#CivProMatters

Appellant’s theory rests on generalized allegations that Appellees operate Amazon storefronts accessible in Pennsylvania and counsel-orchestrated test purchases allegedly shipped into the forum state. But the mere operation of an online storefront, without evidence of deliberate, forum-directed conduct, does not constitute purposeful availment under settled Third Circuit law. Nor may a plaintiff manufacture jurisdiction through unilateral, litigation-driven contacts. The District Court properly concluded that Appellant’s evidence—consisting primarily of redacted screenshots and declarations concerning purchases arranged by Appellant’s own counsel—did not demonstrate the minimum contacts required by due process

This is another case involving the question of personal jurisdiction over online sellers. #CivProMatters

MINUTE entry before the Honorable John Robert Blakey: Plaintiff asks this Court to reconsider its 12/2/25 order [23] dismissing the complaint, see [24]. Plaintiff suggests that the Court's ruling remains inconsistent with NBA Props., Inc. v. HANWJH, 46 F.4th 614 (7th Cir. 2022); not so. That case emphasizes that, for the exercise of personal jurisdiction to comport with "established constitutional limitations," the defendant's actions must be "purposefully directed" a standard satisfied, for example, when a defendant "creates an interactive website and explicitly provides that Illinois residents could purchase its products through that website," "arranged for the sale of its products through third−party websites," "sent written confirmation to the Illinois customers acknowledging their sale and including their Illinois shipping address," and then, "shipped the product to its customers who were in Illinois." NBA Props., 46 F.4th at 624 (citing Curry v. Revolution Laboratories, LLC, 949 F.3d 385, 399 (7th Cir. 2020)). In distinguishing Matlin v. Spin Master Corp., 921 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2019), where the exercise of personal jurisdiction did not pass constitutional muster, the court in NBA Props. also emphasized, however, the importance of determining whether the "plaintiff−initiated contact" was done "solely to lure the defendants into Illinois to establish personal jurisdiction over them.quot; 46 F.4th at 625. That is precisely what has transpired here. Plaintiff represents that Defendant's "broader e−commerce activities" establish the requisite minimum contacts; yet the only alleged connection to Illinois is the maintenance of a website accessible here and the one sale to Plaintiff. Because these facts fail to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendant, the Court denies Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration [24] and strikes the 1/7/26 Notice of Motion date. If Plaintiff can amend its complaint to allege facts supporting the exercise of personal ju…

Does the NBA Properties case mean that a single test buy is always sufficient to manufacture personal jurisdiction over an online seller in Illinois? Judge Blakey has been saying "no." E.g., XYZ Corp. v. Schedule A, No. 1:25-cv-13387 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2026), ECF 28. #CivProMatters

Personal jurisdiction in the 7th Circuit:

In Liu v. Monthly, No. 25-02074, which will be argued today, the appellant argues that they were not subject to personal jurisdiction in the NDIL because they "did not sell or ship a single accused product to Illinois."

#CivProMatters

This case is about personal jurisdiction in #ScheduleA cases. SAFE is trying to get the Seventh Circuit to expand its NBA rule and say that a mere offer to sell or ship to the forum is enough. #CivProMatters

#CivProMatters, First Amendment Edition:

NDIL case assignment rules in the news. #CivProMatters

#CivProMatters, White House destruction edition:

screenshot of the motion's table of contents, showing that the two main arguments are personal jurisdiction and venue

Columbia University files a motion to dismiss the Columbia Sportswear case. While the news coverage I've seen so far focuses on the brief's nod to the merits (prior use by the university), the motion actually focuses on personal jurisdiction and venue: www.scribd.com/document/937... #CivProMatters

#CivProMatters

Life After Form 18: A One-Year Retrospective on Pleading Direct Infringement Authored by Jonathan J. Fagan and Jason E. Stach Form 18 provided a simple way to plead direct patent infringement. It required a party to provide little more than the asserted patent number and a gen...

