Reza Pahlavi’s Emergency Blueprint: A Transition Plan—or a Survival Manual for the Islamic Republic’s Power Networks?
A critique of Reza Pahlavi’s emergency blueprint warns that prioritizing technocratic stability and integrating former IRGC specialists could reproduce old power networks and derail transitional justice.
Reza Pahlavi’s emergency program—known as the “Emergency-Period Booklet”—was drafted and published in Tir 1404 (June 22–July 22, 2025) by the National Union for Democracy in Iran (NUFDI), a U.S.-based Iranian-American advocacy organization, (NUFDI) within the Iran Prosperity Project (IPP), a policy initiative developed under Reza Pahlavi’s guidance. The program’s main aim is to provide an operational, expert-driven roadmap for managing the first 100 to 180 days after the collapse of the Islamic Republic, in order to prevent chaos, restore political and economic stability, and lay the groundwork for a free, democratic, and prosperous Iran. Based on the experience of domestic and international experts and focused on stabilizing and reviving industry, the document has been presented as a public draft for feedback, framed as a response to the urgency of the current moment. (NUFDI Fund)
The booklet consists of 15 main chapters addressing key transition issues: from the goals of a provisional government and core areas such as the political and legal process of transitioning from the Islamic Republic, maintaining essential functions, education, foreign policy, military and security affairs, asset recovery and protection, to economic and social sectors such as energy, industry and production, water, the environment, health and healthcare, and macroeconomics. Each chapter focuses on the emergency phase and, without entering long-term detail, offers practical measures aimed at preventing harm, stabilizing conditions, and preparing the ground for sustainable growth.
I examine this booklet first as a citizen and then as a writer and journalist, since it is, in practice, the proposed governance program of Mr. Pahlavi and his supporters. At first glance, this document offers a pragmatic operational roadmap for managing immediate post-collapse crises. Its main strength lies in security, finance, and diplomacy. Yet it suffers from a fundamental weakness: the dominance of a technocratic–security outlook over a political–democratic one. This weakness becomes visible in prioritizing “stability” at the cost of suspending “transitional justice,” in approaching linguistic and socio-cultural groups as a security issue rather than offering an inclusive legal–political framework, and in its ambiguity about the economic model and the governance of national assets. As a result, while the plan for moving beyond the emergency period may prevent chaos, it also carries the risk of preserving old power structures in a new guise, reproducing inequality and social distrust, and it offers no guarantee of a stable and just democratic transition.
Stability Through Integration
The transition plan proposes a three-component, stability-oriented approach to dealing with the Islamic Republic’s security–military institutions: dissolving ideological and repressive bodies, reforming and integrating vetted technical and mid-level forces,[1] and maintaining the structures of “professional” institutions. On this basis, institutions such as the Quds Force, the Basij, and the IRGC’s military branches would be fully dissolved[2] to eliminate the pillars of domestic repression and foreign intervention. In contrast, the three branches of the conventional army[3] would continue operating within their professional framework under new oversight, and specialized personnel from dissolved bodies would, after retraining, be integrated into national structures to prevent a security vacuum and the loss of technical expertise.
This plan is designed with the fragility of transition in mind and seeks to balance dismantling authoritarian structures with avoiding instability. Risks such as intelligence gaps, internal resistance by dismissed forces, or the emergence of extremist groups have pushed planners toward gradual, integration-focused solutions.[4] Accordingly, even in institutions that would be dissolved organizationally (such as the IRGC Intelligence Organization), the plan anticipates integrating some IRGC experts into new bodies to preserve organizational memory. Overall, the priority is to avoid broad purges while ensuring livelihoods, so as to prevent security and social crises.
