What impact is the federal #immigration crackdown having on our state and our country, beyond what's happening in our immigrant communities? @nwirp.bsky.social, #OIRA Seattle and @acluwa.bsky.social discuss this & more on @seattlechannel.bsky.social. WATCH: www.seattlechannel.org/CityInsideOu...

The Peak of Trump’s Fact-Free Vendetta Against Regulation It’s the end of an era. The GOP, in the person of Donald Trump, has fallen out of love with subjecting regulations to cost-benefit analysis. Our story begins in December 1980, when President Jimmy Carter signed (over the objection of four Cabinet agencies) a law creating the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, or OIRA. The purpose was to establish within the White House budget office a clearinghouse to, in Carter’s words, “regulate the regulators” by reviewing and sometimes jettisoning paperwork requirements that regulatory agencies imposed on the public. Two months later, Carter’s successor, Ronald Reagan, greatly expanded OIRA’s mandate by giving it review power over the regulations themselves. All major new regulations (defined as any that imposed a cost to industry of $100 million or more) would henceforth be submitted to OIRA for cost-benefit review. If the benefits didn’t outweigh the costs, the regulation would be modified or scrapped. Liberals complained that cost-benefit analysis biased OIRA against protecting health and safety because a regulation’s benefit to society, being widespread, was harder to quantify than its narrow cost to specific businesses. In addition, because calculations of regulatory cost relied on industry input, these were highly exaggerated. For Republicans, though, regulatory cost-benefit analysis became a kind of religion. So confident were they that it was a reliable regulation killer that in the 1994 midterm elections they pledged, as part of Newt Gingrich’s Contract With America, to make it a statutory requirement.  After Republicans retook the House of Representatives in 1995, the House passed a bill that fulfilled that pledge—and rigged cost-benefit methodology even further in industry’s direction. The legislation died in the Senate, in large part because President Bill Clinton had already signed in 1993 an executive order that reaffirmed Reagan’s cost-benefit requirement for major rules. By then cost-benefit analysis was, among social science wonks across the ideological spectrum, too respectable to discard. Whatever its flaws, cost-benefit analysis was rational, it was market-friendly (these were the “Washington consensus” years), and, with a little effort, its pro-business bias could be reduced. Lo and behold, that started to happen during the presidency of Barack Obama. Obama’s OIRA administrator, Cass Sunstein, broadened cost-benefit’s scope to include, for instance, the calculation of benefits to people living outside the United States, and to assign a (human) cost to the release into the atmosphere of carbon ($21.40 per metric ton). You can guess what happened next. “As economists got better at measuring the benefits of regulation,” Stuart Shapiro, a onetime OIRA analyst and now professor of public policy at Rutgers, observes in _The Regulatory Review_ , “benefit-cost analysis began to be seen as a tool that supported more stringent regulation of the economy.” How committed, really, are Republicans to cost-benefit analysis? In 2019, Berkeley law professor Daniel Farber, author of the classic 1986 _New Republic_  essay “The Case Against Brilliance,” found a way to measure this, and if it wasn’t brilliant, it was certainly shrewd. In 2017, a Republican Congress had used expedited procedures under the Congressional Review Act, or CRA, to eliminate 14 Obama-era regulations. To what extent, Farber asked, did Congress rely on cost-benefit analysis in selecting regulations to kill off? The pool of regulations eligible to block was limited to those passed at the tail end of Obama’s presidency, so Farber looked only at those. What he found was that the regulations Congress targeted through proposed CRA resolutions corresponded not at all with OIRA cost-benefit analyses. Indeed, fully one-third of the regulations that members of Congress sought to eliminate had _no OIRA cost-benefit analysis at all,_ because their economic impact was too slight. Among major rules eligible for elimination, most never even got considered, even though they came with cost-benefit analyses. And among those regulations that _were_ considered, minor ones were repealed at twice the rate of major ones. If not cost-benefit analysis, what determined which rules Congress chose to eliminate? You can probably guess. The deciding factor was whether a given regulation addressed a hot-button issue such