Anyway, for more on Form 18 and the effect of Twiqbal, this is a pretty good explainer. #CivProMatters

The Seventh Circuit is getting a chance to consider the duck decoy hypo. #CivProMatters

#CivProMatters

The previous case between these parties, Dadbod Apparel LLC v. Hildawn Design LLC et al, Docket No. 2:24-cv-00188 (E.D. Cal.) was dismissed in February for lack of personal jurisdiction. #CivProMatters

In addition to filing a nonmeritorious infringement claim, "PSP's complaint cited the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, rather than the patent-specific venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400." PS Prods. Inc. v. Panther Trading Co. Inc., 122 F.4th 893, 899 (Fed. Cir. 2024)." #CivProMatters

It may be interesting, though, to see if the Tenth Circuit follows the Seventh Circuit approach to Schedule A personal jurisdiction. See NBA Props., Inc. v. HANWJH, 46 F.4th 614 (7th Cir. 2022). #CivProMatters

i dunno—sounds like a whole lotta civil procedure to me #CivProMatters

The Court agrees with Defendant that the Complaint is subject to dismissal. First, the Complaint fails to allege with any plausibility or specificity which of Defendant’s products are infringing Plaintiff’s copyright and how Defendant’s products are infringing. This total lack of factual allegations leaves Defendant and the Court guessing what exactly Plaintiff alleges against Defendant3 and runs afoul of the Twombly/Iqbal standard. On top of this lack of specificity, Plaintiff’s Complaint is replete with conclusory allegations that merely restate the elements of the cause of action.

Good news: SDFL judge dismisses defendant over Twiqbal problems with a #ScheduleA complaint: www.scribd.com/document/873...

Bad news: What about the other defendants?

#CivProMatters

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Plaintiff asserts a variety of intellectual property infringement claims against a host of Schedule A Defendants that Plaintiff claims infringe on its trademarks, utility patents, design patents, and copyright for its Outward Hound Brand. The trademarks, patent registrations, and copyright referenced by Plaintiff in its Complaint number nearly twenty different registrations in Case No.: 1:25-cv-21710 Case 1:25-cv-21710-RKA Document 26 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/21/2025 Page 1 of 11 all; as a threshold matter, Plaintiff cannot plausibly join 142 Schedule A Defendants in an action that depends on such varying allegations of infringement and wrongdoing. The Complaint does not inform any defendants of which allegations of infringement pertain to them and how they are alleged to have committed this alleged infringement; thus, the Complaint does not provide any of the Schedule A Defendants with notice as to the specific claims against them

Motion to dissolve a #ScheduleA preliminary injunction:
"The Complaint does not inform any defendants of which allegations of infringement pertain to them and how they are alleged to have committed this alleged infringement."

www.scribd.com/document/867... #Twiqbal #CivProMatters

#CivProMatters, design edition:

docket snapshot, including: " MINUTE entry before the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall: In its memorandum of law 12 on joinder of defendants, plaintiff states that "to the extent the Court wishes to apply its Bailie opinion (as the Court has indicated), Plaintiff respectfully requests an order denying Plaintiff's request for joinder, and Plaintiff will proceed with an amended complaint naming one defendant." Mem. 1. Having reached a reasoned decision after receiving adversary briefing, this court will follow Bailie v. Schedule A Defendants, 734 F. Supp. 3d 798 (N.D. Ill. 2024), unless and until it is given a legally sufficient reason to do otherwise, such as newly decided binding or persuasive authority. Plaintiff cites no newly decided binding or persuasive authority in its memorandum and urges the court to adopt the "swarm" theory of permissive joinder rejected in Bailie. See ECF No. 12 at 35. Because the court has not been given sufficient reason to revisit Bailie, plaintiff's request to join 50 defendants is denied, and plaintiff is ordered to file an amended complaint on or before April 14, 2025, dropping all improperly joined defendants under Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2) and Bailie. Mailed notice (mjc, ) (Entered: 04/08/2025)"

Well, this is interesting: www.courtlistener.com/docket/69827... #ScheduleA #CivProMatters

#CivProMatters

Judge Ellis dismisses a #ScheduleA case for misjoinder: Shenzhen Jisu Tech. Co. v. Individuals, Corps., Ltd. Liab. Companies, Partnerships, & Unidentified Assocs. Identified on Schedule A, No. 24 C 4134, 2025 WL 972866 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 2025). #CivProMatters

