Per Curiam 6-3 decision

Justice Barrett concurrence (Roberts and Kavanaugh join) Cite as: 607 U.S. _ (2026) BARRETT, J., concurring SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 25A810 ELIZABETH MIRABELLI, ET AL. v. ROB BONTA, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL. ON APPLICATION TO VACATE INTERLOCUTORY STAY ORDER [March 2, 2026] JUSTICE BARRETT, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE KAVANAUGH join, concurring. As the dissent observes, substantive due process is a controversial doctrine. Judges typically interpret express constitutional rights, such as the freedom of speech or religion. But substantive due process asks us to find unexpressed rights in a constitutional provision that guarantees only "process" before a person is deprived of life, liberty, or prop-erty. U.S. Const., Amdt. 14, §1. When rights are unstated, how do judges know what they are? The obvious risk is that judges will use their own values as a guide, thereby jeopardizing the People's right to self-governance. To mitigate this risk, the Court has crafted a demanding test for recognizing unexpressed rights: They must be "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Relevant here, the doctrine of substantive due process has long embraced a parent's right to raise her child, which includes the right to participate in significant decisions about her child's mental health. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S. 584 (1979). The parent-applicants are likely to succeed on the merits under a straightforward application of these cases. California prohibits its public schools from informing parents of

Justice Kagan dissent (Justice Jackson joins) Justice Sotomayor would deny the application in full. Cite as: 607 U.S._ (2026) 1 KAGAN, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 25A810 ELIZABETH MIRABELLI, ET AL. u. ROB BONTA, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL. ON APPLICATION TO VACATE INTERLOCUTORY STAY ORDER (March 2, 2026] SCRUSTICE KAGAN, with whom JUSTICE: JAcKSoN joins, dis- Today's decision shows, not for the first time, how our emergency docket can malfunction. A case raising novel legal questions and arousing strong views comes to this Court via an application about whether to stay a district court's injunction pending appeal. The ordinary appellate process has barely started; only a district court has ruled on the case's merits. The Court receives scant and, frankly, inadequate briefing about the legal issues in dispute. It does not hold oral argument or deliberate in conference, as reg. ular procedures dictate. It considers the request on a short fuse—a matter of weeks. And then the Court grants relief by means of a terse, tonally dismissive ruling designed to conclusively resolve the dispute. The Court does all this even though the application of existing law to the case raises tricky questions, and so cries out for reflection and explanation. The Court is impatient: It already knows what it thinks, and insists on getting everything over quickly. See also, e.g., Department of State v. AIDS Vaccine Advocacy Coalition, 606 U.S._ _ (2025) (KAGAN, J., dissent- ing from grant of stay application) (slip op., at 2-3); Trump v. Wilcox, 605 U.S. - _ (2025) (KAGAN, J., dissenting from grant of stay application) (slip op., at 2-3, 8). Indeed, the precipitousness of the Court's decision today has yet a further-and wholly new-dimension: In granting

consider this application for a reason. It’s part of an alarming trend. It’s a California case but it’s important. But I suspect it won’t get nearly the attention it deserves.

To put it bluntly: #abortion legal reporters should be reporting on this too.

#Mirabelli v. #Bonta #CA #SDP #rights