However, the proposal to “integrate experts” from parallel, ideological forces such as the IRGC and Basij—after the structural dissolution of these bodies (especially in intelligence and aerospace)—creates a practical problem. These experts do not possess merely “neutral technical knowledge”; they are also products and carriers of an organizational culture, networked relationships, and prior ideological loyalties. Integrating them without a time-consuming process of individualized separation (as opposed to group integration) effectively means the infiltration and continuity of the very culture and power networks that were supposedly dissolved. This approach may ensure the dissolution of the formal structure, but it risks producing a hidden, informal network of old elements behind the façade of the state.
The plan’s overriding concern is avoiding a security vacuum and unrest—hence its emphasis on “maximum integration” and “avoiding broad purges.” But this logic directly collides with society’s natural demand for justice, truth-seeking, accountability, and symbolic cleansing. It should be noted that after the January 2026 uprising (Dey 1404, December 22, 2025–January 20, 2026), this demand has deepened. It is not at all unlikely that, by the time of collapse, these wounds will be even more raw and deep—and that justice-seeking may not turn into vengeance-seeking.
The “respectful retirement” of surveillance managers or the integration of former intelligence forces—even if their hands are not stained with blood—may be perceived by a large segment of society, which has endured systematic repression, as impunity and the continuation of injustice. Because this approach prioritizes stability over justice, it undermines the legitimacy of new security institutions and weakens the possibility of genuine “national reconciliation” from the outset.
The plan distinguishes between “professional and non-ideological” institutions (such as a conventional army) and “ideological” ones (such as the IRGC), proposing continuity for the former and dissolution or reform for the latter. But in the Islamic Republic, this boundary is profoundly blurred. The ideology of the Guardianship of the Jurist (Velayat-e Faqih) has systematically penetrated all governing institutions, including the conventional army. Many army commanders also subscribe to the regime’s ideological foundations. So by what metric will “vetting” be conducted? Is loyalty to the previous structure—often the condition of survival and advancement—not itself a form of collaboration with a repressive regime? This ambiguity opens space for arbitrary interpretations and the influence of old networks. It blocks real reform and may even serve, instead of purification, as cover for preserving the status quo.
A Safe Passage to Democracy
The desirable solution for a safe passage to democracy requires a clear strategy grounded in public participation—one that both guarantees justice and prevents a security breakdown. First, we examine the ideal scenario, then—based on realities on the ground and drawing on the experience of the 1979 Revolution—we address the challenges:
Instead of rapid integration, a transparent process of temporary suspension and oversight should be implemented. All security–military institutions should immediately be placed under the command of a transitional, civilian, multi-member Security Council (including trusted national figures and representatives of civil society). All senior and key personnel should be temporarily removed from positions that allow misuse or sabotage, while their salaries and livelihoods are maintained until final adjudication.
In the second stage, an independent truth-finding body with broad judicial powers should be formed, combining impartial Iranian judges and international observers. Its mission must be to separate three clearly distinct groups:
* Criminals (perpetrators of crimes against humanity, torture, extrajudicial killings), who must be tried in public and fair courts.
* Loyal collaborators whose hands are not stained with people’s blood (those who merely served within the system but did not commit crimes), who can return to service after mandatory professional and human-rights retraining and an oath to the new constitution.
* Neutral technical specialists, who can be recruited immediately.
This process must be accompanied by the legal and symbolic dissolution of all parallel ideological bodies (the IRGC, Basij) and by the adoption of new laws banning any military interference in politics and the economy. New security institutions must be rebuilt from the ground up, with new recruitment and strict oversight by parliament and civil society. This solution is time-consuming, but if implemented with full transparency, it secures popular legitimacy for the new institutions by responding to the demand for justice and by establishing a real break with the past.
From “Long Live the Shah” to Rebuilding SAVAK
Reza Pahlavi—often framed by supporters as “Pahlavi III”—already needs an ideology to consolidate monarchy, and that ideology is antiquarian nationalism and the notion of divinely bestowed royal glory, reflected in slogans like “Long live the Shah.”
