Chiltern Hundreds right now: “All full up on stewards at the moment, thanks.”
Posts by Aaron Bruhl
I have interacted with lots of judges and a few U.S. Supreme Court justices over the years, but I have never seen one of them mingle with students so warmly. Check out these pictures of Justice Sotomayor and our lucky students at William & Mary Law School!
In those cases, a short dissent saying, “I look at it the other way for basically this reason” is probably as persuasive as it is going to get. And such an opinion would certainly have many other virtues for the system, persuasiveness aside.
As long as we don’t call dissents “powerful.”
2/2
At the risk of being annoying . . . I’d say it depends. Sometimes it takes a ton of pages to excavate and synthesize a bunch of evidence. E.g., Souter in Seminole Tribe. But often cases boil down to, Is it better to look at this issue this way or that way?
1/2
I read page 14 and thought, “he’s going to invoke noscitur a sociis.” And I turned the page and he did! And “no elephants in mouseholes”! I should buy a lottery ticket.
Flyer for Bagenstos lecture.
I had the privilege of attending a lecture by Professor Samuel Bagenstos today. The topic was “Reconstructing the Public Health State.” Thank you for visiting William & Mary, @sbagen.bsky.social !
The debates about DHS and Iran appropriations assume the long term slush funds the OBBA gave the president for ICE and military ops are constitutional.
That premise is mistaken, as @marknevitt.bsky.social and I explain in our draft, now forthcoming in GW Law Review! papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers....
Look! It's finally happening, I'm so excited! Please share with your friends, people who assign books, and pets.
Larsen & McSweeney Medieval Treatises
Alli Orr Larsen (William & Mary Law School) & Thomas McSweeney (William & Mary Law School) have posted Medieval Treatises and the Judicial Search for a Useable Past on SSRN. Here is the abstract: The Supreme Court’s recent turn to history and tradition has…
I recently heard @orentaoren.bsky.social present an interesting paper on comparative statutory interpretation. Tagging him in case you two are not in touch.
Is this a worse end than the gravel pit?
Portrait of a Patriot, edited by Coquillette and York.
Here is the book from which the images come.
(And some of my research on early understandings of the nature of interpretive methodology is reported in a draft here: papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers....)
At left: Interpret by the reason, sprit, and consequences.
At right: Judges should mold statutes to their best reason and outcomes. No, actually that is the most dangerous thing.
Plus ça change . . .
Blackstone and others on using spirit, reason, and consequences.
Beccaria on the dangers of interpreting by the spirit.
Everyone knows Llewellyn’s chart showing canons and their counter canons. Compare the pages on statutory interpretation in the patriot lawyer Josiah Quincy Jr.’s law commonplace (started c. 1763). On consecutive pages, he collects venerable authorities for and against interpreting by the “spirit”:
Thank you for keeping quality in focus, not just cost. There are good free(ish) options in some fields, but not all materials are equal. Your model of the top-notch book that isn’t $300 is great.
Hill v. McDonough (2006), I think. One of @kannonshanmugam.bsky.social ‘s early arguments.
The account says the quotations are random, but geez.
“Realigned: Standing and Substantive Due Process”
This post comments on SCOTUS’s decision this week in Mirabelli v. Bonta.
blog.dividedargument.com/p/realigned-...
Incredible scenes here.
I guess Jenner & Block, WilmerHale, Susman Godfrey, and Perkins Coie now get to beat the government on appeal too. Government’s brief due this Friday.
Well, sure, it’s easy if you use bowls instead of your counter.
Personal jurisdiction in the 7th Circuit:
In Liu v. Monthly, No. 25-02074, which will be argued today, the appellant argues that they were not subject to personal jurisdiction in the NDIL because they "did not sell or ship a single accused product to Illinois."
#CivProMatters
I hadn’t heard much about what is going on at UH (especially as compared to A&M and UT-Austin). Thank you for sharing.
Thanks!
Comments welcome.
Remedies / Civ Pro Valentines:
Roses are red
Violets are blue
Moot my demand
By saying, “I do”
Roses are red
Violets are blue
Tho’ equity act in personam
It can’t restrain my love for you
Roses are red
Violets are blue
A constructive trust
Couldn’t account for you
Workshopping these, obvs.
Remedies / Civ Pro Valentines:
Roses are red
Violets are blue
Moot my demand
By saying, “I do”
Roses are red
Violets are blue
Tho’ equity act in personam
It can’t restrain my love for you
Roses are red
Violets are blue
A constructive trust
Couldn’t account for you
Workshopping these, obvs.
Working on Administrative Law valentines. 💘 ⚖️
Roses are red
Violets are blue
If you take my heart
What process is due?
Came up in my Legislation course just the other day!
Abstract: Long presumed obsolete after Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, the "general common law" has reemerged as a subject of serious inquiry in recent scholarship in constitutional law and public law more broadly. This Article investigates one strand of that revival: the claim that there existed, and may still exist, a "general law of interpretation," an unwritten body of trans-jurisdictional principles governing how judges construe statutes and other instruments. Drawing on early American sources, the Article reconstructs how courts and commentators understood interpretive methodology in the framing era and nineteenth century, especially with regard to how methods could vary across time and place. The study reveals both continuity and change. While early interpretive practice reflected inherited English principles, American jurisdictions localized those rules to suit state institutions or policy goals. Federal courts, long before Erie, acknowledged and applied these localized approaches when construing state law. At the same time, some characteristics of the general law of interpretation linger on even today. These findings unsettle the familiar narrative of Erie as a sharp turning point and provide new perspectives on current debates over methodological pluralism and federal-state relations. The findings also show that the roots of today's methodological diversity reach deep into the common-law past. Armed with a fuller understanding of the pre-Erie law(s) of interpretation, one can see that a revival of the world of general law, at least in the field of statutory interpretation, would neither offer the benefits of conflict-free consensus nor threaten to unleash disastrous chaos.
I hope this will be of interest to people who care about statutory interpretation, federalism, and the “general law revival.”
Comments welcome.
The abstract: