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Since its founding, the Islamic Republic has wished to export the Islamic Revolution beyond its borders. Early on, Iran established militias and operated cells in countries with a sizable Shia population-Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia-yet failed to overthrow the regimes. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had success only in countries debilitated by conflict, with weak state institutions. During the civil war in Lebanon, after an Israeli invasion in 1982, Iran established the Shia Islamist militant group that came to be named Hezbollah. After assuming the position of supreme leader in 1989, Khamenei oversaw the rapid expansion of the IRGC's external operations, masterminded by the Quds Force led by Qassem Soleimani. Until being assassinated by the United States in 2020, Soleimani oversaw the creation of networks seeking to carry out attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets outside of Israel, to assassinate Iranian dissidents abroad, and to shepherd new militias across the Middle East.

Since its founding, the Islamic Republic has wished to export the Islamic Revolution beyond its borders. Early on, Iran established militias and operated cells in countries with a sizable Shia population-Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia-yet failed to overthrow the regimes. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had success only in countries debilitated by conflict, with weak state institutions. During the civil war in Lebanon, after an Israeli invasion in 1982, Iran established the Shia Islamist militant group that came to be named Hezbollah. After assuming the position of supreme leader in 1989, Khamenei oversaw the rapid expansion of the IRGC's external operations, masterminded by the Quds Force led by Qassem Soleimani. Until being assassinated by the United States in 2020, Soleimani oversaw the creation of networks seeking to carry out attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets outside of Israel, to assassinate Iranian dissidents abroad, and to shepherd new militias across the Middle East.

In post-2003 Iraq, with its state institutions dismantled and a sectarian civil war under way, Iran again set up a series of pro-Iranian militias. In Syria, after the outbreak of civil war, Iran significantly increased its influence, as the Assad regime grasped for foreign assistance to remain in power. Assad welcomed Iran-run militias made up of tens of thousands of foreign Shia fighters from Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. In Yemen, too, instability allowed the Houthi militia to take over large swaths of the country, including the capital, Sanaa. The Houthis have received significant financial and military support from Iran.
From Hezbollah's inception, members have, at Iran's orders, turned their weapons on fellow Lebanese.
From 1988 to 1990, the group engaged in what came to be known as the "War of Brothers" against Amal, a Syrian-backed Shia militia. Hezbollah prevailed in this fratricidal war, which led to the deaths of hundreds of Shia civilians and militants. On May 7, 2008, following the decision of the Lebanese government to dismantle the independent communications network Hezbollah had set up, the militia stormed Beirut and took control of pro-government Sunni neighborhoods in the city, later clashing with Druze communities in the Chouf and Sunnis in the north and killing dozens of people. The Doha Agreement, which ended the conflict, cemented Hezbollah's political dominance of Lebanon, granting Shia ministers a third of the cabinet.

In post-2003 Iraq, with its state institutions dismantled and a sectarian civil war under way, Iran again set up a series of pro-Iranian militias. In Syria, after the outbreak of civil war, Iran significantly increased its influence, as the Assad regime grasped for foreign assistance to remain in power. Assad welcomed Iran-run militias made up of tens of thousands of foreign Shia fighters from Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. In Yemen, too, instability allowed the Houthi militia to take over large swaths of the country, including the capital, Sanaa. The Houthis have received significant financial and military support from Iran. From Hezbollah's inception, members have, at Iran's orders, turned their weapons on fellow Lebanese. From 1988 to 1990, the group engaged in what came to be known as the "War of Brothers" against Amal, a Syrian-backed Shia militia. Hezbollah prevailed in this fratricidal war, which led to the deaths of hundreds of Shia civilians and militants. On May 7, 2008, following the decision of the Lebanese government to dismantle the independent communications network Hezbollah had set up, the militia stormed Beirut and took control of pro-government Sunni neighborhoods in the city, later clashing with Druze communities in the Chouf and Sunnis in the north and killing dozens of people. The Doha Agreement, which ended the conflict, cemented Hezbollah's political dominance of Lebanon, granting Shia ministers a third of the cabinet.

Hezbollah carried out dozens of assassinations: politicians, intellectuals, journalists, and state officials. One of the recent prominent victims was Luqman Slim, a Shia intellectual and activist and critic of Hezbollah who was assassinated in 2021. A friend of Luqman, also a Lebanese intellectual, explained to me the chilling effect these assassinations have had on public discourse in Lebanon: "People are censoring themselves, particularly until the 2024 war," which significantly weakened Hezbollah, he said. In private, individuals would be critical of Hezbollah, but when they were urged to be outspoken in media interviews, he recounted, they told him, "Do you want me to get killed?" That intellectual was granted anonymity, as were others I interviewed for this article, because of the legal prohibition in Iraq and Lebanon on
"normalization" of relations with Israel, which in some court cases has been interpreted as a ban on even engaging with an Israeli citizen like me. The Syrian surgeon asked for his name to be withheld because of the political sensitivity of talking with me after the Israeli invasion of southern Syria that followed Assad's fall.

Hezbollah carried out dozens of assassinations: politicians, intellectuals, journalists, and state officials. One of the recent prominent victims was Luqman Slim, a Shia intellectual and activist and critic of Hezbollah who was assassinated in 2021. A friend of Luqman, also a Lebanese intellectual, explained to me the chilling effect these assassinations have had on public discourse in Lebanon: "People are censoring themselves, particularly until the 2024 war," which significantly weakened Hezbollah, he said. In private, individuals would be critical of Hezbollah, but when they were urged to be outspoken in media interviews, he recounted, they told him, "Do you want me to get killed?" That intellectual was granted anonymity, as were others I interviewed for this article, because of the legal prohibition in Iraq and Lebanon on "normalization" of relations with Israel, which in some court cases has been interpreted as a ban on even engaging with an Israeli citizen like me. The Syrian surgeon asked for his name to be withheld because of the political sensitivity of talking with me after the Israeli invasion of southern Syria that followed Assad's fall.

In Iraq, pro-Iranian militias killed hundreds of American servicepeople, mostly through roadside bombs. But the number of Iraqi civilians they have killed far exceeds this. During the 2006-08 sectarian civil war, these militias murdered, raped, and tortured to death countless numbers of Sunnis. In 2014, during the anti-ISIS war, the militias kidnapped Sunni male teenagers and men and disappeared them into a network of torture sites. The militias also ethnically cleansed entire Sunni towns, such as Jurf al-Sakhr, and established military bases there, preventing the residents from returning to this day. The militias engaged in widespread looting of private property in Sunni areas, and stripped state assets such as the oil refinery in Baiji and multiple factories in Ninewa.
After years of abusing Iraq's Sunnis, the militias turned their guns on the country's Shia in 2019.
Starting in the fall and continuing well into 2020, the militias violently repressed the mostly Shia anti-regime Tishreen ("October") protest movement, spraying activists with bullets, as well as assassinating them or kidnapping them into their black sites. According to testimonies of survivors, in Baghdad the militias used the abandoned houses of Jewish residents as sites to torture and gang-rape female and male protesters they would kidnap from the city's Tahrir Square encampment.

In Iraq, pro-Iranian militias killed hundreds of American servicepeople, mostly through roadside bombs. But the number of Iraqi civilians they have killed far exceeds this. During the 2006-08 sectarian civil war, these militias murdered, raped, and tortured to death countless numbers of Sunnis. In 2014, during the anti-ISIS war, the militias kidnapped Sunni male teenagers and men and disappeared them into a network of torture sites. The militias also ethnically cleansed entire Sunni towns, such as Jurf al-Sakhr, and established military bases there, preventing the residents from returning to this day. The militias engaged in widespread looting of private property in Sunni areas, and stripped state assets such as the oil refinery in Baiji and multiple factories in Ninewa. After years of abusing Iraq's Sunnis, the militias turned their guns on the country's Shia in 2019. Starting in the fall and continuing well into 2020, the militias violently repressed the mostly Shia anti-regime Tishreen ("October") protest movement, spraying activists with bullets, as well as assassinating them or kidnapping them into their black sites. According to testimonies of survivors, in Baghdad the militias used the abandoned houses of Jewish residents as sites to torture and gang-rape female and male protesters they would kidnap from the city's Tahrir Square encampment.

Iran’s war is not only with the West: The Islamic Republic’s expansionist project has led to the immiseration and repression of people beyond its borders. www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/0... By Elizabeth Tsurkov #Islamism #terrorism #IranianImperialism #IranProxies

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When the Israelis showed that the rules of the game had changed, Mr. Khamenei stayed with his old playbook. Others in Iran realized they lacked firepower. Voices within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the supreme leaders' praetorians, advocated obtaining nuclear arms-quickly.
Mr. Khamenei persisted with his strategy of gradually expanding nuclear infrastructure. On two occasions before the 12-Day War, Iran lobbed missiles toward Israel, assuming Tehran's ballistic missile capacity could still check Israeli behavior. It didn't.

When the Israelis showed that the rules of the game had changed, Mr. Khamenei stayed with his old playbook. Others in Iran realized they lacked firepower. Voices within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the supreme leaders' praetorians, advocated obtaining nuclear arms-quickly. Mr. Khamenei persisted with his strategy of gradually expanding nuclear infrastructure. On two occasions before the 12-Day War, Iran lobbed missiles toward Israel, assuming Tehran's ballistic missile capacity could still check Israeli behavior. It didn't.

The twilight of Ali Khamenei: Iran’s supreme leader is not gone, but his power has been greatly reduced since Oct. 7, 2023. www.wsj.com/opinion/the-... #Islamism #IranianImperialism

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Forces allied with Yemen's internationally recognized government this week intercepted a major shipment of missiles, drone parts and other military gear sent to Houthi rebels on the Red Sea coast. Syria's new government says it has seized a number of weapons cargoes, including Grad rockets-for use in multiple-launch systems mounted on trucks-along its borders with Iraq and Lebanon.
The Lebanese army, meanwhile, has seized shipments brought in across its border with Syria that include Russian antitank missiles favored by Hezbollah.
"Iran is rebuilding its presence in the Levant by sending missiles to Hezbollah and weapons from Iraq to Syria," said Michael Knights, a senior fellow at the U.S.-based Washington Institute for Near East Policy with expertise in Iran's militia allies.
Yemeni forces said Wednesday they had seized a record number of Iranian missiles destined for the Houthis.
The shipment was intercepted by the National Resistance Force, a military coalition aligned with the Yemeni government. The U.S. Central Command, which is responsible for America's military operations in the Middle East, said it was the National Resistance Force's largest seizure of advanced Iranian conventional weapons-750 tons of cruise missiles, antiship and antiaircraft missiles, warheads, targeting components and drone engines.

Forces allied with Yemen's internationally recognized government this week intercepted a major shipment of missiles, drone parts and other military gear sent to Houthi rebels on the Red Sea coast. Syria's new government says it has seized a number of weapons cargoes, including Grad rockets-for use in multiple-launch systems mounted on trucks-along its borders with Iraq and Lebanon. The Lebanese army, meanwhile, has seized shipments brought in across its border with Syria that include Russian antitank missiles favored by Hezbollah. "Iran is rebuilding its presence in the Levant by sending missiles to Hezbollah and weapons from Iraq to Syria," said Michael Knights, a senior fellow at the U.S.-based Washington Institute for Near East Policy with expertise in Iran's militia allies. Yemeni forces said Wednesday they had seized a record number of Iranian missiles destined for the Houthis. The shipment was intercepted by the National Resistance Force, a military coalition aligned with the Yemeni government. The U.S. Central Command, which is responsible for America's military operations in the Middle East, said it was the National Resistance Force's largest seizure of advanced Iranian conventional weapons-750 tons of cruise missiles, antiship and antiaircraft missiles, warheads, targeting components and drone engines.

