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Posts by British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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Ellen Clarke, The Units of Life | BJPS Review of Books John Dupré reviews The Units of Life, by Ellen Clarke

New from the BJPS Review of Books

The Units of Life
– Ellen Clarke

Reviewed by John Dupré

www.thebsps.org/reviewofbook...

#phisci #hpbio #philsky

5 hours ago 4 1 0 0
ABSTRACT. According to Bayesians, agents should respond to evidence by conditionalizing their prior degrees of belief on what they learn. A major aim of this article is to demonstrate that there are common scenarios where Bayesian conditionalization is less rational—from both an ecological and an internal perspective—than other theoretically well-motivated belief updating strategies, even in simple situations and even for an ‘ideal’ agent who is computationally unbounded. The examples also serve to demarcate the conditions under which Bayesian conditionalization may be expected to be ecologically optimal. A second aim of the article is to argue for a broader notion of rationality than what is typically assumed in formal epistemology. On this broader understanding of rationality, classical decision theoretic principles such as expected utility maximization play a less important role.

ABSTRACT. According to Bayesians, agents should respond to evidence by conditionalizing their prior degrees of belief on what they learn. A major aim of this article is to demonstrate that there are common scenarios where Bayesian conditionalization is less rational—from both an ecological and an internal perspective—than other theoretically well-motivated belief updating strategies, even in simple situations and even for an ‘ideal’ agent who is computationally unbounded. The examples also serve to demarcate the conditions under which Bayesian conditionalization may be expected to be ecologically optimal. A second aim of the article is to argue for a broader notion of rationality than what is typically assumed in formal epistemology. On this broader understanding of rationality, classical decision theoretic principles such as expected utility maximization play a less important role.

This issue's Editors' Choice article (free to read):

On the Ecological and Internal Rationality of Bayesian Conditionalization
– Olav B Vassend

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky

1 day ago 12 5 0 0
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Scientists on Tap, Not on Top | BJPS Short Reads Stephen John on why scientists cannot, and should not, care about policymakers’ values

Elephants, sandwiches, and values in science. Stephen John’s BJPS Short Read has it all…

www.thebsps.org/short-reads/...

#philsci #philsky

2 days ago 1 1 0 1
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Jan Baedke, The Organism | BJPS Review of Books Matthew Sims reviews The Organism, by Jan Baedke

ICYMI: Matthew Sims reviews Jan Baedke’s The Organism

www.thebsps.org/reviewofbook...

#philsci #hpbio #philsky

3 days ago 12 3 0 0
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Questioning Self-Location | Emily Adlam | BJPS Short Reads Is there an objectively correct way to form beliefs about when or where you are?

New BJPS Short Read

Questioning Self-Location

Emily Adlam on whether there is an objectively correct way to form beliefs about when or where you are

Read it here: www.thebsps.org/short-reads/...

Or listen on YouTube or wherever you get your podcasts

#philsci #philsky

5 days ago 3 2 0 0
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Questioning Self-Location | Emily Adlam | BJPS Short Reads Is there an objectively correct way to form beliefs about when or where you are?

New BJPS Short Read

Questioning Self-Location

Emily Adlam on whether there is an objectively correct way to form beliefs about when or where you are

Read it here: www.thebsps.org/short-reads/...

Or listen on YouTube or wherever you get your podcasts

#philsci #philsky

5 days ago 3 2 0 0
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We’re looking for a writer We’re hiring a writer who can make the world’s largest problems understandable to our large Our World in Data audience.

Please help share what must be one of the best jobs ever. We are looking for a writer to join @ourworldindata.org to work with our fantastic team including @maxroser.bsky.social and @hannahritchie.bsky.social. £80k - £120k / ideally full time / location flexible
ourworldindata.org/hiring-write...

5 days ago 81 83 3 10
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Frances Egan, Deflating Mental Representation | BJPS Review of Books Nico Orlandi reviews Deflating Mental Representation, by Frances Egan

New from the BJPS Review of Books

Deflating Mental Representation
– Frances Egan

Reviewed by Nico Orlandi

www.thebsps.org/reviewofbook...

#philsci #philsky

1 week ago 14 7 0 2
ABSTRACT. Much of the literature on values in science is framed around the idea of a shift in the status of the so-called value-free ideal (VFI) for science: having been widely accepted in the past, it has now come to be thoroughly rejected. Instead, the commonly asserted view now is that there is a new problem for philosophy of science to address, namely, distinguishing appropriate from inappropriate value-influence on science. While understanding the many intricate ways that values can influence science is an important task for philosophy, we argue that this framing—that there is a single phenomenon to be understood or a single problem to be solved—is misleading and liable to distort inquiry. This framing creates a chimera.

