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Posts by The Journal of Philosophy

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1 day ago 0 0 1 0

Of related interest (2/2)

"Actions, Reasons, and Causes"
Donald Davidson
Volume 60, Issue 23, November 1963
Pages 685-700
doi.org/10.2307/2023...

2 weeks ago 1 0 0 0

Of related interest (1/2)

"Primary Reasons as Normative Reasons"
Nathan Howard
Volume 118, Issue 2, February 2021
Pages 97-111
doi.org/10.5840/jphi...

2 weeks ago 0 0 1 0
Abstract of J. J. Cunningham's paper "Factivism Defended: A Reply to Howard":

In a recent article, Nathan Howard argues that normative reasons for action are to be identified not with facts, but with fact/goal pairs. For example, on Howard’s view, the reason in favor of me cooking the meal is not the fact that I promised—rather, it is that fact PLUS the goal to honor my promises. Howard supplies three arguments for his preferred view. In this reply I aim to do two things. The first is to undermine Howard’s three arguments. The second is to establish a dilemma for Howard’s preferred view. The upshot is a defense and development of the view that normative reasons for action are facts.

Abstract of J. J. Cunningham's paper "Factivism Defended: A Reply to Howard": In a recent article, Nathan Howard argues that normative reasons for action are to be identified not with facts, but with fact/goal pairs. For example, on Howard’s view, the reason in favor of me cooking the meal is not the fact that I promised—rather, it is that fact PLUS the goal to honor my promises. Howard supplies three arguments for his preferred view. In this reply I aim to do two things. The first is to undermine Howard’s three arguments. The second is to establish a dilemma for Howard’s preferred view. The upshot is a defense and development of the view that normative reasons for action are facts.

Abstract (also in alt text)

2 weeks ago 0 0 1 0
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Factivism Defended: A Reply to Howard - Volume 122, Issue 8, August 2025 In a recent article, Nathan Howard argues that normative reasons for action are to be identified not with facts, but with fact/goal pairs. For example, on Howard’s view, the reason in favor of me cook...

"Factivism Defended: A Reply to Howard"
J. J. Cunningham
Volume 122, Issue 8, August 2025
Pages 433-448

doi.org/10.5840/jphi...

#newpaper #philsky #philosophy #philosophysky

2 weeks ago 4 1 2 0

Of related interest (2/2)

"Elgin on Lewis’s Putnam’s Paradox"
Bas C. van Fraassen
Volume 94, Issue 2, February 1997
Pages 85-93
doi.org/10.2307/2940...

2 weeks ago 0 0 0 0

Of related interest (1/2)

"Unnatural Science"
Catherine Z. Elgin
Volume 92, Issue 6, June 1995
Pages 289-302
doi.org/10.2307/2941...

2 weeks ago 0 0 1 0
Abstract for Rohan Sud's paper titled "Reference Magnetism Beyond the Predicate: Two Putnam-Style Results":

Many accept David Lewis's (1983) claim that, among the candidate meanings for our predicates, some are more natural than others—they do better or worse at “carving nature at its joints.” Call this claim predicate naturalism. Disagreement remains over whether the notion of naturalness extends “beyond the predicate'” (à la Sider, 2011). Are the candidate meanings of logical vocabulary also more or less natural? Call this claim logical naturalism. One motivation for predicate naturalism comes from its supposed ability to help rebut various radical indeterminacy arguments associated with Hilary Putnam (1977, 1980, 1981). It does so in combination with a popular meta-semantic theory called reference magnetism. I argue that the same threats of Putnam-style radical indeterminacy rearise for proponents of predicate naturalism—threats that logical naturalism helps rebut. So, if we accept predicate naturalism because it helps fend off threats of indeterminacy, we should also accept logical naturalism.

Abstract for Rohan Sud's paper titled "Reference Magnetism Beyond the Predicate: Two Putnam-Style Results": Many accept David Lewis's (1983) claim that, among the candidate meanings for our predicates, some are more natural than others—they do better or worse at “carving nature at its joints.” Call this claim predicate naturalism. Disagreement remains over whether the notion of naturalness extends “beyond the predicate'” (à la Sider, 2011). Are the candidate meanings of logical vocabulary also more or less natural? Call this claim logical naturalism. One motivation for predicate naturalism comes from its supposed ability to help rebut various radical indeterminacy arguments associated with Hilary Putnam (1977, 1980, 1981). It does so in combination with a popular meta-semantic theory called reference magnetism. I argue that the same threats of Putnam-style radical indeterminacy rearise for proponents of predicate naturalism—threats that logical naturalism helps rebut. So, if we accept predicate naturalism because it helps fend off threats of indeterminacy, we should also accept logical naturalism.

Abstract (also in alt text)

2 weeks ago 2 0 1 0
Preview
Reference Magnetism Beyond the Predicate: Two Putnam-Style Results - Volume 122, Issue 8, August 2025 Many accept David Lewis's (1983) claim that, among the candidate meanings for our predicates, some are more natural than others—they do better or worse at “carving nature at its joints.” Call this cla...