Iran suffered a significant setback when Israel killed top military leaders and the U.S. struck its nuclear facilities, but a pattern of high-value weapons seizures shows Tehran is making new efforts to arm its militia allies across the Middle East. archive.ph/8gFcO #IranianImperialism #IranProxies

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By backing various regimes and militias in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Gaza, the Islamic Republic of Iran has boen responsible, directly or indirectly, for the death of hundreds of thousands of Arab and Muslim people in the conflicts it has fomented. Iranian meddling in the region has provided Arab dictators such as Syria's Bashar al-Assad with both the moral and material means to suppress dissent, crush reform, and extend their autocratic rule. The pro-Palestine messaging ignores the fact that a nuclear-armed Iran would be far more belligerent and dangerous than the regime already has been for the past three decades.
For the pro-Palestine lobby to take at face value Tehran's claim to lead an "Axis of Resistance" against Isracl is at best naive, and at worst malignant in a way that can only be described as anti-Semitic. It means accepting that the Islamic Republic's eliminationist rhetoric about Israel has made it a legitimate advocate for the Palestinian cause. These pro-Palestine voices seem oblivious of the fact that the Palestinian national project for independence and statehood is in ruins, thanks in large part to Iranian influence.
Back in the 1990s, Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps and political leadership worked to undermine the Oslo peace process by inciting Hamas's opposition to any settlement that would have led to a two-state solution. Later, they encouraged Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas to carry out suicide bombings inside Israel. Beginning in 2005, Iran increased its arms shipments to Hamas, enabling the group to seize control of Gaza in 2007 and turn it into a one-party Islamist statelet.
Iran also financed Hamas's construction of tunnels in Gaza and provided the group with missile technology, funneled via the smuggling networks that Iran effectively sponsored in Egypr's Sinai Peninsula.
Iranian support for terrorism also bencfited from Hamass Qatari financing, which propped up the group's tenure as the government of Gaza. This arrangement …

By backing various regimes and militias in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Gaza, the Islamic Republic of Iran has boen responsible, directly or indirectly, for the death of hundreds of thousands of Arab and Muslim people in the conflicts it has fomented. Iranian meddling in the region has provided Arab dictators such as Syria's Bashar al-Assad with both the moral and material means to suppress dissent, crush reform, and extend their autocratic rule. The pro-Palestine messaging ignores the fact that a nuclear-armed Iran would be far more belligerent and dangerous than the regime already has been for the past three decades. For the pro-Palestine lobby to take at face value Tehran's claim to lead an "Axis of Resistance" against Isracl is at best naive, and at worst malignant in a way that can only be described as anti-Semitic. It means accepting that the Islamic Republic's eliminationist rhetoric about Israel has made it a legitimate advocate for the Palestinian cause. These pro-Palestine voices seem oblivious of the fact that the Palestinian national project for independence and statehood is in ruins, thanks in large part to Iranian influence. Back in the 1990s, Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps and political leadership worked to undermine the Oslo peace process by inciting Hamas's opposition to any settlement that would have led to a two-state solution. Later, they encouraged Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas to carry out suicide bombings inside Israel. Beginning in 2005, Iran increased its arms shipments to Hamas, enabling the group to seize control of Gaza in 2007 and turn it into a one-party Islamist statelet. Iran also financed Hamas's construction of tunnels in Gaza and provided the group with missile technology, funneled via the smuggling networks that Iran effectively sponsored in Egypr's Sinai Peninsula. Iranian support for terrorism also bencfited from Hamass Qatari financing, which propped up the group's tenure as the government of Gaza. This arrangement …

Pro-Palestine activists fell for Iran’s propaganda: Western supporters would do well to note how Tehran’s policy has left the Palestinian cause in ruins. archive.ph/ZlUFj #Islamism #IranianImperialism #antisemitism #terrorism

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On January 28, 2024, Iran killed three American soldiers on a base in Jordan, injuring more than 40.
On October 19, 2023, an Iranian militia in Yemen engaged the USS Carney destroyer in what the Wall Street Journal described as "the most intense combat a U.S. Navy warship had seen in the better part of a century, shooting down more than a dozen drones and four fast-flying cruise missiles."
That "10-hour engagement" came, of course, just 12 days after Iran's militia in Gaza invaded Israel, murdering 1,200—of which 41 were Americans.
Lost in Iran's modern slaughter was the fact that October 2023 coincided with the 40th anniversary of a kind of villainous origin story for Tehran: the October 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, which killed 241 American servicemembers.
In the intervening decades, that killing continued.
But the bookends of 1983 and 2023 served as fitting brackets for a period of history run red with the blood of Americans. Iran's attacks-as noted above-didn't end. But Tehran had overplayed its hand and set in motion a great American backlash, leading to President Trump's history-making order to strike at the heart of the Iranian nuclear-
weapons program.
The Iranian threat, in other words, has not subsided. American civilians and soldiers live in a world made more dangerous by Iran's constant plotting to harm them.

On January 28, 2024, Iran killed three American soldiers on a base in Jordan, injuring more than 40. On October 19, 2023, an Iranian militia in Yemen engaged the USS Carney destroyer in what the Wall Street Journal described as "the most intense combat a U.S. Navy warship had seen in the better part of a century, shooting down more than a dozen drones and four fast-flying cruise missiles." That "10-hour engagement" came, of course, just 12 days after Iran's militia in Gaza invaded Israel, murdering 1,200—of which 41 were Americans. Lost in Iran's modern slaughter was the fact that October 2023 coincided with the 40th anniversary of a kind of villainous origin story for Tehran: the October 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, which killed 241 American servicemembers. In the intervening decades, that killing continued. But the bookends of 1983 and 2023 served as fitting brackets for a period of history run red with the blood of Americans. Iran's attacks-as noted above-didn't end. But Tehran had overplayed its hand and set in motion a great American backlash, leading to President Trump's history-making order to strike at the heart of the Iranian nuclear- weapons program. The Iranian threat, in other words, has not subsided. American civilians and soldiers live in a world made more dangerous by Iran's constant plotting to harm them.

Iran brought this on itself:
The Iranians have agency. They used that agency to test the limits of American patience. They have found those limits. www.commentary.org/seth-mandel/... By @sethamandel.bsky.social #OperationMidnightHammer #Islamism #IranianImperialism #IranianProxies

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A few years ago, the sudden, near-simultaneous killing of Bagheri, Salami, and a host of other senior leaders would have been unthinkable. Over three decades, the hard-liners who control Iran's regime had built up what seemed like a formidable system of deterrence. They stockpiled ballistic missiles. They developed and advanced a nuclear enrichment program. Most important, they established a network of foreign proxies that could routinely harass Israeli and U.S. forces.
But Iran's hard-liners overplayed their hand. After Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023, the regime's leaders opted for a campaign of maximum aggression. Rather than letting Hamas and Israel fight it out, they unleashed their proxies at Israeli targets.
Israel, in turn, was compelled to expand its offensive beyond Gaza. It succeeded in severely degrading Hezbollah, the most powerful of Tehran's proxy groups, and eviscerating Iranian positions in Syria-indirectly contributing to the collapse of the Assad regime. Iran responded to this aggression by unleashing the two largest ballistic missile attacks ever launched against Israel. But Israel, backed by the U.S. military and other partners, repelled those attacks and incurred little damage. It then struck back.
With that, the foundation of Iran's deterrence strategy crumbled. Its ruling regime became more vulnerable and exposed than at any point since the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. And Israel, which has dreamed of striking Iran for decades, had an opportunity it decided it could not pass up.

