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“THE WHITE POWER MATRIX & THE NWO”
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#Adelaja #AdelajaIndexes #Africa #Jihadism #NewWorldOrder #NWO #PanAfrican #PanAfricanism

SWITCH SOCIAL MEDIA
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“SUDAN GENOCIDE!”
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10 years after Brussels attacks, threat has moved online, says EU terror chief The attacks exposed security gaps in the EU’s borderless travel area. Now the threat has moved to the internet.

Violent #jihadism remains the main threat: new large-scale attacks cannot be excluded. But the probability is much lower today than it was 10 years ago. With new threats emerging (lone actors, youth #radicalisation online), we must adopt a “security reflex”, focusing on prevention and collaboration.

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Although the Islamic State is unlikely to restore its territorial caliphate, it is well positioned to expand as a diffuse insurgency. Rather than attempting to govern, it will likely rely on mobile cells operating across Syria and conducting terrorist attacks, ambushes, and assassinations. In Syria's northeast, contested control, local tensions, and overstretched forces, compounded by the mass escapes from al-Hol, are creating a rare opening for the group to rebuild networks and recruit fighters.
All this is unfolding amid a widening regional war that risks further straining the fragile security environment. If Iran enters a prolonged period of instability, Iraq is likely to absorb the first-order shock, potentially reopening long-standing vulnerabilities in its western provinces that have historically served as terrain for Sunni insurgent mobilization.
Meanwhile, Israel is escalating its military campaign across Lebanon, raising spillover risks that Syria is poorly positioned to absorb.
Regional ruptures have repeatedly acted as accelerants for jihadist movements, from the invasion of Iraq to the Syrian civil war, and this conflict risks reproducing that dynamic.

Although the Islamic State is unlikely to restore its territorial caliphate, it is well positioned to expand as a diffuse insurgency. Rather than attempting to govern, it will likely rely on mobile cells operating across Syria and conducting terrorist attacks, ambushes, and assassinations. In Syria's northeast, contested control, local tensions, and overstretched forces, compounded by the mass escapes from al-Hol, are creating a rare opening for the group to rebuild networks and recruit fighters. All this is unfolding amid a widening regional war that risks further straining the fragile security environment. If Iran enters a prolonged period of instability, Iraq is likely to absorb the first-order shock, potentially reopening long-standing vulnerabilities in its western provinces that have historically served as terrain for Sunni insurgent mobilization. Meanwhile, Israel is escalating its military campaign across Lebanon, raising spillover risks that Syria is poorly positioned to absorb. Regional ruptures have repeatedly acted as accelerants for jihadist movements, from the invasion of Iraq to the Syrian civil war, and this conflict risks reproducing that dynamic.

Washington's priority should be preventing
Syria's transition from sliding back into renewed conflict, because stabilization is the only durable foundation for containment. That requires sustained pressure on Damascus to move beyond coercive consolidation toward genuinely inclusive governance, including a workable degree of decentralization to strengthen local security. Washington played an instrumental role in providing al Sharaa with international legitimacy. It still retains enough leverage to ensure the ceasefire in the northeast is respected and to press for accountability inside the security forces, including curbing sectarian incitement and sidelining the most extreme elements rather than absorbing them. That means maintaining Syria's State Sponsor of Terrorism designation and advancing measures such as the proposed Save the Kurds Act to reimpose targeted sanctions in response to violations. Without enforceable conditions, Syria risks a transition that either fractures, allowing the Islamic State to expand its operating space, or consolidates into an exclusionary Islamist order. Either way, the consequences will not be confined to Syria.

Washington's priority should be preventing Syria's transition from sliding back into renewed conflict, because stabilization is the only durable foundation for containment. That requires sustained pressure on Damascus to move beyond coercive consolidation toward genuinely inclusive governance, including a workable degree of decentralization to strengthen local security. Washington played an instrumental role in providing al Sharaa with international legitimacy. It still retains enough leverage to ensure the ceasefire in the northeast is respected and to press for accountability inside the security forces, including curbing sectarian incitement and sidelining the most extreme elements rather than absorbing them. That means maintaining Syria's State Sponsor of Terrorism designation and advancing measures such as the proposed Save the Kurds Act to reimpose targeted sanctions in response to violations. Without enforceable conditions, Syria risks a transition that either fractures, allowing the Islamic State to expand its operating space, or consolidates into an exclusionary Islamist order. Either way, the consequences will not be confined to Syria.

Islamic State containment is collapsing in Syria: Although the Islamic State is unlikely to restore its territorial caliphate, it is well positioned to expand as a diffuse insurgency. warontherocks.com/2026/03/isla... By Kelly Kassis #Islamism #Jihadism #terrorism

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"Des États, comme la Russie et l'Iran, se mêlent à l'environnement des réseaux terroristes" Dix ans après les attentats de Bruxelles, comment a évolué la stratégie de l'Union européenne en matière de contre-terrorisme ? Entretien avec Bartjan...

10 years after the #Brussels attacks, the #terrorist threat hasn’t disappeared. It has evolved: mutant #jihadism, jihadism in gaming, and violence from both the #farright & #farleft. Our #youth are the most vulnerable and targeted. All this in my interview with #LaLibreBelgique.

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Dr Walid Phares: "What this war is unearthing in #Middle-East isn’t just #liberation of one oppressed #nation of 90 millions - it's also cracking a millenarian wall of suppression imposed by #jihadism against #Indigenous #peoples who lost their freedom, cultures & dreams &
who are now #rising again"

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🔔 Avec le chercheur Francesco Bergoglio Errico, nous analysons l’anatomie du djihadisme italien.

Il propose une typologie des acteurs engagés dans le djihad armé et examine les politiques mises en œuvre pour lutter contre ce phénomène.

#jihadism #terrorism #radicalisation #sécurité

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“THE AFRICAN REVOLUTION”
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#Adelaja #AdelajaIndexes #Africa #AfricanRevolution #AfricanUnity #Cyberspace #Jihadism #PanAfrican

SWITCH SOCIALmEDIA
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“SUDAN GENOCIDE”
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Israel's position here is overly generous. An NGO that is, by its own implicit acknowledgement, incapable of vetting for terrorists should not be operating in a war zone, full stop. Instead of immediately banning MSF, the Israeli government is volunteering to do MSF's vetting work for it.
MSF should jump at the chance. After all, Israel is undeniably more reliable in its vetting than is MSF or any other NGO.
And that is precisely why MSF and its defenders have refused to take the deal: It would be tantamount to admitting that Israel's information is far more likely to be accurate than anybody else's. The Committee to Protect Journalists, for example, can't seem to tell terrorists from civilians either. And we've known nearly from the beginning of the war that the UN agencies operating in Gaza were practically subsidiaries of Hamas.
Admitting that Israel is more reliable a source than anyone else in the theater would also remind the public how much the media have smeared the IDF with false allegations and false reporting-to say nothing of the made-up casualty figures journalistic institutions have run for over two years. And it would suggest that perhaps the entire narrative of the wider conflict has been misleading.

Israel's position here is overly generous. An NGO that is, by its own implicit acknowledgement, incapable of vetting for terrorists should not be operating in a war zone, full stop. Instead of immediately banning MSF, the Israeli government is volunteering to do MSF's vetting work for it. MSF should jump at the chance. After all, Israel is undeniably more reliable in its vetting than is MSF or any other NGO. And that is precisely why MSF and its defenders have refused to take the deal: It would be tantamount to admitting that Israel's information is far more likely to be accurate than anybody else's. The Committee to Protect Journalists, for example, can't seem to tell terrorists from civilians either. And we've known nearly from the beginning of the war that the UN agencies operating in Gaza were practically subsidiaries of Hamas. Admitting that Israel is more reliable a source than anyone else in the theater would also remind the public how much the media have smeared the IDF with false allegations and false reporting-to say nothing of the made-up casualty figures journalistic institutions have run for over two years. And it would suggest that perhaps the entire narrative of the wider conflict has been misleading.

Get used to saying it: ‘Israel was right again’.
The world’s NGO-media complex would rather put untold lives in danger than swallow its pride and admit that the credibility of Israel, and only of Israel, remains intact. www.commentary.org/seth-mandel/... #Jihadism #terrorism #NGOs

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Israel's position here is overly generous. An NGO that is, by its own implicit acknowledgement, incapable of vetting for terrorists should not be operating in a war zone, full stop. Instead of immediately banning MSF, the Israeli government is volunteering to do MSF's vetting work for it.
MSF should jump at the chance. After all, Israel is undeniably more reliable in its vetting than is MSF or any other NGO.
And that is precisely why MSF and its defenders have refused to take the deal: It would be tantamount to admitting that Israel's information is far more likely to be accurate than anybody else's. The Committee to Protect Journalists, for example, can't seem to tell terrorists from civilians either. And we've known nearly from the beginning of the war that the UN agencies operating in Gaza were practically subsidiaries of Hamas.
Admitting that Israel is more reliable a source than anyone else in the theater would also remind the public how much the media have smeared the IDF with false allegations and false reporting-to say nothing of the made-up casualty figures journalistic institutions have run for over two years. And it would suggest that perhaps the entire narrative of the wider conflict has been misleading.

