client-side JavaScript.
This mitigates traditional XSS, but it provides zero defense against a weaponized extension operating inside your identity perimeter.
Your Zero Trust architecture has a fatal flaw: Weaponized browser extensions.
XSS is limited by the HttpOnly flag. Silent browser compromise is not. The Armada team breaks down the ultimate vector for stealth session hijacking: youtube.com/shorts/drglc...
Because the user manually initiates the execution through the native Windows Run dialog, this tactic frequently bypasses standard EDR behavioral alerts.
#InfoSec #CyberSecurity #RedTeam #Malware #Infostealer #Technology #Microsoft #ClickFix #Armada #ArmadaOps #Hacking #ThreatIntel
Step 3: The Execution.
When the user pastes the string, they are pasting the payload. Attackers append a PowerShell comment (#) to the end of the script, making the visible text look like a random CAPTCHA code.
Step 2: The Social Engineering.
A fake CAPTCHA appears. It instructs the user to press "Windows Key + R" to open the local Run dialog, and then press "Ctrl + V" to paste their verification code.