"Reference Magnetism Beyond the Predicate: Two Putnam-Style Results"
Rohan Sud
Volume 122, Issue 8, August 2025
Pages 405-432

doi.org/10.5840/jphi...

#newpaper #philsky #philosophy #philosophysky

2 weeks ago 3 1 1 0
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Of related interest (2/2):

"Does Perception Have a Nonconceptual Content?"
Christopher Peacocke
Volume 98, Issue 5, May 2001
Pages 239-264
doi.org/10.2307/2678...

2 weeks ago 0 0 0 0

Of related interest (1/2):

Murat Aydede, "Is Feeling Pain the Perception of Something?" Volume 106, Issue 10, October 2009
Pages 531-567
doi.org/10.5840/jphi...

2 weeks ago 1 0 1 0
Abstract for Hilla Jacobson's paper titled "On the Very Idea of Valenced Perception": Tradition contrasts “cold” (sense) perception with “hot” emotion and affect. Against this backdrop, it has recently been argued that perceptual experiences have another fundamental phenomenal aspect, beyond their sensory aspects—perception in all sense-modalities is (at least often) intrinsically valenced. Roughly, its phenomenal character is inherently pleasant or unpleasant, feeling good or bad to some degree. Yet, the revolutionary notion of Intrinsically Valenced Perception (IVP) requires elucidation and is fraught with theoretical difficulties. This paper aims to explicate and address some foundational questions regarding the very notion of IVP: What is required for perception to be intrinsically valenced? Specifically, if perception itself is valenced, what should be the relations between its valenced aspects and sensory aspects? The paper uncovers various constraints and desiderata that IVP must meet. It further offers a Determination-Dimension Model of the relations between sensory and valenced aspects that aims to resolve the previously identified theoretical difficulties.

Abstract for Hilla Jacobson's paper titled "On the Very Idea of Valenced Perception": Tradition contrasts “cold” (sense) perception with “hot” emotion and affect. Against this backdrop, it has recently been argued that perceptual experiences have another fundamental phenomenal aspect, beyond their sensory aspects—perception in all sense-modalities is (at least often) intrinsically valenced. Roughly, its phenomenal character is inherently pleasant or unpleasant, feeling good or bad to some degree. Yet, the revolutionary notion of Intrinsically Valenced Perception (IVP) requires elucidation and is fraught with theoretical difficulties. This paper aims to explicate and address some foundational questions regarding the very notion of IVP: What is required for perception to be intrinsically valenced? Specifically, if perception itself is valenced, what should be the relations between its valenced aspects and sensory aspects? The paper uncovers various constraints and desiderata that IVP must meet. It further offers a Determination-Dimension Model of the relations between sensory and valenced aspects that aims to resolve the previously identified theoretical difficulties.

Abstract (also in alt text)

2 weeks ago 1 0 1 0
Preview
On the Very Idea of Valenced Perception - Volume 122, Issue 8, August 2025 Tradition contrasts “cold” (sense) perception with “hot” emotion and affect. Against this backdrop, it has recently been argued that perceptual experiences have another fundamental phenomenal aspect, ...

#newpaper #philsky #philosophy #philosophysky

"On the Very Idea of Valenced Perception" by Hilla Jacobson

doi.org/10.5840/jphi...

2 weeks ago 1 0 1 0
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Schmidt Sciences Research Scholars in AI & the Humanities, 2026-2027 - The Metropolitan Museum of Art | NYFA The Metropolitan Museum of Art seeks eligible candidates for two twelve-month Postdoctoral Research Scholar positions in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the Humanities. This pilot program aims to adv...

#postdoc
Schmidt Sciences Research Scholars in AI & the Humanities, 2026-2027
The Metropolitan Museum of Art
(Not affiliated with JPhil)

www.nyfa.org/jobs/job-inf...

3 weeks ago 2 0 0 0

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www.thesunshinehome.com

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Portrait of Emile Du Chatelet at desk with books, compass, armillary sphere (source: Wiki)

Portrait of Emile Du Chatelet at desk with books, compass, armillary sphere (source: Wiki)

Titlepage and frontispiece of the third edition Newton's Principia (source Wiki)

Titlepage and frontispiece of the third edition Newton's Principia (source Wiki)

Submissions (< 10,000 words) invited for 2026 Du Châtelet Prize in Philosophy of Physics. Topic Celebrating 300th anniversary of 3rd ed. Newton’s Principia.
www.duchateletprize.org
Winner will receive $1000, workshop & SHPS pub
Open to grad students & w/in 5 yrs PhD
Deadline September 1, 2026 #HPS

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Welcome to Bluesky, @jneurophilo.bsky.social

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It’s time for an Enlightenment of your own.

We’ve opened the gates to our archive. No paywalls, no passwords: just 20+ years of timeless insights applied to today’s most urgent questions.