A few years ago, the sudden, near-simultaneous killing of Bagheri, Salami, and a host of other senior leaders would have been unthinkable. Over three decades, the hard-liners who control Iran's regime had built up what seemed like a formidable system of deterrence. They stockpiled ballistic missiles. They developed and advanced a nuclear enrichment program. Most important, they established a network of foreign proxies that could routinely harass Israeli and U.S. forces. But Iran's hard-liners overplayed their hand. After Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023, the regime's leaders opted for a campaign of maximum aggression. Rather than letting Hamas and Israel fight it out, they unleashed their proxies at Israeli targets. Israel, in turn, was compelled to expand its offensive beyond Gaza. It succeeded in severely degrading Hezbollah, the most powerful of Tehran's proxy groups, and eviscerating Iranian positions in Syria-indirectly contributing to the collapse of the Assad regime. Iran responded to this aggression by unleashing the two largest ballistic missile attacks ever launched against Israel. But Israel, backed by the U.S. military and other partners, repelled those attacks and incurred little damage. It then struck back. With that, the foundation of Iran's deterrence strategy crumbled. Its ruling regime became more vulnerable and exposed than at any point since the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. And Israel, which has dreamed of striking Iran for decades, had an opportunity it decided it could not pass up.

How Iran lost: Iran's hard-liners overplayed their hand: Tehran’s hard-liners squandered decades of strategic capital and undermined deterrence www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/... By @osto.bsky.social #IsraelIranWar #IranProxies #IranianImperialism

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October 7 exposed this folly, as Hamas and its allies disabled that technology and stormed across the border on land, meeting little resistance as they rampaged through civilian communities. This was a war Israel did not expect and was not prepared to fight. That fact was evident not only in the casualties and hostage-taking during the massacre, but in the grinding, brutal, and haphazard war in Gaza that has followed. Simply put, Israel was flying without radar. It did not know Hamas's capabilities, had not infiltrated its leadership, did not have widespread intelligence sources on the ground, and was largely ignorant of the group's sprawling underground infrastructure in Gaza. This operational ignorance has resulted in a horrific meat grinder of a war with thousands of civilian casualties and still no end in sight. It's also why Israel's military took more than a year after October 7 to find and kill the Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar.
By the time that happened, Israel had already taken out Hezbollah's Nasrallah, a far more protected and high-value target, after neutralizing many of his elite forces via exploding beepers and walkie-talkies and blowing up many of the group's missiles while they were still in storage. The very resources that had not been brought to bear on Hamas, thus enabling the disaster of October 7, achieved the neutralization of Hezbollah within weeks.

October 7 exposed this folly, as Hamas and its allies disabled that technology and stormed across the border on land, meeting little resistance as they rampaged through civilian communities. This was a war Israel did not expect and was not prepared to fight. That fact was evident not only in the casualties and hostage-taking during the massacre, but in the grinding, brutal, and haphazard war in Gaza that has followed. Simply put, Israel was flying without radar. It did not know Hamas's capabilities, had not infiltrated its leadership, did not have widespread intelligence sources on the ground, and was largely ignorant of the group's sprawling underground infrastructure in Gaza. This operational ignorance has resulted in a horrific meat grinder of a war with thousands of civilian casualties and still no end in sight. It's also why Israel's military took more than a year after October 7 to find and kill the Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar. By the time that happened, Israel had already taken out Hezbollah's Nasrallah, a far more protected and high-value target, after neutralizing many of his elite forces via exploding beepers and walkie-talkies and blowing up many of the group's missiles while they were still in storage. The very resources that had not been brought to bear on Hamas, thus enabling the disaster of October 7, achieved the neutralization of Hezbollah within weeks.

Hezbollah had joined in the attacks on Israel after the assault on October 7, apparently believing that Israel was too hobbled to respond beyond token tit-for-tat strikes. Likewise, the group's patrons in Iran may have misread the events of October 7 as evidence of fundamental Israeli weakness, rather than a terrible but isolated error. For months, Tehran continued to supply its proxies in Lebanon and Yemen with advanced missiles to fire at Israel, seemingly under the belief that it would be immune from similar incoming in response. That mistake, like Israel's on October 7, proved costly.
Last night, Israel began running the same playbook it used on Hezbollah against Iran. Key military leaders were reportedly assassinated, drone factories were targeted, and missile depots and launchers were eliminated before they could be used. In retrospect, October 7 wasn't a preview of an Israel-Iran war-the mysterious strike last July that killed the Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in an Iranian Revolutionary Guard guesthouse in Tehran was. That audacious assassination revealed that Israel had clandestine capabilities within Iran's most fortified strongholds of a sort it never had in Gaza. After last night's initial assault, Israel's Mossad released rare footage of its agents operating inside Iran.

Hezbollah had joined in the attacks on Israel after the assault on October 7, apparently believing that Israel was too hobbled to respond beyond token tit-for-tat strikes. Likewise, the group's patrons in Iran may have misread the events of October 7 as evidence of fundamental Israeli weakness, rather than a terrible but isolated error. For months, Tehran continued to supply its proxies in Lebanon and Yemen with advanced missiles to fire at Israel, seemingly under the belief that it would be immune from similar incoming in response. That mistake, like Israel's on October 7, proved costly. Last night, Israel began running the same playbook it used on Hezbollah against Iran. Key military leaders were reportedly assassinated, drone factories were targeted, and missile depots and launchers were eliminated before they could be used. In retrospect, October 7 wasn't a preview of an Israel-Iran war-the mysterious strike last July that killed the Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in an Iranian Revolutionary Guard guesthouse in Tehran was. That audacious assassination revealed that Israel had clandestine capabilities within Iran's most fortified strongholds of a sort it never had in Gaza. After last night's initial assault, Israel's Mossad released rare footage of its agents operating inside Iran.