as guns or contraception, or whether it affected some key Republican constituency such as the oil business. Even as the Supreme Court was preparing to push regulatory decision-making onto Congress, Congress was demonstrating that its approach followed no logic except crude political gain. During his first term, Trump imposed a limit on the regulatory cost of new regulations. This appalled even President George W. Bush’s notoriously pro-business OIRA administrator John Graham, who was a fervent cost-benefit advocate. Prior to Trump, observed a highly critical 2020 article in the journal _Regulation_  that Graham co-authored, “there was no annual cap on the additional cost burdens an agency can impose.” Trump created a cap and set it, of course, at zero. “Thus has cost-benefit analysis,” wrote Georgetown law professor Lisa Heinzerling, “mutated, by executive directive, into cost-nothing analysis.” During his second term, Trump issued an executive order setting the cost of new regulations (with apologies due Elvis Costello) at “significantly less than zero.” In 2023, President Joe Biden’s OIRA administrator, Richard Revasz, updated the agency’s analytic process for the first time in 20 years. When calculating a proposed rule’s future benefit, Revasz explained last February in _The New York Times_ , OIRA applies a discount rate fixed to the long-term, inflation-adjusted return on government debt. The higher the discount rate, the lower the calculated benefit. Based on bond yields over the previous 30 years, Revasz set OIRA’s discount rate at 2 percent, leaving room for future adjustments based on new data. But when the Trump administration came back in, it raised the discount rate from 2 percent to as high as 7 percent, based on some vague notion that societal well-being will be higher in 30 years. Will it be? That’s an interesting but unanswerable question. On one hand, Trump won’t be around, and that’s a definite plus. On the other hand, I think everybody over 35 can agree that societal well-being in December 1995, despite its many deficits, was a damned sight better than societal well-being in December 2025. Trump also jettisoned from cost-benefit review the social cost of carbon (and also methane, and other greenhouse gases) because it was “marked by logical deficiencies, a poor basis in empirical science, politicization, and the absence of a foundation in legislation.” Global warming is a hoax! In October, Jeffrey Bossert Clark, acting OIRA administrator, issued a memo leveling yet another blow at cost-benefit analysis. Instead of taking 90 days to evaluate some proposed deregulatory action, OIRA will now take 28 days—and 14 if a given rule is “factually unlawful.” That’s not even close to enough time. “If high-quality analysis suggests that deregulation is costly, and it often will,” concludes Shapiro, “the [Clark] memo effectively instructs OIRA to turn a blind eye.” (If I may be permitted a digression: Can something be “ _un_ factually unlawful”? Under Trump, I suppose the answer is yes. Such a doctrine would perhaps justify Trump’s serial unsuccessful attempts to indict Letitia James and James Comey.) Increasingly, it’s left to others to calculate the true cost of Trump’s policies. For instance, Trump is promising a $2,000 rebate on his tariffs for low- and middle-income Americans. But according to the nonprofit (and very centrist) Tax Foundation, even if Trump were to distribute every penny of tariff revenue, the result would be a rebate well below $2,000—and that’s assuming a means test with a hard cutoff at $100,000. Partly that’s because total tariff revenue must be discounted by about 25 percent to take into account tariffs’ shrinkage of the tax base. “A better way to provide relief from the burden of tariffs,” the Tax Foundation concluded, “would be to eliminate the tariffs.” The decline and fall of cost-benefit analysis is in step with the decline of other conservative values under Trump: fiscal conservatism, a united West, free trade, tight money at the Fed, and of course that old standby, dignified leadership at the top. It’s another reminder that Trumpism has almost nothing to do with what Republicans purport to stand for (excepting tax cuts for the rich and deregulation, and even Mitt Romney is having second thoughts about the former). Liz Cheney was right: When the Trump nightmare is over conservatives will need to start a new party because the old one will be too compromised by Trump. It will have no more legitimacy than Vichy after the Allied liberation of Paris. Instead of trying to revive neoconservatism, David Brooks should try to revive the Whigs. Maybe Cheney, who disappeared from view after departing Congress, will come out of hiding to help.