Dare to listen at philosophytalk.org/get-the-podcast.

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2 months ago 17 6 1 0
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Final reminder 📢 We are looking for a #philbio or #philphysics postdoc for an interdisciplinary project exploring the boundary between living and nonliving systems through the lens of self-organization & active matter 👇 www.kuleuven.be/personeel/jo... #philjobs #philsky #HPS #devbio Please share!

2 months ago 30 24 1 0
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PhilPapers categorisation update! The 'Feminist Philosophy of Science' leaf has been moved up from the miscellaneous sub-category into the main category of 'General Philosophy of Science' on PhilPapers. 🧡

2 months ago 20 8 1 0

The early shots in the desert might be a nod to the cover art of Funkadelic’s album Maggot Brain?

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Review of Christopher Moore: The Virtue of Agency: Sôphrosunê and Self-Constitution in Classical Greece - Volume 122, Issue 7, July 2025

Review of Christopher Moore, _The Virtue of Agency: Sôphrosunê and Self-Constitution in Classical Greece_ by Thomas Tuozzo @oupphilosophy.bsky.social

doi.org/10.5840/jphi...

#bookreview #newarticle #philosophy #philsky

3 months ago 2 0 0 0
Abstract for Ethan Nowak's paper titled "Sociolinguistic Variation, Slurs, and Speech Acts"

In this paper, I argue that the ‘social meanings’ associated with sociolinguistic variation put pressure on the standard philosophical conception of language, according to which the foremost thing we do with words is exchange information. Drawing on parallels with the explanatory challenge posed by slurs and pejoratives, I argue that the best way to understand social meanings is to think of them in speech act theoretic terms, and I develop a distinctive form of pluralism about the kinds of performances realized by means of sociolinguistic variants.

Abstract for Ethan Nowak's paper titled "Sociolinguistic Variation, Slurs, and Speech Acts" In this paper, I argue that the ‘social meanings’ associated with sociolinguistic variation put pressure on the standard philosophical conception of language, according to which the foremost thing we do with words is exchange information. Drawing on parallels with the explanatory challenge posed by slurs and pejoratives, I argue that the best way to understand social meanings is to think of them in speech act theoretic terms, and I develop a distinctive form of pluralism about the kinds of performances realized by means of sociolinguistic variants.

Abstract (also in alt text):

3 months ago 0 0 0 0
Preview
Sociolinguistic Variation, Slurs, and Speech Acts - Volume 122, Issue 7, July 2025 In this paper, I argue that the ‘social meanings’ associated with sociolinguistic variation put pressure on the standard philosophical conception of language, according to which the foremost thing we ...

"Sociolinguistic Variation, Slurs, and Speech Acts" by Ethan Nowak @ethannowak.bsky.social

doi.org/10.5840/jphi...

Freely accessible courtesy of @umeauniversitet.bsky.social

#philosophy #philsky #openaccess #newarticle

3 months ago 1 0 1 0
Applications Open for Philosophy Department Head Position - Department of Philosophy - Dietrich College of Humanities and Social Sciences - Carnegie Mellon University Carnegie Mellon’s Philosophy Department seeks a Department Head to provide academic leadership and shape the department’s strategic vision.

CMU's Philosophy department is doing a search for a new department head. If you are interested, definitely apply. ALSO, if you know anyone that we should consider, please let me know. I'm happy to reach out to anyone who might be interested. (Please repost for reach!)

www.cmu.edu/dietrich/phi...

3 months ago 14 11 2 1

Final reminder! New submissions close this Friday at 12pm Eastern. Please review our Memo to Authors prior to submitting, and remember to include at least two keywords.
www.journalofphilosophy.org/memotoauthor...

3 months ago 2 0 0 0
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🔔 We're launching our Bluesky account today! Can you help us spread the word by retweeting this post? 😀

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3 months ago 122 86 0 2

Boosting this news: The Journal of Philosophy will suspend new submissions starting next Friday, January 16, 2026, until at least mid-August.

3 months ago 2 1 0 0
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At the close of 2025, we offer our gratitude to the global philosophical community for supporting The Journal of Philosophy in many crucial capacities: as authors, reviewers, editors, subscribers, and readers. Thank you.

3 months ago 6 0 0 0
World Philosophy Day | November 20, 2025 | Presidents’ Challenge
The APA divisional presidents and past presidents will match up to $3,000 in donations that the APA receives on World Philosophy Day, November 20. | Donate Now | apaonline.org/donate

World Philosophy Day | November 20, 2025 | Presidents’ Challenge The APA divisional presidents and past presidents will match up to $3,000 in donations that the APA receives on World Philosophy Day, November 20. | Donate Now | apaonline.org/donate

Happy World Philosophy Day! The current presidents and past presidents of the APA Divisions will match up to $3,000 in donations that the APA receives today, November 20. Double your impact with a gift to the APA. Donate now: apaonline.org/donate

5 months ago 3 2 0 1