When Israel went after Hezbollah in Lebanon last September, American and Israeli officials characterized the move as
"de-escalation through escalation." That line was mocked by many, but it is largely what happened, because Israel was prepared for the conflict-unlike in Gaza-and achieved a decisive victory. Within months, Israel and Lebanon had agreed to a cease-fire, and Hezbollah was effectively disabled. Israel did the heavy lifting, and the U.S. acted as the closer with its diplomacy.
By contrast, Israel's unplanned war in Gaza has seen no such resolution and steadily devolved into a messianic power grab by Israel's far right. No Israeli faction has religious or territorial designs on Tehran, which makes this outcome less likely in Iran.
Nonetheless, Iran is a far more powerful adversary than any Israel has yet faced, making a protracted and profoundly destructive conflict likely. This is the war Israel had prepared to wage, but in war, preparation is no insulation from devastation.

When Israel went after Hezbollah in Lebanon last September, American and Israeli officials characterized the move as "de-escalation through escalation." That line was mocked by many, but it is largely what happened, because Israel was prepared for the conflict-unlike in Gaza-and achieved a decisive victory. Within months, Israel and Lebanon had agreed to a cease-fire, and Hezbollah was effectively disabled. Israel did the heavy lifting, and the U.S. acted as the closer with its diplomacy. By contrast, Israel's unplanned war in Gaza has seen no such resolution and steadily devolved into a messianic power grab by Israel's far right. No Israeli faction has religious or territorial designs on Tehran, which makes this outcome less likely in Iran. Nonetheless, Iran is a far more powerful adversary than any Israel has yet faced, making a protracted and profoundly destructive conflict likely. This is the war Israel had prepared to wage, but in war, preparation is no insulation from devastation.

The war Israel was ready to fight:
The strategy that led to the October 7 disaster is the same one fueling Israel’s current successes. www.theatlantic.com/internationa... #IranianImperialism #IranProxies #Islamism #nuclearweapons #StandWithIsrael

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Israel severely damaged Iran's ability to produce new solid propellant missiles in October by taking out around a dozen so-called planetary mixers, used to blend components for the missiles.
Iran has started to repair the mixers, one official said. That means much of the material imported from China could remain in Iran but some is expected to be sent to militia including the Houthis, the official said.
Iran likely needs material from abroad to avoid bottlenecks in its domestic production capabilities, said Fabian Hinz, a military analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Storing the combustible material creates risks. An April explosion at the Shahid Rajaee port, which handles most of Iran's container trade, killed dozens of people, state media said. The explosion was the result of mishandling of explosive material by a unit of the IRGC's Quds Force. At least some of the sodium perchlorate imported from China earlier this year was lost in the explosion, one official said.
"These substances are a major fire and explosive hazard," Hinz said. "Iran's defense industrial complex does not have a strong track record in ensuring safety standards."
Last month, Iran's customs authorities issued an order to accelerate the clearing of "hazardous materials" through customs.

Israel severely damaged Iran's ability to produce new solid propellant missiles in October by taking out around a dozen so-called planetary mixers, used to blend components for the missiles. Iran has started to repair the mixers, one official said. That means much of the material imported from China could remain in Iran but some is expected to be sent to militia including the Houthis, the official said. Iran likely needs material from abroad to avoid bottlenecks in its domestic production capabilities, said Fabian Hinz, a military analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Storing the combustible material creates risks. An April explosion at the Shahid Rajaee port, which handles most of Iran's container trade, killed dozens of people, state media said. The explosion was the result of mishandling of explosive material by a unit of the IRGC's Quds Force. At least some of the sodium perchlorate imported from China earlier this year was lost in the explosion, one official said. "These substances are a major fire and explosive hazard," Hinz said. "Iran's defense industrial complex does not have a strong track record in ensuring safety standards." Last month, Iran's customs authorities issued an order to accelerate the clearing of "hazardous materials" through customs.

Iran has ordered thousands of tons of ballistic-missile ingredients from China, people familiar with the transaction said, seeking to rebuild its military prowess as it discusses the future of its nuclear program with the U.S. archive.ph/4rPFs #NuclearWeapons #IranianImperialism

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Preview
Iran vows to help rebuild Lebanon, potentially boosting Hezbollah - analysis This is an important meeting because it shows Iran is seeking to redouble efforts to involve itself in Lebanon after it saw setbacks last year in Israel’s war on Hezbollah and the fall of Assad.

Iran vows to help rebuild Lebanon, potentially boosting Hezbollah
m.jpost.com/middle-east/... By @sfrantzman.bsky.social #Islamism #IranianImperialism

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It's too soon to say Trump is leaving Israel behind. But it's not too soon to say that his control over events is tenuous and his penchant for
unpredictability often inspires the same in other parties, and therefore Israel should figure out how to end the war in Gaza on its own terms before anything else changes.

It's too soon to say Trump is leaving Israel behind. But it's not too soon to say that his control over events is tenuous and his penchant for unpredictability often inspires the same in other parties, and therefore Israel should figure out how to end the war in Gaza on its own terms before anything else changes.

Loosening #Hezbollah’s grip on #Lebanon begins at the airport: With support from the U.S., a new government is cracking down on smuggling and rooting out sources of the militant group’s archive.ph/uV3xs #Islamism #terrorism #IranianImperialism

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Retired Lebanese army Gen.
Elias Hanna said he believes that Hezbollah is "still in the phase of denial" regarding the diminution of its military and political clout.
He said disarmament needs to take place as part of broader discussions about Lebanon's military doctrine and strategy. The Lebanese army could benefit from the experience of Hezbollah, which for many years maintained deterrence with Israel before the latest war, he said.
Saab said he believes the outcome is not in doubt.
"Hezbollah has a choice," he said. "Either lay down its arms or have them removed by Israeli force."

Retired Lebanese army Gen. Elias Hanna said he believes that Hezbollah is "still in the phase of denial" regarding the diminution of its military and political clout. He said disarmament needs to take place as part of broader discussions about Lebanon's military doctrine and strategy. The Lebanese army could benefit from the experience of Hezbollah, which for many years maintained deterrence with Israel before the latest war, he said. Saab said he believes the outcome is not in doubt. "Hezbollah has a choice," he said. "Either lay down its arms or have them removed by Israeli force."