Israel's position here is overly generous. An NGO that is, by its own implicit acknowledgement, incapable of vetting for terrorists should not be operating in a war zone, full stop. Instead of immediately banning MSF, the Israeli government is volunteering to do MSF's vetting work for it. MSF should jump at the chance. After all, Israel is undeniably more reliable in its vetting than is MSF or any other NGO. And that is precisely why MSF and its defenders have refused to take the deal: It would be tantamount to admitting that Israel's information is far more likely to be accurate than anybody else's. The Committee to Protect Journalists, for example, can't seem to tell terrorists from civilians either. And we've known nearly from the beginning of the war that the UN agencies operating in Gaza were practically subsidiaries of Hamas. Admitting that Israel is more reliable a source than anyone else in the theater would also remind the public how much the media have smeared the IDF with false allegations and false reporting-to say nothing of the made-up casualty figures journalistic institutions have run for over two years. And it would suggest that perhaps the entire narrative of the wider conflict has been misleading.

Get used to saying it: ‘Israel was right again’.
The world’s NGO-media complex would rather put untold lives in danger than swallow its pride and admit that the credibility of Israel, and only of Israel, remains intact. www.commentary.org/seth-mandel/... #Jihadism #terrorism #NGOs

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The security consequences are already emerging. Al-Hol staff have reported receiving threats from former residents and now live in fear of reprisal attacks. Recently, the head of Iraqi intelligence warned of a resurgence of Islamic State cells in Iraq, citing an increase from 2,000 to 10,000 fighters over the past year. Syria already faces an uphill battle meeting the needs of its citizens in a postwar environment with few resources, raising concerns about how they would handle more radical challenges to the regime of Ahmed al-Sharaa. As the IS waits in the shadows to reconstitute itself, international inaction may provide it the opportunity that it needs.

The security consequences are already emerging. Al-Hol staff have reported receiving threats from former residents and now live in fear of reprisal attacks. Recently, the head of Iraqi intelligence warned of a resurgence of Islamic State cells in Iraq, citing an increase from 2,000 to 10,000 fighters over the past year. Syria already faces an uphill battle meeting the needs of its citizens in a postwar environment with few resources, raising concerns about how they would handle more radical challenges to the regime of Ahmed al-Sharaa. As the IS waits in the shadows to reconstitute itself, international inaction may provide it the opportunity that it needs.

For years, the SDF, U.N., and U.S. government have called on countries to address indefinite detention in northeast Syria-and warned of the consequences of neglecting this issue. The chaos of the past few weeks was both predictable and preventable. Occurring on the watch of the Syrian government, it raises serious questions about whether this release was the result of intent or ineptitude. Both scenarios are worrisome.
While not everyone in al-Hol was a committed Islamic State extremist, many were. Still more have been exposed to a harsh, heavily radicalized environment for seven years, and these civilians will likely require some support transitioning back to their homes.
Two divergent regional approaches have emerged in this regard. Syria has seemingly focused on thrusting its citizens back into society in a haphazard manner.
Many Syrians previously held in al-Hol have already reportedly returned to their families without proper documentation or support. Iraq has emphasized a formalized rehabilitation and reintegration program for its citizens. Some Iraqis also remained in al-Hol camp. The Iraqi government-which has been in the process of bringing back more than 22,000 of its citizens since 2021—repatriated 191 nationals who wanted to go home last week. Which national approach will be more effective in the long term is yet to be seen, but Iraq's undoubtedly looks more promising at this stage, even if imperfect.

For years, the SDF, U.N., and U.S. government have called on countries to address indefinite detention in northeast Syria-and warned of the consequences of neglecting this issue. The chaos of the past few weeks was both predictable and preventable. Occurring on the watch of the Syrian government, it raises serious questions about whether this release was the result of intent or ineptitude. Both scenarios are worrisome. While not everyone in al-Hol was a committed Islamic State extremist, many were. Still more have been exposed to a harsh, heavily radicalized environment for seven years, and these civilians will likely require some support transitioning back to their homes. Two divergent regional approaches have emerged in this regard. Syria has seemingly focused on thrusting its citizens back into society in a haphazard manner. Many Syrians previously held in al-Hol have already reportedly returned to their families without proper documentation or support. Iraq has emphasized a formalized rehabilitation and reintegration program for its citizens. Some Iraqis also remained in al-Hol camp. The Iraqi government-which has been in the process of bringing back more than 22,000 of its citizens since 2021—repatriated 191 nationals who wanted to go home last week. Which national approach will be more effective in the long term is yet to be seen, but Iraq's undoubtedly looks more promising at this stage, even if imperfect.

