You don't defeat resentment with better arguments. You change it with better stories. I tried to think about the new cruelty using Richard Rorty's positions. Is it naive?
bzoennchen.github.io/Pages/2026/0...
#Rorty #Philosophy #Solidarity #Democracy
Unlike Habermas, I do not think that disciplines like philosophy, linguistics, and developmental psychology can do much for democratic politics. I see the development of the social conventions in which Habermas and I both rejoice as a lucky accident. Still, I should be happy to think that I was wrong about this. Maybe the gradual development of those conventions does, as Habermas thinks, illustrate a universal pattern of phylo- or onto-genetic development, a pattern captured by the rational reconstruction of competences offered by various human sciences and illustrated by the transition from “traditional” to modern, “rationalized” societies.
I see the development of the social conventions in which Habermas and I both rejoice as a lucky accident.
PasAA p.67
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Politics
Unlike Habermas, I do not think that disciplines like philosophy, linguistics, and developmental psychology can do much for democratic politics. I see the development of the social conventions in which Habermas and I both rejoice as a lucky accident. Still, I should be happy to think that I was wrong about this. Maybe the gradual development of those conventions does, as Habermas thinks, illustrate a universal pattern of phylo- or onto-genetic development, a pattern captured by the rational reconstruction of competences offered by various human sciences and illustrated by the transition from “traditional” to modern, “rationalized” societies.
Unlike Habermas, I do not think that disciplines like philosophy, linguistics, and developmental psychology can do much for democratic politics.
PasAA p.67
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Politics
My problem, of course, is that I do not have the option of understanding them that way. Pragmatists like me can’t figure out how to tell whether we are understanding a justification as just a “justification for us” or as a “justification, period.” This strikes me as trying to tell whether I think of my scalpel or my computer as “a good tool for this task” or as “a good tool, period.”
Pragmatists like me can’t figure out how to tell whether we are understanding a justification as just a “justification for us” or as a “justification, period.”
PasAA p.65
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Truth
Putnam, Apel, and Habermas all take over from Peirce an idea which I reject: the idea of convergence upon the One Truth. Instead of arguing that because reality is One, and truth correspondence to that One Reality, Peirceans argue that the idea of convergence is built into the presuppositions of discourse. They all agree that the principal reason why reason cannot be naturalized is that reason is normative and norms cannot be naturalized. But, they say, we can make room for the normative without going back to the traditional idea of a duty to correspond to the intrinsic nature of One Reality. We do this by attending to the universalistic character of the idealizing presuppositions of discourse. This strategy has the advantage of setting aside metaethical questions about whether there is a moral reality to which our moral judgments might hope to correspond, as our physical science supposedly corresponds to physical reality.
Putnam, Apel, and Habermas all take over from Peirce an idea which I reject: the idea of convergence upon the One Truth.
PasAA p.54
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Truth
So I take the appropriate pragmatist attitude toward truth to be: it is no more necessary to have a philosophical theory about the nature of truth, or the meaning of the word “true,” than it is to have one about the nature of danger, or the meaning of the word “danger.” The principal reason we have a word like “danger” in the language is to caution people: to warn them that they may not have envisaged all the consequences of their proposed action. We pragmatists, who think that beliefs are habits of action rather than attempts to correspond to reality, see the cautionary use of the word “true” as flagging a special sort of danger. We use it to remind ourselves that people in different circumstances—people facing future audiences—may not be able to justify the belief which we have triumphantly justified to all the audiences we have encountered.
We pragmatists use “truth” to remind ourselves that people in different circumstances—people facing future audiences—may not be able to justify the belief which we have triumphantly justified to all the audiences we have encountered.
PasAA p.52
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Truth
So I take the appropriate pragmatist attitude toward truth to be: it is no more necessary to have a philosophical theory about the nature of truth, or the meaning of the word “true,” than it is to have one about the nature of danger, or the meaning of the word “danger.” The principal reason we have a word like “danger” in the language is to caution people: to warn them that they may not have envisaged all the consequences of their proposed action. We pragmatists, who think that beliefs are habits of action rather than attempts to correspond to reality, see the cautionary use of the word “true” as flagging a special sort of danger. We use it to remind ourselves that people in different circumstances—people facing future audiences—may not be able to justify the belief which we have triumphantly justified to all the audiences we have encountered.