Dean Shapiro @stuartshapiroblou.bsky.social argues that the #Trump Administration’s new #OIRA memo accelerates #deregulation by sidelining rigorous benefit-cost analysis and elevating presidential preferences over #economic evidence. bloustein.rutgers.edu/dean-shapiro...

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The Spring 2025 Regulatory Agenda is out, detailing federal regs in the pipeline. View our dashboard!

After filtering for entries with a date on/after Jan. 20, 2025 (or “To Be Determined” finales), we’re tracking 3,567 active rules across 177 unique agencies. #Regulation #OIRA #SpringAgenda

The Spring 2025 Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions is now online: reginfo.gov/public/do/eA...

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PSA: RegInfo.gov & the Congress.gov API have been experiencing technical issues over the past several days. Thus, no new updates on RegulationRoundup.com or in the Daily Roundup email. Thanks for your patience! #OIRA #RegInfo

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Fiel á miña cita de verán acudín a #Oira #Ourense a contarlle ás nenas e nenos que están alí coas actividades de verán que é iso do #CambioClimático para que se conciencien, conciencien e dicirlles que poden facer para mitigalo para que este noso planeta non se nos vaia a pique...

DoD addresses two big challenges to make CMMC a reality Stacy Bostjanick, DoD’s chief of the Defense Industrial Base Cybersecurity in the CIO’s office, said managed service providers could reduce the cost of CMMC.

“Stacy Bostjanick, DoD’s chief of the #DIB #Cybersecurity in the CIO’s office, said the rule to change the .. #DFARs .. close to going to the Office of Management & Budget’s .. #OIRA .. for final processing.” federalnewsnetwork.com/defense-news... @federalnewsnetwork.com