For the few hundred residents—Syrians and Iraqis-that did not leave the camps, the Syrian government implemented a plan this week to send them to a repurposed camp for internally displaced people called Akhtarin in Aleppo province. The UNHCR is supporting this effort, which ultimately aims to reintegrate this population. But it is not clear what will happen to those at Akhtarin who do not voluntarily return to their homes. Already 1,200
Iraqis have reportedly said they do not want to go to Iraq due to outstanding warrants.
As for the approximately 20,000 people who disappeared from al-Hol, they have simply been forgotten. These include citizens from 40 countries, many of whom have reportedly moved around Idlib and Aleppo. Some foreigners are trying to return home. Others who might be facing criminal charges in their home countries are unlikely to return. Finally, those who are still committed to the Islamic State may try to rejoin local jihadi groups or even move internationally to other hotbeds of jihadi activity.
There is a long history of foreign fighters (and in some cases, their families) moving from conflict to conflict. Unfortunately, there is no shortage of jihadi hot spots in the world today to consider.
The smaller Roj camp-which is still under the control of the SDF-also holds around 2,000 foreigners, including many Westerners. Questions remain over the future of these populations, but some are taking their fate into their own hands.

For the few hundred residents—Syrians and Iraqis-that did not leave the camps, the Syrian government implemented a plan this week to send them to a repurposed camp for internally displaced people called Akhtarin in Aleppo province. The UNHCR is supporting this effort, which ultimately aims to reintegrate this population. But it is not clear what will happen to those at Akhtarin who do not voluntarily return to their homes. Already 1,200 Iraqis have reportedly said they do not want to go to Iraq due to outstanding warrants. As for the approximately 20,000 people who disappeared from al-Hol, they have simply been forgotten. These include citizens from 40 countries, many of whom have reportedly moved around Idlib and Aleppo. Some foreigners are trying to return home. Others who might be facing criminal charges in their home countries are unlikely to return. Finally, those who are still committed to the Islamic State may try to rejoin local jihadi groups or even move internationally to other hotbeds of jihadi activity. There is a long history of foreign fighters (and in some cases, their families) moving from conflict to conflict. Unfortunately, there is no shortage of jihadi hot spots in the world today to consider. The smaller Roj camp-which is still under the control of the SDF-also holds around 2,000 foreigners, including many Westerners. Questions remain over the future of these populations, but some are taking their fate into their own hands.

Syria has just witnessed a great escape. Just weeks after a breakout from an Islamic State detention facility in the country’s northeast, more than 20,000 people from al-Hol detention camp, which is known for holding Islamic State-affiliated families, are now unaccounted for. #Syria #ISIS #Jihadism

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At first glance, things could not be better right now for the Sunni jihadist movement.
The Afghan Taliban and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) have seized power and are now the governments in Afghanistan and Syria.
Jihadist groups have made unprecedented gains in Africa and pose existential threats to multiple governments in the region. The conflict in Gaza and the Israeli government's reported plans to relocate Palestinians to other countries tapped into the most galvanizing cause in the movement. This instability coupled with the geographic reach of the movement should be potent.
Yet the jihadist movement-meaning the individuals, factions, and organizations that use violence in pursuit of resurrecting the caliphate-has failed to capitalize on these circumstances. The movement has failed to seize this opportunity because it is experiencing a prolonged deficit of leaders who can inspire and direct it.

At first glance, things could not be better right now for the Sunni jihadist movement. The Afghan Taliban and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) have seized power and are now the governments in Afghanistan and Syria. Jihadist groups have made unprecedented gains in Africa and pose existential threats to multiple governments in the region. The conflict in Gaza and the Israeli government's reported plans to relocate Palestinians to other countries tapped into the most galvanizing cause in the movement. This instability coupled with the geographic reach of the movement should be potent. Yet the jihadist movement-meaning the individuals, factions, and organizations that use violence in pursuit of resurrecting the caliphate-has failed to capitalize on these circumstances. The movement has failed to seize this opportunity because it is experiencing a prolonged deficit of leaders who can inspire and direct it.

The absence of a
transformational jihadist movement leader is good news for counterterrorism. This deficit means the movement lacks individuals to inspire organizations and attract new followers. But while Sunni jihadism may have transitioned to a leaderless movement, if a leader could harness the powerful potential of social media or the mobilizing
potential of the war in Gaza or another conflict, the jihadist movement would be transformed and possess the capability to be as dangerous than ever.

The absence of a transformational jihadist movement leader is good news for counterterrorism. This deficit means the movement lacks individuals to inspire organizations and attract new followers. But while Sunni jihadism may have transitioned to a leaderless movement, if a leader could harness the powerful potential of social media or the mobilizing potential of the war in Gaza or another conflict, the jihadist movement would be transformed and possess the capability to be as dangerous than ever.