ABSTRACT. Much of the literature on values in science is framed around the idea of a shift in the status of the so-called value-free ideal (VFI) for science: having been widely accepted in the past, it has now come to be thoroughly rejected. Instead, the commonly asserted view now is that there is a new problem for philosophy of science to address, namely, distinguishing appropriate from inappropriate value-influence on science. While understanding the many intricate ways that values can influence science is an important task for philosophy, we argue that this framing—that there is a single phenomenon to be understood or a single problem to be solved—is misleading and liable to distort inquiry. This framing creates a chimera.

Just accepted:

The New Chimera for Values in Science
– Arnon Levy & Jacob Stegenga

Abstract in alt text or read the paper here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky

1 week ago 12 3 0 0
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Why Does Causal Reasoning Work? | BJPS Short Reads Naftali Weinberger, Porter Williams and James Woodward on the role of worldly infrastructure

New BJPS Short Read!

Why Does Causal Reasoning Work?

Naftali Weinberger, Porter Williams & James Woodward on the role of worldly infrastructure

www.thebsps.org/short-reads/...

#philsci #philsky

3 weeks ago 63 22 0 4

What’s a long weekend without at least one book review? Terrible, is what. Improve things with this 👇

2 weeks ago 13 1 0 0
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Jan Baedke, The Organism | BJPS Review of Books Matthew Sims reviews The Organism, by Jan Baedke

A new review of Jan Baedke’s #OpenAccess Cambridge Element The Organism (@universitypress.cambridge.org), by Matthew Sims (@philosobio.bsky.social), has been published in @thebjps.bsky.social Review of Books! Check it out! 👇📕 www.thebsps.org/reviewofbook... #HPBio #philsky #HPS #evosky #booksky

2 weeks ago 32 13 2 0
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Scientists on Tap, Not on Top | BJPS Short Reads Stephen John on why scientists cannot, and should not, care about policymakers’ values

New BJPS Short Read, for your reading or listening pleasure!

Scientists on Tap, Not on Top

Stephen John argues that scientists cannot, and should not, care about policymakers’ values

#philsci #philsky

2 weeks ago 6 4 0 0
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Jan Baedke, The Organism | BJPS Review of Books Matthew Sims reviews The Organism, by Jan Baedke

New from the BJPS Review of Books

The Organism
– Jan Baedke

Reviewed by Matthew Sims

www.thebsps.org/reviewofbook...

#philsci #hpbio #philsky

3 weeks ago 34 12 0 1
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Death in Mind | BJPS Short Reads
Death in Mind | BJPS Short Reads What does the opossum’s playing dead tell us about animal minds? By Susana Monsó and Laura DanónRead the essay here: https://www.thebsps.org/short-reads/mons...

You can listen to BJPS Short Reads being read by the author. Find them on our shiny new YouTube channel or subscribe wherever you normally get your podcasts

youtu.be/VTE87PDMNuc?...

#philsky #philsci

3 weeks ago 11 3 0 0
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Ryan Nefdt, Language, Science, and Structure | BJPS Review of Books Christopher Viger reviews Language, Science, and Structure, by Ryan Nefdt

ICYMI from the BJPS Review of Books:

Christopher Viger reviews

Language, Science, and Structure
By Ryan Nefdt

www.thebsps.org/reviewofbook...

#philsci #philsky

3 weeks ago 6 2 1 0

Wake up babe, new Weinberger paper on causal reasoning just dropped 👀

3 weeks ago 33 4 0 1
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Why Does Causal Reasoning Work? | BJPS Short Reads Naftali Weinberger, Porter Williams and James Woodward on the role of worldly infrastructure

New BJPS Short Read!

Why Does Causal Reasoning Work?

Naftali Weinberger, Porter Williams & James Woodward on the role of worldly infrastructure

www.thebsps.org/short-reads/...

#philsci #philsky

3 weeks ago 63 22 0 4
Death in Mind | BJPS Short Reads
Death in Mind | BJPS Short Reads What does the opossum’s playing dead tell us about animal minds? By Susana Monsó and Laura Danón Read the essay here: https://www.thebsps.org/short-reads/monso-danon-death-in-mind/ #philsci

We now have a brand new youtube channel, where we'll be sharing BJPS Short Reads (new episodes as they are released; back catalogue whenever we can...). And we're starting with a banger...
youtu.be/VTE87PDMNuc

#philsci #philsky #hpbio

3 weeks ago 15 7 0 0
Death in Mind | BJPS Short Reads
Death in Mind | BJPS Short Reads What does the opossum’s playing dead tell us about animal minds? By Susana Monsó and Laura Danón Read the essay here: https://www.thebsps.org/short-reads/monso-danon-death-in-mind/ #philsci

We now have a brand new youtube channel, where we'll be sharing BJPS Short Reads (new episodes as they are released; back catalogue whenever we can...). And we're starting with a banger...
youtu.be/VTE87PDMNuc

#philsci #philsky #hpbio

3 weeks ago 15 7 0 0
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Emily Adlam, Saving Science from Quantum Mechanics | BJPS Review of Books Steven French reviews Saving Science from Quantum Mechanics, by Emily Adlam

New from the BJPS Review of Books:

Saving Science from Quantum Mechanics
– Emily Adlam

Reviewed by Steven French

Read it here:
www.thebsps.org/reviewofbook...