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__**Twitter** _**Facebook**_ __**LinkedIn** _**Email**_ __**Print** __ President Reagan introduced comprehensive White House oversight of agency regulatory activities. __Tweet __Share __Post __Email __Print __Link With President Donald J. Trump’s election, regulatory reform is back in the headlines. John D. Graham’s book, _Regulatory Reform From Nixon To Biden_, provides an important and timely treatment of the topic. By taking a historical approach, Graham captures the ebb and flow of presidential efforts to shape—or stop—agency regulations before they are proposed, in order to bring regulation and deregulation in line with the President’s priorities. The chapter on the Reagan Administration was of particular interest to me because in 1984 and 1985, I was President Ronald Reagan’s so-called “regulatory czar”—that is, the administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), part of the Executive Office of the President. In that capacity, I conceived of Executive Order 12,498 which Graham describes modestly as “buttressing OIRA.” White House control of the regulatory apparatus went from sporadic episodes during the Nixon Administration, to a more regular practice in the Carter Administration, to comprehensive oversight under the Reagan Administration. President Reagan’s Executive Order 12,291 formalized the process by requiring that all significant regulations be scrutinized by OIRA to ensure that they would, to the extent allowed by law, yield greater benefits than costs. An early episode in which OIRA disapproved a proposed regulation was revealing. An agency head had appealed OIRA’s decision to the OMB director, then to the Vice President, and finally to President Reagan, to whom he said he would resign if the regulation was not issued. Agency staff were invested in the regulation, which had been in gestation for many years during which they had made commitments to congressional committees and external stakeholders. Rather than let the resignation ignite a firestorm of protest in the press and on Capitol Hill, the President acquiesced. When I looked into the matter, I found that it was not at all unusual for a significant regulation to take a decade or more from conception to completion, as it goes from a literature review to a research grant, to a long-term study, to a proposal ready for public comment, and to adoption when OIRA signed off. No President could successfully impose policies on the regulatory state if the President’s only tool is to kill a regulation at the last possible moment. Hence, I proposed—and President Reagan issued—Executive Order 12,498, which required that each agency head submit “an overview of the agency’s regulatory policies, goals, and objectives” for the upcoming year, with “information concerning all significant regulatory actions of the agency, planned or underway, including actions taken to consider whether to initiate rulemaking; requests for public comment; and the development of documents that may influence, anticipate, or could lead to the commencement of rulemaking proceedings at a later date.” Anything the agency wanted to do that could someday lead to a regulation had to be disclosed, or it was not authorized. The resulting inaugural Regulatory Program of the United States Government was published in 1985 and ran over 600 pages. The U.S. Department of Labor’s account of its “significant regulatory actions,” some of which were in the earliest stages of development, ran 100 pages. The account of such actions by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ran for almost 80 pages. Graham describes the aim of Executive Order 12,498 as “enhancing OIRA’s power in dealing with agencies,” which is true in part. The greater goal, however, was not to empower OIRA but to enable—and require—the President’s political appointees to follow the President’s policies. As President Reagan informed the U.S. Congress in his message on the first Regulatory Program, “because some complex regulations take years to develop … it is important that senior Federal officials be able to review regulatory options early in the rulemaking process and plan regulatory actions over a longer time horizon.” By requiring each agency to submit a regulatory plan to OIRA each year, Executive Order 12,498 was an action-forcing device. Henceforth, the heads of all agencies would be informed about all the pre-regulatory activity occurring in the agencies and could be held accountable by the President. As then Secretary of Commerce Macolm Baldrige told me after the first regulatory planning process, he was able to kill several regulatory projects that he would not otherwise have known about. Or as Cass Sunstein and Peter Strauss observed, Executive Order 12,498 provided “a means of ensuring that regulatory policy is set by agency heads rather than staffs.” Because Presidents need regulatory planning to impose the President’s will on the administrative state, my predecessor at OIRA and I predicted in 1986 “that no future President will disestablish the process of regulatory review and regulatory planning.” That prediction has been only partially borne out. The regulatory review and annual regulatory planning processes that President Reagan instituted continued through the Administration of President George H.W. Bush. But President Bill Clinton revoked both Reagan orders in Executive Order 12,866. As President Clinton explained, one of the purposes of his order was “to reaffirm the primacy of Federal agencies in the regulatory decision-making process.” To that end, he limited presidential oversight by providing that “OIRA may review only actions identified by the agency or by OIRA as significant regulatory actions.” The term “significant regulatory action” was given a four-part definition that included an action which likely would result in a rule that could “have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities.” The order also provided that cost-benefit analyses would henceforth be diluted by including “qualitative measures” and instructed agencies to consider “distributive impacts” and “equity.” It further excused agencies from including in their annual regulatory plan all but “the most important significant regulatory actions.” Although the order also required that, in addition to its regulatory plan, each agency “prepare an agenda of all regulations under development or review” accompanied by “a brief summary of the action”—now called the Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions—it left undefined the meaning of “under development,” so only the regulatory plan had to “be approved personally by the agency head.” These changes undermined the system put in place by the Reagan Administration. Indeed, as Richard H. Pildes and Sunstein put it, Executive Order 12,866 “is significant mostly for the constraints it imposes on presidential oversight.” Those constraints persisted for the better part of the last two decades. President Barack Obama’s Executive Order 13,563 expressly reaffirmed President Clinton’s order. Then President Joseph R. Biden’s Executive Order 14,094 further diminished the utility of the annual plan by changing the definition of “significant regulatory action” from having an annual burden on the economy of $100 million to $200 million. The result was less disclosure to OIRA and to the public concerning agency initiatives, particularly at their earliest stages of development. President Trump took immediate steps to address the deficiencies of the Clinton framework at the start of his second term. On the day he was sworn into office, President Trump issued Executive Order 14,148 in which he rescinded President Biden’s order that had weakened the definition of “significant regulatory action.” Eleven days later, on January 31, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14,192, in which he required that “any new incremental costs associated with new regulations” be “offset by the elimination of existing costs associated with at least 10 prior regulations.” As part of that order, President Trump directed that “no regulation shall be issued by an agency if it was not included in the most recent version or update of the published Unified Regulatory Agenda” or approved by OMB. He further required that “no regulation shall be added to or removed from the Unified Regulatory Agenda” without the approval of OMB. Less than a month later, on February 18, 2025, President Trump asserted authority over the independent agencies in Executive Order 14,215 and subjected them to the requirements of Executive Order 12,866. As explained in an accompanying fact sheet, “all agencies” going forward are required to “(1) submit draft regulations for White House review—with no carve-out for so-called independent agencies, except for the monetary policy functions of the Federal Reserve; and (2) consult with the White House on their priorities and strategic plans, and the White House will set their performance standards.” The very next day President Trump issued Executive Order 14,219, a significant deregulatory order regarding his Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). He declared his policy “to commence the deconstruction of the overbearing and burdensome administrative state” and ordered the agencies to perform a sweeping review of “all regulations,” prioritizing rules “that satisfy the definition of ‘significant regulatory action’ in Executive Order 12866.” Going forward, new regulations must continue to comply with the process set forth in Executive Order 12,866 and, in addition, “agency heads” are required to “consult with their DOGE Team Leads and the Administrator of OIRA on potential new regulations as soon as practicable.” Substantively, agency heads, DOGE, and OIRA must consider the factors set out in Executive Order 12,866 as well as the additional factors in Trump’s deregulatory order. Most recently, on April 9, 2025, President Trump issued an executive order aimed at reducing anticompetitive regulations. The order requires agencies, in consultation with the U.S. Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice, to review all regulations—prioritizing “rules that satisfy the definition of ‘significant regulatory action’” in Executive Order 12,866—and identify rules that reduce competition. Then the agencies must provide OMB a list of regulations that warrant rescission or modification and work with OIRA “to decide whether to incorporate the proposed rescissions or modifications into the Unified Regulatory Agenda.” All said, Trump’s deregulatory juggernaut has placed OIRA squarely in the driver’s seat and given it a sweeping mandate over agency regulations past and future. The questions now are the extent to which his deregulatory initiatives succeed in court, and whether his degree of control persists in future administrations. With respect to the former, Graham explains in his book that Trump’s deregulatory actions in his first term fared poorly in court compared to those of his predecessors, often due to unforced errors. We should expect improved performance from the second Trump Administration. I also expect Trump will eventually eschew Clinton’s Executive Order 12,866 altogether in favor of a new, comprehensive executive order setting forth the process by which the president can control the administrative agencies going forward. Douglas H. Ginsburg is a senior judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Tagged: Executive Order, OIRA, Regulatory Reform