The Jihadist movement’s leadership deficit: Where did the unifying leaders of the transnational extremist movement go? www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-... By Tricia Bacon and Elizabeth Grimm #Jihadism #terrorism

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How thousands of people linked to ISIS went missing: Women and children flee Syrian facilities holding alleged members of extremist group after Kurdish forces lose control archive.ph/nWU6n #Syria #Kurds #Jihadism

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In a worldwide study of more than 10 million tweets and posts published between Oct. 7, 2023, and Oct. 7, 2024, the French researcher Hugo Micheron found that the number of shares and comments on the massacre swiftly reached a historic peak, higher than even the war in Ukraine, and remained abnormally high. All discussion groups across the globe were affected, even those having nothing to do with the Middle East, such as anti-vaxxers and climate skeptics. This is a new and unprecedented phenomenon, he told me. "With Oct.7, the very concept of war adds to its physical nature an informational component that touches everybody. We have entered the era of the First World War on information." What follows is an attempt to describe the effects of this information war launched by Hamas in Europe.

In a worldwide study of more than 10 million tweets and posts published between Oct. 7, 2023, and Oct. 7, 2024, the French researcher Hugo Micheron found that the number of shares and comments on the massacre swiftly reached a historic peak, higher than even the war in Ukraine, and remained abnormally high. All discussion groups across the globe were affected, even those having nothing to do with the Middle East, such as anti-vaxxers and climate skeptics. This is a new and unprecedented phenomenon, he told me. "With Oct.7, the very concept of war adds to its physical nature an informational component that touches everybody. We have entered the era of the First World War on information." What follows is an attempt to describe the effects of this information war launched by Hamas in Europe.

The Fall of Europe: From Paris to Birmingham to Brussels, antisemitism is the new normal—again www.tabletmag.com/sections/new... By @marcweitzmann.bsky.social #antisemitism #Islamism #Jihadism #authoritarianLeft #HistoricalPoliticalMemory

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Two Islamic State extremists are facing life in jail after they were found guilty of plotting a suicide attack on Manchester's Jewish community, with any Christians killed "a bonus".
The plan would have resulted in "the deadliest terrorist attack in UK history", according to Rob Potts, the assistant chief constable of Greater Manchester police.

Two Islamic State extremists are facing life in jail after they were found guilty of plotting a suicide attack on Manchester's Jewish community, with any Christians killed "a bonus". The plan would have resulted in "the deadliest terrorist attack in UK history", according to Rob Potts, the assistant chief constable of Greater Manchester police.

Two convicted of Islamic State-inspired plot to kill British Jews:
Walid Saadaoui, 38, and Amar Hussein, 52, plotted to attack Manchester in what police said would have been the deadliest terrorist attack in British history archive.ph/uk0ZAb #antisemitism #Islamism #Jihadism #terrorism

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Al-Qaeda and its network of affiliates have 50 times more recruits than they had at the time of 9/11, according to data compiled by a United Nations monitoring group.
The figures, drawn from intelligence gathered by spy agencies such as MI6, show that there are now 25,000 potential fighters dotted across the globe. At the time of the Twin Tower attacks, in September 2001, there were an estimated 500 terrorists.
The statistics were shared at a briefing at the Royal United Services Institute (Rusi) before the publication of the UN security council monitoring team's annual report on the global terrorist threat.

Al-Qaeda and its network of affiliates have 50 times more recruits than they had at the time of 9/11, according to data compiled by a United Nations monitoring group. The figures, drawn from intelligence gathered by spy agencies such as MI6, show that there are now 25,000 potential fighters dotted across the globe. At the time of the Twin Tower attacks, in September 2001, there were an estimated 500 terrorists. The statistics were shared at a briefing at the Royal United Services Institute (Rusi) before the publication of the UN security council monitoring team's annual report on the global terrorist threat.

Al-Qaeda 50 times bigger than at time of 9/11, UN warns: The terrorist group and its affiliates have 25,000 fighters across the globe, including the Middle East and Africa, planning attacks against the West archive.ph/ILiOJ By Larisa Brown #Jihadism #terrorism

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This is not merely a Levantine crisis; it is the activation of a global export strategy. For years, the fragile detention network in Syria held over 8,500 battle-hardened foreign fighters and tens of thousands of their radicalized family members. With the withdrawal of the Kurdish buffer and the rise of an Islamist-dominated government in Damascus that has prioritized sectarian cleansing over counter-terrorism, that jar has been shattered. These fighters are not seeking a quiet life in the Syrian hinterlands. They are seeking the path of least resistance to the West, and that path runs through the lawless human smuggling corridors of North Africa.
While Damascus trades barbs over prison breaks in al-Shaddadi, the UN migration agency (IOM) is reporting a surge in deadly shipwrecks departing from Sfax, Tunisia, and the Libyan coast. These are the two ends of a single logistical pipeline. The collapse of order in the Levant is feeding the human smuggling machines of the Mediterranean.
The "ISIS blackmail" currently being deployed by regional actors is a sophisticated form of asymmetric warfare. By allowing or facilitating the movement of radical elements toward the coast, unstable regimes in North Africa and the Levant gain a powerful bargaining chip against Europe. Their message is clear: "Fund our reconstruction and legitimize our rule, or the next boat to Lampedusa will carry more than just economic migrants." Under the populist and increasingly isolated regime of Kais Saied in Tunisia, and the fragmented militia rule in Libya, these smuggling networks have become "sovereign shields" for Islamist movement.