As to Defendant Shinny Mermaid, the Court grants its motion to dismiss. (Dkt. 43.) Shinny Mermaid persuasively argues that, at least based on the pleadings, it was improperly joined, and the complaint fails to state a viable claim. (Dkt. 44 at 6, 10.) Both issues are intertwined, and the Court takes them in reverse order. The complaint asserts infringement of more than 90 trademarks by 123 Defendants. (See Dkt. 1, 2.) Although some of these Defendants no longer remain in the case, the pleading issue is glaring: the Complaint does not put Shinny Mermaid on notice about which mark it is alleged to have infringed. It is axiomatic that a complaint must present a “short, plain, and plausible factual narrative that conveys a story that holds together.” Kaminski v. Elite Staffing, Inc., 23 F.4th 774, 777 (7th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). Plaintiff does not meet this low standard because there is no story or narrative as to Shinny Mermaid. For this reason alone, dismissal without prejudice for failure to state a claim is warranted.

Judge Kness grants a defendant's motion to dismiss in a #ScheduleA case on, inter alia, Twiqbal grounds: "[T]he pleading issue is glaring: the Complaint does not put Shinny Mermaid on notice about which mark it is alleged to have infringed." www.scribd.com/document/845...

#CivProMatters

The Little Catholic case has been transferred (because of improper venue) to SDFL. #CivProMatters

Plaintiff’s reliance on Bose overlooks a split in authority within the same District. See, e.g., Estée Lauder Cosms. Ltd. v. P’ships & Unincorporated Ass’ns Identified on Schedule A (“Estée Lauder”), 334 F.R.D. 182, 187 (N.D. Ill. 2020). In cases like Estée Lauder, courts in the Northern District of Illinois have held “that it is not enough for a plaintiff to simply allege that multiple defendants have infringed the same patent or trademark to meet Rule 20’s requirements.” Id. (collecting cases). In Bose, the court recognized that reasoning like that used in Estée Lauder has been adopted by “[m]any courts around the country[.]” 334 F.R.D. at 515 (alterations added).

Another SDFL judge rejects the Bose "swarm joinder" theory in a #ScheduleA case: "Plaintiff’s reliance on Bose overlooks a split in authority within the same District."
www.scribd.com/document/823... #CivProMatters

Screenshot of docket entry 10 in DiFOLD Inc. v. The Individuals, Corporations, Limited Liability Companies, Partnerships, and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule A, Docket No. 0:24-cv-61997 (S.D. Fla. Oct 24, 2024),

In good news: This SDFL judge rejects "swarm joinder" in a #ScheduleA case.

In bad news: No one involved (so far) seems to realize that because this is a patent case, 35 U.S.C. § 299--not FRCP 20--governs joinder here.

www.scribd.com/document/823...

#CivProMatters

Plaintiff also filed a memorandum in support of joinder, [20]. But the evidence submitted by Plaintiff belies the allegations concerning the "unique identifiers," and instead shows a variety of text, images, products, and displays, thus undermining Plaintiff's joinder arguments. As a result, Plaintiff may not proceed on the current complaint [1], and the Court dismisses it without prejudice. The Court also denies without prejudice Plaintiff's motions for a temporary restraining order [12] and electronic service of process [17]. Based upon Plaintiff's submissions, the Court grants Plaintiff's motion for leave to seal [3]; the 2/5/25 Notice of Motion date is stricken as to all motions. To the extent Plaintiff can, consistent with its obligations under Rule 11, Case: 1:25-cv-00890 Document #: 23 Filed: 01/29/25 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:614 amend its complaint to cure the deficiencies noted in this order, it may file an amended complaint, under seal if appropriate, by 2/12/25. If Plaintiff fails to comply, the Court will dismiss this case.

Blakey dismisses another GBC #ScheduleA complaint for misjoinder: www.scribd.com/document/822... #CivProMatters

screenshot of the district court order denying the motion to vacate: "Wilkxuewa argues that a cancelled order cannot be used to establish personal jurisdiction because it does not constitute a "sale" or "transaction," and no injury occurred in Illinois. Pit Viper disagrees"

New 7th Circuit appeal in a #ScheduleA case:
www.scribd.com/document/821....

On first skim, it looks like the main issue is personal jurisdiction--in particular, whether a cancelled sale is sufficient to confer jurisdiction under NBA Properties.

#CivProMatters

#CivProMatters

The Fashion Law picks the American Girl case as one of the most important "fashion, retail, and tech lawsuits" of the year:

"The Second Circuit’s ruling represents an important expansion of New York’s jurisdictional reach in a new era of e-commerce."

#CivProMatters