Will a weakened Hezbollah in #Lebanon disarm?
Israel’s latest airstrike on what it called a #Hezbollah missile storage facility in Beirut’s southern suburbs came during increasing pressure for the Lebanese militant group to disarm. apnews.com/article/leba... #Islamism #terrorism #IranianImperialism

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To be sure, sanctions (along with chronic mismanagement and systemic corruption) have depleted Iran's treasury and spurred inflation and unemployment. The regime can barely keep the lights on and periodically has to shutter government offices and schools in order to conserve energy. But for regime leaders who claim to know the mind of God, those economic troubles are a small price to pay for making Iranians better Muslims.
The Islamic Republic's affection for proxy wars, terrorism and antisemitic conspiracies display a mindset fundamentally different from our own. Sanctions may cause such believers pain. They deprive them of resources. But they haven't in the slightest obliged them to forsake their faith and their missions.

To be sure, sanctions (along with chronic mismanagement and systemic corruption) have depleted Iran's treasury and spurred inflation and unemployment. The regime can barely keep the lights on and periodically has to shutter government offices and schools in order to conserve energy. But for regime leaders who claim to know the mind of God, those economic troubles are a small price to pay for making Iranians better Muslims. The Islamic Republic's affection for proxy wars, terrorism and antisemitic conspiracies display a mindset fundamentally different from our own. Sanctions may cause such believers pain. They deprive them of resources. But they haven't in the slightest obliged them to forsake their faith and their missions.

From the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s forward to now, the Islamic Republic has proven far more resilient than its critics expected, in large part because it has a pattern of using short-term retreats to pursue long-term, consistent goals.
The regime gives ground when necessary but always circles back to take back its concessions.
You can see this pattern domestically. Since 2009, the clerical regime has overcome numerous nationwide protests, some of which had economic sparks and all of which could have proved fatal to the theocracy. Each time, neither Khamenei nor his security services have flinched from doing what's necessary to suppress internal dissent, but they have also made short-term concessions to retain control. For instance, the mullahs have repeatedly eased restrictions against what they consider a lethal threat - public visibility of women's hair - allowing scarves to come down temporarily when unrest threatens the state.
Later the regime reasserts its sartorial dictates, arresting and beating refractory women. Abroad the regime acts similarly. When the United States invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, Tehran held back, temporarily played nice, and then devised tactics to kill and torment Americans. Obama's nuclear accord fits the pattern: Make minor concessions while establishing the means to come back stronger.

From the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s forward to now, the Islamic Republic has proven far more resilient than its critics expected, in large part because it has a pattern of using short-term retreats to pursue long-term, consistent goals. The regime gives ground when necessary but always circles back to take back its concessions. You can see this pattern domestically. Since 2009, the clerical regime has overcome numerous nationwide protests, some of which had economic sparks and all of which could have proved fatal to the theocracy. Each time, neither Khamenei nor his security services have flinched from doing what's necessary to suppress internal dissent, but they have also made short-term concessions to retain control. For instance, the mullahs have repeatedly eased restrictions against what they consider a lethal threat - public visibility of women's hair - allowing scarves to come down temporarily when unrest threatens the state. Later the regime reasserts its sartorial dictates, arresting and beating refractory women. Abroad the regime acts similarly. When the United States invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, Tehran held back, temporarily played nice, and then devised tactics to kill and torment Americans. Obama's nuclear accord fits the pattern: Make minor concessions while establishing the means to come back stronger.

The Iranian negotiating tactic the Trump administration doesn’t get: Sanctions and ‘maximum pressure’ have never made the clerical regime abandon its nuclear ambitions. www.politico.com/news/magazin... By Reuel Marc Gerecht and Ray Takey #Islamism #IranianImperialism #nuclearwaepons

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Iran could lose Iraq: The Axis of resistance is primed to take another hit - Iran and its proxies parasitically feed off Iraq’s economy. foreignaffairs.com/iran/iran-coul… By Mike Knights and Hamdi Malik #IranianImperialism #Islamism #IranProxies

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Syrian army advances into Lebanese territory, clashes with Hezbollah The confrontation between the Syrian Army and Hezbollah on Lebanese soil marks a major shift in regional dynamics.

Syrian army advances into Lebanese territory, clashes with Hezbollah: The confrontation between the Syrian Army and Hezbollah on Lebanese soil marks a major shift in regional dynamics. m.jpost.com/middle-east/... #Islamism #IranianImperialism #IranProxies

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Iran ‘secretly building nuclear missiles that can hit Europe’: Revolutionary Guard aerospace experts working on warheads with 3,000km range at two sites disguised as satellite launch bases, say exiles archive.ph/i5DNP #Islamism #IranianImperialism #nuclearweapons

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But concluding a deal is one thing; implementing it is another. The agreement has three phases, and the first, even though it is proceeding, has already been plagued by disputes. Hamas seems to be testing the limits of the deal. It delayed providing names of the hostages it planned to release and did not initially free Arbel Yehud, one of the hostages on its list. Israel responded by preventing the return of Palestinians to the north of Gaza. Though those issues were overcome and the agreement has continued to hold, Hamas may balk at Israel’s refusal to release some of the most prominent prisoners on its list, including Marwan Barghouti and Ahmad Saadat. The biggest question that remains is whether phase two of the agreement can be negotiated. If Hamas decides that the Israelis are not serious and vice versa, they may be unable to do so. With phase two negotiation scheduled to begin on February 3, their differences could yet complicate the completion of the first phase.
Netanyahu has told his coalition partners that he has not committed to ending the war in part because of threats by Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich to bring down the government if phase two proceeds. Netanyahu has also touted commitments from Trump and former U.S. President Joe Biden that Israel would be allowed to resume the war if Hamas did not negotiate seriously or violated the deal. Mike Waltz, Trump’s national security adviser, confirmed this promise, guaranteeing U.S. backing.
In other words, Hamas, by violating the deal, would allow Netanyahu to avoid the difficult choice of putting his government and his political career at risk to save the remaining hostages and permanently end the war. And it may just do that. After all, the Hamas lead negotiator, Khalil al-Hayya, made a militant speech the day the cease-fire was announced in which he extolled October 7 and its mass killings as a “source of pride,” implying it needed to be repeated.