This is not merely a Levantine crisis; it is the activation of a global export strategy. For years, the fragile detention network in Syria held over 8,500 battle-hardened foreign fighters and tens of thousands of their radicalized family members. With the withdrawal of the Kurdish buffer and the rise of an Islamist-dominated government in Damascus that has prioritized sectarian cleansing over counter-terrorism, that jar has been shattered. These fighters are not seeking a quiet life in the Syrian hinterlands. They are seeking the path of least resistance to the West, and that path runs through the lawless human smuggling corridors of North Africa. While Damascus trades barbs over prison breaks in al-Shaddadi, the UN migration agency (IOM) is reporting a surge in deadly shipwrecks departing from Sfax, Tunisia, and the Libyan coast. These are the two ends of a single logistical pipeline. The collapse of order in the Levant is feeding the human smuggling machines of the Mediterranean. The "ISIS blackmail" currently being deployed by regional actors is a sophisticated form of asymmetric warfare. By allowing or facilitating the movement of radical elements toward the coast, unstable regimes in North Africa and the Levant gain a powerful bargaining chip against Europe. Their message is clear: "Fund our reconstruction and legitimize our rule, or the next boat to Lampedusa will carry more than just economic migrants." Under the populist and increasingly isolated regime of Kais Saied in Tunisia, and the fragmented militia rule in Libya, these smuggling networks have become "sovereign shields" for Islamist movement.

The failure of the international community to demand "organizational finality" against the remnants of ISIS is now being paid for in the currency of European border security. We are witnessing what happens when "conflict management" is substituted for victory. The new Islamist rulers in Damascus—many of whom share the same ideological DNA as the prisoners they now claim to hunt—cannot be trusted as custodians of Western security. Their "Justice Charade" in Syria, where they promise moderation while overseeing the slaughter of minorities, is a blueprint for how they will handle the export of extremism. They will use the threat of radicalization as a permanent "security tax" on the West.
The implications for "lone actor" radicalization in Europe are profound. Every escaped emir from a Syrian prison who makes it to a North African port is a potential node in a transnational engine of terror. They do not need a centralized caliphate to strike; they only need the chaotic anonymity of the Mediterranean transit routes. The influx of foreign fighters into the Islamic State in Somalia (Puntland) and West Africa, documented in recent intelligence reports, proves that the movement is already diversifying its theaters. The Mediterranean is no longer a moat; it is a highway.
If the West is to avoid a second caliphate born from the debris of the first, it must move beyond humanitarian platitudes and "managed transitions." Security cannot be outsourced to former emirs or fragile North African dictators who view the "ISIS virus" as a tool of statecraft.

The failure of the international community to demand "organizational finality" against the remnants of ISIS is now being paid for in the currency of European border security. We are witnessing what happens when "conflict management" is substituted for victory. The new Islamist rulers in Damascus—many of whom share the same ideological DNA as the prisoners they now claim to hunt—cannot be trusted as custodians of Western security. Their "Justice Charade" in Syria, where they promise moderation while overseeing the slaughter of minorities, is a blueprint for how they will handle the export of extremism. They will use the threat of radicalization as a permanent "security tax" on the West. The implications for "lone actor" radicalization in Europe are profound. Every escaped emir from a Syrian prison who makes it to a North African port is a potential node in a transnational engine of terror. They do not need a centralized caliphate to strike; they only need the chaotic anonymity of the Mediterranean transit routes. The influx of foreign fighters into the Islamic State in Somalia (Puntland) and West Africa, documented in recent intelligence reports, proves that the movement is already diversifying its theaters. The Mediterranean is no longer a moat; it is a highway. If the West is to avoid a second caliphate born from the debris of the first, it must move beyond humanitarian platitudes and "managed transitions." Security cannot be outsourced to former emirs or fragile North African dictators who view the "ISIS virus" as a tool of statecraft.