#philsci #philsky

4 weeks ago 11 2 1 5
ABSTRACT. Recent studies allege that large language models (LLMs) exhibit a range of cognitive biases familiar from human cognition. I argue that the case for many biases is weaker than it may appear. Using case studies of knowledge effects in the Wason selection task, availability bias in relation extraction, and anchoring bias in code generation, I show how a range of vindicatory strategies traditionally used to vindicate apparent biases in humans can be used to push back against allegations of bias in LLMs. I discuss implications for the role of cognitive bias in evaluating LLM performance, the rationality of human cognition, and future work on cognitive bias in LLMs.

ABSTRACT. Recent studies allege that large language models (LLMs) exhibit a range of cognitive biases familiar from human cognition. I argue that the case for many biases is weaker than it may appear. Using case studies of knowledge effects in the Wason selection task, availability bias in relation extraction, and anchoring bias in code generation, I show how a range of vindicatory strategies traditionally used to vindicate apparent biases in humans can be used to push back against allegations of bias in LLMs. I discuss implications for the role of cognitive bias in evaluating LLM performance, the rationality of human cognition, and future work on cognitive bias in LLMs.

Just accepted:

Cognitive Bias in Large Language Models: A Vindicatory Approach
– David Thorstad

Abstract in alt text or read it here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky

4 weeks ago 10 6 0 0
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ABSTRACT. Several authors have recently argued against realism about dark matter due to it being empirically unconfirmed or too conceptually thin. In response, Vaynberg has convincingly argued in favour of dark matter realism based on the Bullet Cluster observations. However, anti-realist concerns about conceptual thinness or future empirical detection may linger. I argue that these can be diffused by distinguishing between two different dark matter concepts, which I call astrophysical dark matter and fundamental dark matter. I submit that anti-realist concerns about future dark matter detection conflate empirical confirmation for fundamental dark matter with empirical confirmation for astrophysical dark matter. I further argue that the resulting realist commitment to astrophysical dark matter is more substantive than dark matter anti-realists recognize. I end with dispelling some concerns about unconceived alternatives.

ABSTRACT. Several authors have recently argued against realism about dark matter due to it being empirically unconfirmed or too conceptually thin. In response, Vaynberg has convincingly argued in favour of dark matter realism based on the Bullet Cluster observations. However, anti-realist concerns about conceptual thinness or future empirical detection may linger. I argue that these can be diffused by distinguishing between two different dark matter concepts, which I call astrophysical dark matter and fundamental dark matter. I submit that anti-realist concerns about future dark matter detection conflate empirical confirmation for fundamental dark matter with empirical confirmation for astrophysical dark matter. I further argue that the resulting realist commitment to astrophysical dark matter is more substantive than dark matter anti-realists recognize. I end with dispelling some concerns about unconceived alternatives.

Just accepted:

Dark Matter Realism Reconsidered
– Siska De Baerdemaeker

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky

1 month ago 4 3 0 0
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New season of BJPS Short Reads!

Death in Mind
– Susana Monsó and Laura Danón on what the opossum’s playing dead tells us about animal minds.

Read or listen here: www.thebsps.org/short-reads/...

#philsci #philsky #hpbio

1 month ago 14 5 1 1
ABSTRACT. A counterpossible is a counterfactual with an impossible antecedent. Jenny has argued that relative computability theory provides examples of false counterpossibles. If Jenny were right, this would be highly significant, since it would follow that the standard analysis of counterfactuals, according to which counterpossibles are all vacuously true, is incorrect. In this paper, we argue against the claim that computability theory provides examples of false counterpossibles. We distinguish two ways of reading the alleged false counterpossibles. Under the first reading, they are indeed false but, as we argue, they are not genuine counterpossibles. Under the second reading, they are genuine counterpossibles, but they are true. There is a way to interpret the alleged false counterpossibles as false, and there is a way to interpret them as counterpossibles, but under neither of these two interpretations are they false counterpossibles.