The danger of reproducing the Imperial Guard or SAVAK in new clothing is real and serious. The current program—by emphasizing “centralized leadership by a single top figure” during the transition and “maximum integration of old forces without a transparent separation process”—is exposed to this historical misuse. Power networks inherited from the previous regime can, by promoting extreme nationalist discourses and manufacturing crises, present themselves as “the true guardians of the homeland” against “separatist and foreign threats.” They can then exploit the program’s centralized structure to eliminate rivals, suppress critics under the label of “treason,” and institutionalize an unaccountable power. In this scenario, the “Transitional National Guard” can quickly—through purging independent elements and replacing them with old or new ideological loyalists—become the nucleus of a new repressive force rooted in securitization and aggressive nationalism.
To prevent this disaster, the program must be accompanied by courageous structural reforms: replacing centralized leadership with a collective leadership council composed of representatives of major political and civil currents, with security decisions taken by consensus, is essential. In addition, the mission of the National Guard must be defined precisely and narrowly as “physical protection of democratic processes and transitional justice institutions,” not political intervention or social surveillance. Third, an independent oversight body with the power to dismiss commanders—composed of judges, representatives of the provisional parliament, and international civil organizations (such as Amnesty International)—must be established to monitor all operations.
Without such strong safeguards, the program’s internal logic can easily serve the reproduction of authoritarianism—this time under a different flag.
The most important point must be stated at the end of this section: the program lacks any specific mechanism for dismantling the political economy of repressive institutions. The integration or structural dissolution of the IRGC and foundations can only be sustainable if their financial, corporate, and rent-seeking networks are simultaneously and systematically separated, made transparent, and democratized.
The program focuses on asset control and human-resource integration,[5] but it offers no plan to prevent the economic penetration of these networks into the new government. How can one ensure that former IRGC commanders or foundation managers—using wealth accumulated during the transition—do not buy politicians and media in the new state, or lobby to reclaim power?
Without simultaneously striking at the economic foundations of repressive institutions’ power, any integration or dissolution at the personnel level will be a superficial performance. The corrupt and powerful core of these networks will continue living in the underground economy or through new proxies and, at the first opportunity, will capture the new political structure. This is the blind spot that can bring the entire transition project to failure.
Footnotes:
[1] Drawn from the “Military and Security” chapter, items related to integrating specialized personnel from dissolved bodies after vetting and retraining: “Vetting, approval, integration of specialists into a new structure” (for the IRGC Intelligence Organization); “integration of specialists into the national intelligence structure”; “integration of experts into the new structure after retraining and vetting to prevent a security vacuum and preserve technical knowledge.”
[2] Drawn from the “Military and Security” chapter, items related to dissolving the IRGC’s ideological and repressive bodies: “Quds Force: full dissolution”; “Basij: full dissolution”; “IRGC Ground Force: an ideologically loyal ground force—full dissolution and integration into the national army”; “IRGC Aerospace Force: advanced missile and drone capabilities—full dissolution and integration into the national army”; “IRGC Navy: asymmetric naval warfare capabilities—full dissolution and integration into the national army.”
[3] Drawn from the “Military and Security” chapter, items related to maintaining the structure of “professional” institutions (the conventional army): the army’s three branches (ground, air, navy) are preserved as professional institutions under new oversight.
[4] Drawn from the “Military and Security” chapter, overall justification for preventing a security vacuum: preserving stability and preventing a power vacuum through maximum integration of technical and mid-level forces after vetting and retraining, so technical knowledge is not lost and internal/border security is stabilized.
[5] Drawn from the “Macroeconomics” chapter and sections related to “asset recovery and protection” and the “transitional government”: controlling assets; safeguarding and registering documents; managing and protecting Iran’s assets abroad; removing political appointees from state companies and appointing interim management.
Reza Pahlavi’s Emergency Blueprint: A Transition Plan—or a Survival Manual for the Islamic Republic’s Power Networks? #RezaPahlavi #IranDemocracy