How post-Assad chaos and north African smugglers collide: The diplomatic veneer of the ‘new Syria’ began to crack, revealing a security nightmare that the West has spent a decade trying to prevent www.meforum.org/mef-online/h... #Islamism #Jihadism #terrorism #ISIS #Syria

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Countering a decentralized global terrorist network requires, first and foremost, sustained kinetic strikes against the organization's key nodes. The U.S. drone campaign against al Qaeda was effective in attenuating the quality of the group's personnel, forcing its members to limit communications, and forcing militants to flee from their safe haven in Pakistan's tribal areas.
One of the most common critiques of counterterrorism campaigns is that they fall short of being comprehensive and focus too narrowly on kinetic strikes. And while that critique is valid-after all, few would argue that an armed drone campaign would be enough, in and of itself, to combat terrorist groups-it is also true that drone strikes and other punitive measures are a necessary component of a well-rounded counterterrorism campaign, which cannot be prosecuted with nonkinetic approaches alone.
As currently postured, the Islamic State offers a range of attractive targets for U.S. and allied
counterterrorism planners. The al-Karrar Office in Somalia and the al-Furqan Office in Nigeria function as critical nodes in the Islamic State's broader global network, facilitating the organization's financing endeavors, assisting with its propaganda output, and coordinating the travel of foreign terrorist fighters to various conflict zones where its affiliates remain active.

Countering a decentralized global terrorist network requires, first and foremost, sustained kinetic strikes against the organization's key nodes. The U.S. drone campaign against al Qaeda was effective in attenuating the quality of the group's personnel, forcing its members to limit communications, and forcing militants to flee from their safe haven in Pakistan's tribal areas. One of the most common critiques of counterterrorism campaigns is that they fall short of being comprehensive and focus too narrowly on kinetic strikes. And while that critique is valid-after all, few would argue that an armed drone campaign would be enough, in and of itself, to combat terrorist groups-it is also true that drone strikes and other punitive measures are a necessary component of a well-rounded counterterrorism campaign, which cannot be prosecuted with nonkinetic approaches alone. As currently postured, the Islamic State offers a range of attractive targets for U.S. and allied counterterrorism planners. The al-Karrar Office in Somalia and the al-Furqan Office in Nigeria function as critical nodes in the Islamic State's broader global network, facilitating the organization's financing endeavors, assisting with its propaganda output, and coordinating the travel of foreign terrorist fighters to various conflict zones where its affiliates remain active.

Another essential part of a comprehensive counterterrorism campaign is thinking in the longer term. This means engaging in security cooperation and building partner capacity initiatives with local forces in the host nations where terrorist groups operate. This is no easy task. By their nature, terrorist groups seek out failed states and ungoverned spaces, eager to take advantage of governance gaps, weak security forces, and high levels of corruption that make border guards bribable and lead to widespread ineptitude among all but the most elite security forces, which are typically reserved to insulate and protect the ruling regime. The U.S. Army's elite special forces unit, the Green Berets, is an expert in helping train partner nation forces in foreign internal defense and other counterinsurgency approaches, including training a range of irregular forces such as tribal militias.
Security cooperation is not strictly about military force; efforts geared toward defense institution-building, improving governments' ability to strengthen the rule of law and promote good governance, and counter-corruption initiatives can all help reduce grievances within a population. In turn, this helps reduce the pool of individuals willing to join terrorist groups, which leverage local grievances to recruit new members and supporters.

Another essential part of a comprehensive counterterrorism campaign is thinking in the longer term. This means engaging in security cooperation and building partner capacity initiatives with local forces in the host nations where terrorist groups operate. This is no easy task. By their nature, terrorist groups seek out failed states and ungoverned spaces, eager to take advantage of governance gaps, weak security forces, and high levels of corruption that make border guards bribable and lead to widespread ineptitude among all but the most elite security forces, which are typically reserved to insulate and protect the ruling regime. The U.S. Army's elite special forces unit, the Green Berets, is an expert in helping train partner nation forces in foreign internal defense and other counterinsurgency approaches, including training a range of irregular forces such as tribal militias. Security cooperation is not strictly about military force; efforts geared toward defense institution-building, improving governments' ability to strengthen the rule of law and promote good governance, and counter-corruption initiatives can all help reduce grievances within a population. In turn, this helps reduce the pool of individuals willing to join terrorist groups, which leverage local grievances to recruit new members and supporters.

How to counter a decentralized Islamic State: A franchising model has led to “inspired” rather than “directed” attacks. archive.ph/UsuKF #Islamism #Jihadism #antisemitism #terrorism By @colinpclarke.bsky.social and Clara Broekaert

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Even Muslim countries are terrified of Britain’s Islamists The UAE’s warnings about jihadism on UK campuses must not go unheeded.

Even #Muslim #countries are terrified of #Britain’s #Islamists.

The #UAE’s warnings about #jihadism on #UK #campuses must not go unheeded.

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“THE AFRICAN REVOLUTION”
theafricanrevolution.wixsite.com/adelajas/gen...

#AdelajaIndexes #A_TagZi!

#Africa #African #AfricanRevolution #AfricanUnity #Jihadism #PanAfrican

SWITCH SOCIAL MEDIA
cyberjunction.wixsite.com/iguru/genera...

“SUDAN GENOCIDE”
exclaimcyberspace.wixsite.com/interface/su...

