Webpage from KU Leuven’s Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science (CLPS) announcing the next CLPS seminar by Boaz Schuman titled "Al-Farabi on Reductio and Paradox." The event is scheduled for November 7, 2025, from 2:00 PM to 4:00 PM (CET) in room HIW1-01.20.
Abstract:
Zeno’s paradoxes are not paradoxes. Or anyway, Zeno didn't mean them to be. Instead, he presents them as arguments by reductio, with the aim of showing that things like multiplicity and motion are impossible. More recently, and in a similar vein, McTaggart's paradox is not a paradox either: it is an argument, again by reductio, for the unreality of time as we commonly think of it. But what’s going on here? Why do such arguments by reductio get rebranded as paradoxes? And why specifically these ones, and not others? Why for example don’t we speak of the “Pythagorean incommensurability paradox”, or the “Paradox of infinite primes”? Is there a principle at play here? And if so, what is it?
To answer these questions, I examine the taxonomy of reductio in the logical works of Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (ca. 870–950). This points to a framework for understanding what al-Fārābī calles a paradoxical or “innovative” opinion (رَأْي بَدِيع, ra’y badī’). I'll show how this framework sheds light on—and justifies—the practice of rebranding some conclusions reached by reductio as paradoxes.
Some of philosophy’s most famous paradoxes are arguments by reductio—though not every reductio earns the title of “paradox.” Drawing on the writings of al-Fārābī, Boaz Schuman will offer an answer to why that is in today's CLPS seminar! 👇 hiw.kuleuven.be/clps/events/... #philsky #histphil #logic