We pragmatists, who think that beliefs are habits of action rather than attempts to correspond to reality, see the cautionary use of the word “true” as flagging a special sort of danger.
PasAA p.52
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Truth
So I take the appropriate pragmatist attitude toward truth to be: it is no more necessary to have a philosophical theory about the nature of truth, or the meaning of the word “true,” than it is to have one about the nature of danger, or the meaning of the word “danger.” The principal reason we have a word like “danger” in the language is to caution people: to warn them that they may not have envisaged all the consequences of their proposed action. We pragmatists, who think that beliefs are habits of action rather than attempts to correspond to reality, see the cautionary use of the word “true” as flagging a special sort of danger. We use it to remind ourselves that people in different circumstances—people facing future audiences—may not be able to justify the belief which we have triumphantly justified to all the audiences we have encountered.
It is no more necessary to have a philosophical theory about the nature of truth, or the meaning of the word “true,” than it is to have one about the nature of danger, or the meaning of the word “danger.”
PasAA p.52
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Truth
This latter idea can be made to sound unattractive by dubbing it "Nietzschean" and construing it as a form of the ruthless will to power which was incarnate in the Nazis. I should like to make it sound attractive by dubbing it 'American' and construing it as the idea common to Emerson and Whitman, the idea of a new self-creating community, united not by knowledge of the same truths but by sharing the same generous, inclusivist, democratic hopes. The idea of communal self-creation, of realizing a dream which has no justification in unconditional claims to universal validity, sounds suspicious to Habermas and Apel because they naturally associate it with Hitler. It sounds better to Americans, because they naturally associate it with Jefferson, Whitman and Dewey. The moral to be drawn, I think, is that this suggestion is neutral between Hitler and Jefferson.
The moral to be drawn, I think, is that the idea of communal self-creation—of realizing a dream which has no justification in unconditional claims to universal validity—is neutral between Hitler and Jefferson.
PasAA p.50
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Antifoundationalism
In this paper I shall consider the prospects for defending democratic politics while denying any of the three premises I have listed. I shall be arguing that what philosophers have described as the universal desire for truth is better described as the universal desire for justification.’ The grounding premise of my argument is that you cannot aim at something, cannot work to get it, unless you can recognize it once you've got it. One difference between truth and justification is that between the unrecognizable and the recognizable. We shall never know for sure whether a given belief is true, but we can be sure that nobody is able to summon up any residual objections to it, that everybody agrees that it ought to be held.
We shall never know for sure whether a given belief is true, but we can be sure that nobody is able to summon up any residual objections to it, that everybody agrees that it ought to be held.
PasAA p.48
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Truth
I have given you this sketch of Dewey’s attempt to appropriate Christianity for his own pragmatic purposes in order to reply to the suggestion that pragmatism begs the question against religion. As I see it, the only question it begs is whether we are in a state of Sin: whether we need to rely on something non-human for our salvation. Anyone who thinks the consciousness of Sin essential to religious faith will have no use for James’s and Dewey’s way of reconciling science and religion. But for those who are willing to use the term “religious faith” to cover both a religion of obedient submission to non-human power and a religion of love between human beings, this project of reconciliation may have some attractions.
For those who are willing to use the term “religious faith” to cover both a religion of obedient submission to non-human power and a religion of love between human beings, James’ and Dewey’s project of reconciliation may have some attractions.
PasAA p.46
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Religion
If this humanistic version of Christianity seems strange, that may be because it leaves no room for the doctrine which was closest to Kierkegaard’s heart: the doctrine of sin. That we are in sin, Kierkegaard tells us, is something so hard for us sinners to realize that only the operation of Grace can make it possible. For Dewey, on the other hand, there is no such thing as sin, no such thing as radical evil. Every evil, Dewey thought, is a name for a lesser good—a good considered and rejected in the process of deliberation. … The Enlightenment rationalists substituted the idea of redemption from ignorance by Science for this theological idea, but Dewey and James wanted to get rid of that notion too. They wanted to substitute the contrast between a less useful set of beliefs and a more useful set for the contrast between ignorance and knowledge. For them, there was no goal called Truth to be aimed at; the only goal was the ever-receding goal of still greater human happiness.
