identification of qualitatively distinct preferences types. They appear to matter, however, for the quantitative identification of the strength and the precision of social preferences.
… the #socialPreferences of the general population are likely overestimated when elicited with 2/5
How do monetary incentives affect the measurement of social preferences? https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:482&r=&r=exp
"… the use of monetary #incentives, as well as the size of the stakes, have little impact on choices at the descriptive levels, as well as for the identification of […]
perceived pivotality for algorithmic outcomes.
… removing pivotality led to increased #selfishness in how humans trained the algorithm. Importantly, this change in revealed #socialPreferences was driven by a shift in individual responsibility (the power over one’s own or others’ fate) 3/6
Artificial intelligence, distributional #fairness, and pivotality d.repec.org/n
"#AI training introduces a significant shift – individual decisions no longer terminate with the present but… influence the future behavior of scalable algorithms […]
may be important in explaining prosocial behavior, making it more complicated to draw clear inferences about #socialPreferences from experimental data."
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107039
That's why I (almost) always included a comprehension pre-test before the actual experiment. 3/4
Comprehension in economic games Many disciplines rely on economic games to measure prosocial behavior. However, there is a concern that participants may misunderstand these games, complicating interpretation of results. This study combines online and laboratory data (total n = 1568) to assess subject comprehension of five standard economic games: the Dictator Game, Ultimatum Game, Trust Game, Public Goods Game, and Prisoner's Dilemma. The online and lab data collections are carried out separately and for the online data collection we collect data for two separate platforms (Prolific and CloudResearch’s MTurk Toolkit). Within each data collection participants carry out all five games, and are randomized to comprehension questions with or without incentives for correct answers. Results indicate that misunderstanding is common: the proportion of participants who misunderstood ranged from 22 % (Dictator Game) to 70 % (Trust Game) in the online samples and from 22 % (Dictator Game) to 53 % (Public Goods Game) in the lab sample. Incentivizing the comprehension questions had no significant impact on misunderstanding, but numeracy was associated with lower misunderstanding. Misunderstanding also predicted increased prosocial behavior in several of the games. Our findings suggest that misunderstanding may be important in explaining prosocial behavior, making it more complicated to draw clear inferences about social preferences from experimental data.
A not so great observation for #experimentalEcon:
"Results indicate that misunderstanding is common: the proportion of participants who misunderstood ranged from 22 % (Dictator Game) to 70 % (#Trust Game) in the online samples and from 22 % (Dictator Game) to […]
[Original post on fediscience.org]
FYI: IWSR Report Highlights Resurgence in On-Trade Alcohol Consumption: Increased Consumer Confidence and Social Preferences Drive Growth #AlcoholConsumption #OnTrade #IWSRReport #ConsumerConfidence #SocialPreferences
IWSR Report Highlights Resurgence in On-Trade Alcohol Consumption: Increased Consumer Confidence and Social Preferences Drive Growth #IWSRReport #AlcoholConsumption #OnTrade #ConsumerConfidence #SocialPreferences