But concluding a deal is one thing; implementing it is another. The agreement has three phases, and the first, even though it is proceeding, has already been plagued by disputes. Hamas seems to be testing the limits of the deal. It delayed providing names of the hostages it planned to release and did not initially free Arbel Yehud, one of the hostages on its list. Israel responded by preventing the return of Palestinians to the north of Gaza. Though those issues were overcome and the agreement has continued to hold, Hamas may balk at Israel’s refusal to release some of the most prominent prisoners on its list, including Marwan Barghouti and Ahmad Saadat. The biggest question that remains is whether phase two of the agreement can be negotiated. If Hamas decides that the Israelis are not serious and vice versa, they may be unable to do so. With phase two negotiation scheduled to begin on February 3, their differences could yet complicate the completion of the first phase. Netanyahu has told his coalition partners that he has not committed to ending the war in part because of threats by Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich to bring down the government if phase two proceeds. Netanyahu has also touted commitments from Trump and former U.S. President Joe Biden that Israel would be allowed to resume the war if Hamas did not negotiate seriously or violated the deal. Mike Waltz, Trump’s national security adviser, confirmed this promise, guaranteeing U.S. backing. In other words, Hamas, by violating the deal, would allow Netanyahu to avoid the difficult choice of putting his government and his political career at risk to save the remaining hostages and permanently end the war. And it may just do that. After all, the Hamas lead negotiator, Khalil al-Hayya, made a militant speech the day the cease-fire was announced in which he extolled October 7 and its mass killings as a “source of pride,” implying it needed to be repeated.

But although no one should count on Hamas’s rational calculations to overwhelm its ideological instincts, it is possible that Hamas will see it has an interest in a permanent cease-fire—if only to give it a lengthier respite from fighting and thus a chance to recoup. No Israeli government (or the international community) can or should be willing to accept Hamas’ continued rule in postwar Gaza. Indeed, to ensure this never happens, and to make sure no vacuum is left behind, the Trump administration will need to work with Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and other Arab countries to create an interim alternative administration. The gradual return of a reforming PA to Gaza could support this temporary government. Yet Hamas may well agree to step aside—at least for now. The group may give low priority to the needs of Gazans, but recent events show that they are at least somewhat attuned to their public perception. After Palestinians grew palpably angry about not being able to return to the north, the group began to honor its side of the cease-fire agreement. Hamas also knows that, should it insist on staying in power at this time, clashes with Israel are guaranteed, and that Trump will likely back the Israelis. Hamas leaders might even welcome the chance for a regional and international administration for Gaza—with the real promise of relief and reconstruction. (In any case, Hamas may believe it can find ways to reconstitute in postwar Gaza.)
Netanyahu, for his part, should recognize that if Israel violates the agreement and Hamas doesn’t, there could be a price to pay, not only with the Israeli public, which broadly favors the deal because it would see the release of the remaining hostages,but also with Trump. The president has already claimed victory and will not want the deal’s failure to tarnish his image as a peacemaker. Resuming the war in Gaza would also make it nearly impossible for Trump to broker Israeli-Saudi normalization, as the Saudis have refused to move t…

But although no one should count on Hamas’s rational calculations to overwhelm its ideological instincts, it is possible that Hamas will see it has an interest in a permanent cease-fire—if only to give it a lengthier respite from fighting and thus a chance to recoup. No Israeli government (or the international community) can or should be willing to accept Hamas’ continued rule in postwar Gaza. Indeed, to ensure this never happens, and to make sure no vacuum is left behind, the Trump administration will need to work with Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and other Arab countries to create an interim alternative administration. The gradual return of a reforming PA to Gaza could support this temporary government. Yet Hamas may well agree to step aside—at least for now. The group may give low priority to the needs of Gazans, but recent events show that they are at least somewhat attuned to their public perception. After Palestinians grew palpably angry about not being able to return to the north, the group began to honor its side of the cease-fire agreement. Hamas also knows that, should it insist on staying in power at this time, clashes with Israel are guaranteed, and that Trump will likely back the Israelis. Hamas leaders might even welcome the chance for a regional and international administration for Gaza—with the real promise of relief and reconstruction. (In any case, Hamas may believe it can find ways to reconstitute in postwar Gaza.) Netanyahu, for his part, should recognize that if Israel violates the agreement and Hamas doesn’t, there could be a price to pay, not only with the Israeli public, which broadly favors the deal because it would see the release of the remaining hostages,but also with Trump. The president has already claimed victory and will not want the deal’s failure to tarnish his image as a peacemaker. Resuming the war in Gaza would also make it nearly impossible for Trump to broker Israeli-Saudi normalization, as the Saudis have refused to move t…

The path to a transformed Middle East: How to keep the peace in Gaza while countering Iran www.foreignaffairs.com/united-state... By Dennis Ross and David Makovsky #IsraelHamasWar #IranianImperialism

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The Iranian withdrawal marks the demise of a yearslong effort in which Tehran used Syria as a hub in its broader regional strategy of partnering with regimes and allied militias to spread influence and wage proxy war against the U.S. and Israel. Iranian-backed armed groups in Syria have launched attacks on U.S. forces and aided in attacks on Israel. Members of Iran’s elite Quds Force have now fled to Iran and the militia groups have disbanded, a senior U.S. official said.
The Islamic Republic spent billions of dollars and sent thousands of military personnel and allied fighters to Syria after the Arab Spring uprising in 2011, to prop up the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Syria was Iran’s main state ally in the Middle East and a critical land bridge to Hezbollah—the most powerful militia in Tehran’s self-labeled “axis of resistance” alliance.
Iran, already reeling from Israeli airstrikes on its assets and partners in the region, began withdrawing personnel during the dramatic 11-day collapse of the Assad regime’s military late last year. When rebels in Syria launched an offensive in November, Iran’s government was already frustrated with Assad, who had remained on the sidelines over the prior year during Tehran’s multifront conflict with Israel.
Iran’s network in Syria once spanned the length of the country, from the east where the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps helped transport weapons and fighters into the country, to Syria’s border with Lebanon, where it helped arm Hezbollah with weapons shipments.