For Dewey and James, there was no goal called Truth to be aimed at; the only goal was the ever-receding goal of still greater human happiness.
PasAA p.46
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Truth
If this humanistic version of Christianity seems strange, that may be because it leaves no room for the doctrine which was closest to Kierkegaard’s heart: the doctrine of sin. That we are in sin, Kierkegaard tells us, is something so hard for us sinners to realize that only the operation of Grace can make it possible. For Dewey, on the other hand, there is no such thing as sin, no such thing as radical evil. Every evil, Dewey thought, is a name for a lesser good—a good considered and rejected in the process of deliberation. … The Enlightenment rationalists substituted the idea of redemption from ignorance by Science for this theological idea, but Dewey and James wanted to get rid of that notion too. They wanted to substitute the contrast between a less useful set of beliefs and a more useful set for the contrast between ignorance and knowledge. For them, there was no goal called Truth to be aimed at; the only goal was the ever-receding goal of still greater human happiness.
Dewey and James wanted to substitute the contrast between a less useful set of beliefs and a more useful set for the contrast between ignorance and knowledge.
PasAA p.46
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Truth
If this humanistic version of Christianity seems strange, that may be because it leaves no room for the doctrine which was closest to Kierkegaard’s heart: the doctrine of sin. That we are in sin, Kierkegaard tells us, is something so hard for us sinners to realize that only the operation of Grace can make it possible. For Dewey, on the other hand, there is no such thing as sin, no such thing as radical evil. Every evil, Dewey thought, is a name for a lesser good—a good considered and rejected in the process of deliberation. … The Enlightenment rationalists substituted the idea of redemption from ignorance by Science for this theological idea, but Dewey and James wanted to get rid of that notion too. They wanted to substitute the contrast between a less useful set of beliefs and a more useful set for the contrast between ignorance and knowledge. For them, there was no goal called Truth to be aimed at; the only goal was the ever-receding goal of still greater human happiness.
Every evil, Dewey thought, is a name for a lesser good—a good considered and rejected in the process of deliberation.
PasAA p.46
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Religion
If this humanistic version of Christianity seems strange, that may be because it leaves no room for the doctrine which was closest to Kierkegaard’s heart: the doctrine of sin. That we are in sin, Kierkegaard tells us, is something so hard for us sinners to realize that only the operation of Grace can make it possible. For Dewey, on the other hand, there is no such thing as sin, no such thing as radical evil. Every evil, Dewey thought, is a name for a lesser good—a good considered and rejected in the process of deliberation. … The Enlightenment rationalists substituted the idea of redemption from ignorance by Science for this theological idea, but Dewey and James wanted to get rid of that notion too. They wanted to substitute the contrast between a less useful set of beliefs and a more useful set for the contrast between ignorance and knowledge. For them, there was no goal called Truth to be aimed at; the only goal was the ever-receding goal of still greater human happiness.
For Dewey, in contrast to Kierkegaard, there is no such thing as sin, no such thing as radical evil.
PasAA p.46
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Religion
If this humanistic version of Christianity seems strange, that may be because it leaves no room for the doctrine which was closest to Kierkegaard’s heart: the doctrine of sin. That we are in sin, Kierkegaard tells us, is something so hard for us sinners to realize that only the operation of Grace can make it possible. For Dewey, on the other hand, there is no such thing as sin, no such thing as radical evil. Every evil, Dewey thought, is a name for a lesser good—a good considered and rejected in the process of deliberation. … The Enlightenment rationalists substituted the idea of redemption from ignorance by Science for this theological idea, but Dewey and James wanted to get rid of that notion too. They wanted to substitute the contrast between a less useful set of beliefs and a more useful set for the contrast between ignorance and knowledge. For them, there was no goal called Truth to be aimed at; the only goal was the ever-receding goal of still greater human happiness.
If a humanistic version of Christianity seems strange, that may be because it leaves no room for the doctrine which was closest to Kierkegaard’s heart: the doctrine of sin.