ABSTRACT. A counterpossible is a counterfactual with an impossible antecedent. Jenny has argued that relative computability theory provides examples of false counterpossibles. If Jenny were right, this would be highly significant, since it would follow that the standard analysis of counterfactuals, according to which counterpossibles are all vacuously true, is incorrect. In this paper, we argue against the claim that computability theory provides examples of false counterpossibles. We distinguish two ways of reading the alleged false counterpossibles. Under the first reading, they are indeed false but, as we argue, they are not genuine counterpossibles. Under the second reading, they are genuine counterpossibles, but they are true. There is a way to interpret the alleged false counterpossibles as false, and there is a way to interpret them as counterpossibles, but under neither of these two interpretations are they false counterpossibles.

Just accepted:

Counterpossibles in Relative Computability Theory: A Deeper Look
– Matteo Plebani, Luca San Mauro & Giorgio Lenta

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky

1 month ago 7 2 0 0
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Ryan Nefdt, Language, Science, and Structure | BJPS Review of Books Christopher Viger reviews Language, Science, and Structure, by Ryan Nefdt

New from the BJPS Review of Books:

Christopher Viger reviews

Language, Science, and Structure
By Ryan Nefdt

www.thebsps.org/reviewofbook...

#philsci #philsky

1 month ago 8 2 0 1

The BJPS asks referees to return reviews within a month. Are you aware of journals that offer less time than this? Please share—it’s for a thing!

1 month ago 0 3 1 0
ABSTRACT. There is a question of whether de-idealization is needed for justified use of---for 'checking'---idealizations. We argue that the standard philosophical account of de-idealization has become too idealized, but that this does not preclude the possibility of justificatory practices that show how models can be used to make inferences about the world. In turn, motivated by examples in physics, we provide a more expansive and practice-driven account of de-idealization by relaxing the standards for closeness to more realistic theoretical items, identifying at least three kinds of procedure for de-idealization: intra-model, inter-model, and measurement de-idealizations. These examples highlight how idealizations can be---and indeed have been---scrutinized within physics without appealing to the philosopher's idealized notion of de-idealization.

ABSTRACT. There is a question of whether de-idealization is needed for justified use of---for 'checking'---idealizations. We argue that the standard philosophical account of de-idealization has become too idealized, but that this does not preclude the possibility of justificatory practices that show how models can be used to make inferences about the world. In turn, motivated by examples in physics, we provide a more expansive and practice-driven account of de-idealization by relaxing the standards for closeness to more realistic theoretical items, identifying at least three kinds of procedure for de-idealization: intra-model, inter-model, and measurement de-idealizations. These examples highlight how idealizations can be---and indeed have been---scrutinized within physics without appealing to the philosopher's idealized notion of de-idealization.

Just accepted:

De-idealizing De-idealization: Beyond Full Reversal
– Yichen Luo & Eugene Y S Chua

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky

1 month ago 9 1 2 1
ABSTRACT. Work on the evolutionary origins of morality emphasizes one individual helping another without external pressure, threat or enticement, since external pressure can be dismissed as self-interested. This focus, we maintain, limits the range of moral theories under consideration and stacks the evidential deck in favour of theories that characterize morality as a kind of niceness, usually based on emotional capacities such as empathy. We argue that demand sharing—in which animals share after solicitation, request, or demand—should be seen as central in the evolution of morality. The resulting research programme would be more theoretically open-ended. It may shift the literature towards second-personal moral theories that take conflict to be central. It may also shift the literature towards moral psychologies that recognize the complexity of mixed, conflicting moral emotions. The question then is how conflict gave rise to demands that create moral interaction.

ABSTRACT. Work on the evolutionary origins of morality emphasizes one individual helping another without external pressure, threat or enticement, since external pressure can be dismissed as self-interested. This focus, we maintain, limits the range of moral theories under consideration and stacks the evidential deck in favour of theories that characterize morality as a kind of niceness, usually based on emotional capacities such as empathy. We argue that demand sharing—in which animals share after solicitation, request, or demand—should be seen as central in the evolution of morality. The resulting research programme would be more theoretically open-ended. It may shift the literature towards second-personal moral theories that take conflict to be central. It may also shift the literature towards moral psychologies that recognize the complexity of mixed, conflicting moral emotions. The question then is how conflict gave rise to demands that create moral interaction.

Just accepted:

Demand Sharing and the Evolution of Morality
– Mike Dacey & Paul Schofield

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky #hpbio

1 month ago 10 7 0 0
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Calzavarini Wins Popper Prize - Daily Nous The editors of the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (BJPS) have announced the winner of the 2025 Popper Prize. The Popper Prize is awarded annually for the best article appearing in the B...

The 2025 Popper Prize goes to...

1 month ago 8 1 0 0