The Iranian withdrawal marks the demise of a yearslong effort in which Tehran used Syria as a hub in its broader regional strategy of partnering with regimes and allied militias to spread influence and wage proxy war against the U.S. and Israel. Iranian-backed armed groups in Syria have launched attacks on U.S. forces and aided in attacks on Israel. Members of Iran’s elite Quds Force have now fled to Iran and the militia groups have disbanded, a senior U.S. official said. The Islamic Republic spent billions of dollars and sent thousands of military personnel and allied fighters to Syria after the Arab Spring uprising in 2011, to prop up the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Syria was Iran’s main state ally in the Middle East and a critical land bridge to Hezbollah—the most powerful militia in Tehran’s self-labeled “axis of resistance” alliance. Iran, already reeling from Israeli airstrikes on its assets and partners in the region, began withdrawing personnel during the dramatic 11-day collapse of the Assad regime’s military late last year. When rebels in Syria launched an offensive in November, Iran’s government was already frustrated with Assad, who had remained on the sidelines over the prior year during Tehran’s multifront conflict with Israel. Iran’s network in Syria once spanned the length of the country, from the east where the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps helped transport weapons and fighters into the country, to Syria’s border with Lebanon, where it helped arm Hezbollah with weapons shipments.

Iran pulls most forces from Syria, in blow to Tehran’s regional ambitions: Thousands of Iranian military personnel and militia allies fled after Assad’s fall, leaving behind weapons and equipment archive.ph/PSwTm #IranianImperialism #Islamism

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Israel Is Doing Everyone a Favor By Hitting the Houthis Harder The fundamental problem with the Western way of war strategy in the 21st century is on display in Yemen. The Houthis, an Iranian proxy militia, are everyone’s problem. In their

The Houthis, an Iranian proxy militia, are everyone’s problem. They have killed innocent crew members, sank ships, targeted U.S. Navy vessels with missile attacks, held global trade hostage, and expanded regional war. www.commentary.org/seth-mandel/... #IranianImperialism #Islamism #Houthis

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The ‘Machinery of Death’ and Its Apologists Bashar al-Assad’s fall is leading to the excavations of his regime’s prisons and bunkers. We are only beginning to learn of the extent of his crimes. But Syrians have, unfortunately,

The Iranian empire responsible for the barbaric crimes in Syria, in Gaza, in Lebanon may be receding, but now is not the time to look away. Now is the time to sear into our memories just how low Tehran’s apologists are capable of sinking. www.commentary.org/seth-mandel/... #IranianImperialism

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Welcome to the New Great Game Where in the world is Bibi Netanyahu? Like the old Carmen Sandiego computer game, we’re following clues, tracking steps, investigating sightings. Turns out he’s on Mount Hermon in Syria today,

Iran is not gone completely, of course—far from it. Yet its empire is collapsing in much the way the Ottoman Empire collapsed a century earlier: In a global conflict, it is aligned against the West and it is paying for that choice. www.commentary.org/seth-mandel/... #IranianImperialism #Islamism

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Hezbollah loses supply route through Syria, in blow to it and Iran: The militant group’s leader admits that the toppling of Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, cut off an important land route from Iran. archive.ph/JODJB #Islamism #Baathism #IranianImperialism

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Hezbollah chief says group lost its supply route through Syria Hezbollah head Naim Qassem said on Saturday that the Lebanese armed group had lost its supply route through Syria, in his first comments since the toppling of President Bashar al-Assad nearly a week ago by a sweeping rebel offensive.

Hezbollah head Naim Qassem said that the Lebanese armed group had lost its supply route through Syria: Under Assad, Iran-backed Hezbollah used Syria to bring in weapons & other military equipment from Iran, through Iraq and Syria and into Lebanon www.reuters.com/world/middle... #IranianImperialism

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Khamenei Loses Everything The October 7 attack on Israel has now cost Iran its regional proxy forces.

Khamenei loses everything: The October 7 attack on Israel has now cost Iran its regional proxy forces. www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archiv... #IranianImperialism #Islamism

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This Is What Imperial Collapse Looks Like It seems odd that the great mass of “anti-imperialist” students and scholars are so unenthusiastic about having a real-world example to point to. Nonetheless, the end of the Assad rule

This is what imperial collapse looks like: The end of the Assad rule in Syria, whatever else it may also mean, signifies the textbook dissolution of an empire whose time has come and gone.
That empire is, of course, Iran’s. www.commentary.org/seth-mandel/... #IranianImperialism

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The danger of Iran choosing to build a nuclear weapon is increasing, even though it isn’t yet doing so, the U.S. intelligence community said in its sharpest warning yet about Tehran’s nuclear work. archive.ph/RMT5G #IranianImperialism #Islamism #nuclearweapons

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Iran Begins to Evacuate Military Officials and Personnel From Syria (Gift Article) The withdrawals by one of President Bashar al-Assad’s key backers come amid a resurgent rebel offensive.

Iran begins to evacuate military officials and personnel from Syria: The withdrawals by one of President Bashar al-Assad’s key backers come amid a resurgent rebel offensive. www.nytimes.com/2024/12/06/w... #Baathism #Islamism #IranianImperialism

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Iran is sending regional fighters to Syria. Can they save Assad again?
Fighters from Hezbollah and Iraq’s Shiite militias have deployed to Syria to support government forces, but it’s unclear if they are capable of turning the tide. archive.ph/4ajCI #Baathism #Islamism #Jihadism #IranianImperialism

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The armada of more than 100 Israeli planes that flew east on October 26th instead hit only military facilities. But in doing so they may have disarmed Iran and paved the way for deeper and more ambitious attacks in the future. archive.ph/e5omX #IranianImperialism

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Iranian Officials Threaten Retaliation for Israeli Strikes It was unclear how or when Iran plans to respond, or whether the rhetoric could be bluster. Iranian officials had downplayed the damage of Israel’s last attack.

Iranian officials threaten retaliation for Israeli strikes: It was unclear how or when Iran plans to respond, or whether the rhetoric could be bluster. Iranian officials had downplayed the damage of Israel’s last attack. www.nytimes.com/2024/10/31/w... #Islamism #IranianImperialism

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The Times view on Hassan Nasrallah: The Godfather - The leader of Hezbollah was a gangster and a terrorist responsible for untold suffering. Those who accuse Israel of unwarranted escalation in killing him ignore this reality archive.ph/AlWzN #Islamism #terrorism #IranianImperialism

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