The Role of the White House in Regulatory Reform President Reagan introduced comprehensive White ...

www.theregreview.org/2025/04/22/ginsburg-the-...

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Result Details

OIRA: The tiny office that's about to remake the federal government : Planet Money OIRA — the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs — is an obscure, but powerful federal office around the corner from the White House. President Trump has decided that it should get even more po...

“You don’t want a President just putting their finger on the scale all the time & picking winner and losers in the marketplace.” - @csfrayer.bsky.social, Director of Investor Protection #OIRA #PlanetMoney @npr.org

__**Twitter** _**Facebook**_ __**LinkedIn** _**Email**_ __**Print** __ The Trump Administration’s new 1-in-10-out executive order is more flawed than its predecessor. __Tweet __Share __Post __Email __Print __Link In January 2017, President Donald J. Trump issued his “1-in-2-out” executive order that required agencies to repeal at least two existing rules before issuing any new rule and banned the imposition of new net regulatory costs. Eight years later, President Trump has issued a new executive order with the same basic features, but _more_ —instead of requiring that two rules be repealed for any new rule, the new order requires that ten be repealed. Given this blast from the past, it is worth asking whether the 2017 order was worth plucking out of the dustbin of history. The short answer is no. As we described in an essay at the time, the 1-in-X-out concept and the ban on new net regulatory costs do not make sense under any normative theory one might want to adopt. First, the requirements in these executive orders are poorly structured to promote net benefits, which is—ostensibly, at least—the official goal of most federal regulatory policy since the Reagan years. The most obvious reason for this is that the requirements do not prioritize net costly rules for repeal and make it more difficult to adopt rules with net benefits. Second, the requirements are not even well structured to reduce regulatory burdens. Nothing in the executive order requires agencies to prioritize the most burdensome rules for repeal. Moreover, the 1-in-10-out requirement threatens to entangle agencies in a morass of repeal efforts of middling value but that nonetheless must go through the entire administrative process and will often be challenged in court. Finally, the executive order does not help the White House assert control over agencies. Primarily, they constrain the actions of Trump appointees at agencies, who are presumably loyal to the Administration’s agenda. As we wrote eight years ago, “imposing direct, formalistic, and inflexible mandates on agencies reduces the operating room of exactly those political appointees that Presidents typically seek to empower, without any grounding in the relative strengths and weaknesses of agencies and OIRA in promoting the President’s agenda.” These were conceptual points, but subsequent experience has largely vindicated our predictions. The first Trump Administration’s deregulatory push produced, at best, mixed results. Cary Coglianese, Natasha Sarin, and Stuart Shapiro have argued that the Administration’s claims of sweeping deregulation were overstated, pointing to the modest overall reduction in regulatory burdens. Many repeals were procedural rather than substantive, and the Administration often struggled to quantify actual cost savings. By contrast, Anthony Campau, who served in the first Trump Administration’s Office of Informational and Regulatory Affairs, has defended the policy as a meaningful constraint on administrative overreach. Although we need not adjudicate that debate here, the fundamental structural problems of the “1-in-X-out” approach remain clear. Deregulation is not inherently problematic. Thoughtfully designed reforms can reduce unnecessary compliance burdens while maintaining protections for health, safety, and the environment. Blunt instruments like the 1-in-10-out rule, however, impose rigid constraints that ignore regulatory quality. The new executive order doubles down on this flawed approach, requiring agencies to jettison a vastly greater number of existing rules. The sheer scale of the repeal requirement will likely force agencies into hasty, indiscriminate rollbacks that generate legal uncertainty and administrative bottlenecks. Agencies will expend more effort identifying and eliminating rules—regardless of their actual costs or benefits—than on crafting effective policy. The order’s directive to reinstate the 2003 version of the White House Office of Management and Budget’s Circular A-4, which provides guidelines for conducting benefit-cost analysis across agencies, also signals a retreat from recent efforts to improve the methodology that supports rational rulemaking policy. If anything, the current iteration of this misguided regulatory approach is poised to fare worse than its predecessor. The escalation to ten offsetting repeals per new rule all but ensures that agencies will face insurmountable hurdles in issuing new protections, even when clear net benefits exist. In other words, the public will not get net beneficial regulations that respond to current problems _and_ will not see meaningful removal of burdensome preexisting regulatory requirements. Unfortunately, that may be exactly the point. _Caroline Cecot_ _is a Professor of Law at the_ _George Mason Antonin Scalia Law School_ _._ _Michael A. Livermore_ _is a Professor of Law at the_ _University of Virginia School of Law_ _._ Tagged: deregulation, OIRA, Trump Administration

Escalating Flawed Deregulatory Math The Trump Administration’s new 1-in-10-out executive order ...

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Event Attributes

Hey, this is fun. #OIRA is supposed to be furloughed, but they came in to work today to issue a rule to allow companies to stop reporting workplace injuries and illnesses to @OSHA_DOL, 'cause, you know, that's urgent....

@WendyBredhold @BarackObama chose @CassSunstein 2 head #OIRA & gut Federal health/safety regs: because profit. Admitting... #WVWaterCrisis

to tell #WestVirginia who in yr chain of command (esp political appointees, #OIRA & co) made @cdcgov look like dim premeds. #WVWaterCrisis

..the same WH & Prez - @barackobama who chose @casssunstein 2 make #OIRA an abattoir 4 Federal health/safety regs #WVWaterCrisis #wvchemleak

You see, #WestVirginia - the @cdcgov meltdown we've seen this week never made sense. But - with a WH that used #OIRA... #WVWaterCrisis #mchm

Time to ask the same WH whose Prez showed up when Bob Rubin hatched his regulation hating #HamiltonProject & chose @CassSunstein for #OIRA.

Until we remember @cdcgov takes orders from same WH that chose career regulation saboteur @CassSunstein to head #OIRA: where he stifled regs

#WestVirginia - 2know how wealth & power gutted regs that could've enforced US health & safety law, see @CassSunstein @ #OIRA #WVWaterCrisis