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“THE AFRICAN REVOLUTION!”
theafricanrevolution.wixsite.com/adelajas/gen...

#AdelajaIndexes #A #Africa #TagZi!
#Africa #AfricanRevolution #Jihadism #PanAfrican

SWITCH SOCIAL MEDIA
cyberjunction.wixsite.com/iguru/genera...

“SUDAN GENOCIDE!”
exclaimcyberspace.wixsite.com/interface/su...

#Sudan

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#antisemitism
#terrorism
#jihadism
#endtheintifada

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Nigerian villagers are rattled by US airstrikes that made their homes shake and the sky glow red JABO, Nigeriq (AP) — Idris said the strikes targeted areas used as “staging grounds by foreign" IS fighters who had sneaked into Nigeria from the Sahel, the southern fringe of Africa's vast Sahara Desert. government did not release any casualty figures among the militants. The post Nigerian villagers are rattled by US airstrikes that made their homes shake and the sky glow red appeared first on RNS.
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#intifada
#stoptheintifada
#jihadism

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#fuckhamas
#jihadism

Hamas lies and lies, and westerners take it as truth

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A Tale of Cancellation: A Conversation with Meg Smaker (Episode #300)
A Tale of Cancellation: A Conversation with Meg Smaker (Episode #300) YouTube video by Sam Harris

#BondiMassacre
#IslamofascistTerror
#Jihadism

www.youtube.com/watch?v=rec9...

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#islamism
#jihadism

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#terrorism
#stoptheintifada
#jihadism

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Preview
The Return of the Caliphate From Raqqa to Damascus: Ideology as the Vessel of Collective Power

From Raqqa to Damascus
How a defeated caliphate returned as a myth and why ideology, not territory, now carries power.

#Geopolitics #PoliticalTheory #MiddleEast #Ideology #Power #Islamism #ModernPolitics #jihadism #Syria

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#jihadism
#endjewhate

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Camp administrators warn that a new generation is growing up indoctrinated by their mothers in the extremist ideas of ISIS.
"All of the women here are radical. They all stayed with the Islamic State until the end," Hokmiya Ibrahim, the administrator of Roj camp, said in an interview there. "But the bigger problem is that the mothers are educating their kids according to the Islamic State ideology."
Nearly 60 percent of the population in the two family camps are under 18, according to camp administrators. Most of those children have spent years in a place where restrictive ideology of ISIS prevails.
The most extreme among Al Hol detainees are primarily from countries outside the Middle East, including Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, France and Russia. They include roughly 6,000 women and children who live in a separate area of the camp that is off limits to visitors because it is considered so dangerous, according to Ms. Hanan.
Conditions in both camps are grim.
Discontent, violence and ill health plague the residents.
Weapons are routinely smuggled in, and women and older adolescent boys frequently try to escape, according to the administrators.
Hundreds of vehicles enter daily to bring supplies and can be used to smuggle people out, Ms. Hanan said.
"Every day, people are fleeing, and it seems it is an organized operation," she added. "They are building hiding places in the water tanks."
The administrators said they were barely able to hold the camps together and that the situation had worsened since the Trump administration cut U.S.A.I.D. funding this year for basic services such as water deliveries, bread rations and medical care.

Camp administrators warn that a new generation is growing up indoctrinated by their mothers in the extremist ideas of ISIS. "All of the women here are radical. They all stayed with the Islamic State until the end," Hokmiya Ibrahim, the administrator of Roj camp, said in an interview there. "But the bigger problem is that the mothers are educating their kids according to the Islamic State ideology." Nearly 60 percent of the population in the two family camps are under 18, according to camp administrators. Most of those children have spent years in a place where restrictive ideology of ISIS prevails. The most extreme among Al Hol detainees are primarily from countries outside the Middle East, including Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, France and Russia. They include roughly 6,000 women and children who live in a separate area of the camp that is off limits to visitors because it is considered so dangerous, according to Ms. Hanan. Conditions in both camps are grim. Discontent, violence and ill health plague the residents. Weapons are routinely smuggled in, and women and older adolescent boys frequently try to escape, according to the administrators. Hundreds of vehicles enter daily to bring supplies and can be used to smuggle people out, Ms. Hanan said. "Every day, people are fleeing, and it seems it is an organized operation," she added. "They are building hiding places in the water tanks." The administrators said they were barely able to hold the camps together and that the situation had worsened since the Trump administration cut U.S.A.I.D. funding this year for basic services such as water deliveries, bread rations and medical care.

Islamic State camps pose a dangerous problem for Syria’s leaders: The government faces a dilemma over what to do with civil-war-era prisons and detention camps that hold thousands of #ISIS fighters and tens of thousands of their family members. archive.ph/Dybda By @alyssarubin.bsky.social #Jihadism

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