PasAA p.46
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Religion
For he is treating Christianity, utilitarianism, and pragmatism as so many different ways of getting human beings to stand on their own feet, to rely on each other rather than hoping for help from the non-human. They are, in his eyes, three different forms of the attempt to substitute love for obedience. He sees Christianity not as a matter of exchanging worship for a promise of protection from a power not ourselves, but as a way of freeing us to exchange awe for hope and love. He sees utilitarianism and pragmatism as ways of freeing us from the idea that something non-human—be it the mysterious Will of God or the mysterious True Nature of Reality—deserves respect simply because it is so different from us and so unconcerned with our needs. For Dewey, Kierkegaard’s Wholly Other is demonic rather than divine, and the worship of the Wholly Other is idolatry, a betrayal of everything which Christ stood for.
For Dewey, Kierkegaard’s Wholly Other is demonic rather than divine, and the worship of the Wholly Other is idolatry, a betrayal of everything which Christ stood for.
PasAA p.46
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Religion
Suppose that a source which you believe to be non-human tells you that all men are brothers, and that your attempt to make yourself and those you cherish happier should be expanded into an attempt to make all human beings happy. For Dewey, your belief that the source of this suggestion is a non-human power is irrelevant. You might have heard the same suggestion from a false messiah, or you might have found it scratched anonymously on a wall. Whatever its source, it has no validity unless it is treated as a hypothesis, tried out, and found successful. The good thing about the Christian doctrine that love is the only law, Dewey is saying, is not that it has been proclaimed from above, but that it works—works according to utilitarian criteria. Living in this way produces more human happiness than would be produced by living in other ways.
The good thing about the Christian doctrine that love is the only law, Dewey is saying, is not that it has been proclaimed from above, but that it works—works according to utilitarian criteria.
PasAA p.45
#Religion
#Rorty
#Love
If one does see the claim that love is the only law as central to Christianity, then it is plausible to describe the historical development of Christianity in terms of the gradual substitution of love for power as the essential attribute of God. A god of power is an authority; a god of love is a friend. If one thinks of our relation to God as one of awe, worship, & obedience, one will insist that utilitarianism & pragmatism have their limits: limits set by God’s commands. If God has commanded us to worship him under one name rather than another, or commanded us not to suffer a witch to live, or commanded that women be silent in churches, or that a man shall not lie with a man as with a woman, then no pragmatic or utilitarian consideration should have any force to persuade us of any different opinion. Insofar as Christians see their duty of obedience to God as including more than the duty to serve their fellow human beings, they are worshipping a god of power rather than a god of love.
Insofar as Christians see their duty of obedience to God as including more than the duty to serve their fellow human beings, they are worshipping a god of power rather than a god of love.
PasAA p.45
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Religion
If one does see the claim that love is the only law as central to Christianity, then it is plausible to describe the historical development of Christianity in terms of the gradual substitution of love for power as the essential attribute of God. A god of power is an authority; a god of love is a friend. If one thinks of our relation to God as one of awe, worship, & obedience, one will insist that utilitarianism & pragmatism have their limits: limits set by God’s commands. If God has commanded us to worship him under one name rather than another, or commanded us not to suffer a witch to live, or commanded that women be silent in churches, or that a man shall not lie with a man as with a woman, then no pragmatic or utilitarian consideration should have any force to persuade us of any different opinion. Insofar as Christians see their duty of obedience to God as including more than the duty to serve their fellow human beings, they are worshipping a god of power rather than a god of love.
If one does see the claim that love is the only law as central to Christianity, then it is plausible to describe the historical development of Christianity in terms of the gradual substitution of love for power as the essential attribute of God.
PasAA p.44
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Religion
Habermas says, correctly, that I am trying to substitute a neo-Darwinian description of human beings for one which distinguishes sharply between what animals do (causal manipulation) and what we do (offering rationally convincing arguments). To effect this substitution, I need to claim, first, that all argumentation is, under one useful description, causal manipulation (kausaler Einflussnahme).Second, I need to assert that some sorts of causal manipulation by means of language are highly desirable. The difference between strategic and non-strategic uses of language is the difference between the kind of causal manipulation we are glad to have practiced on us and the kind we resent having practiced on us. In this respect it is like the difference between having our body manipulated by a knowledgeable doctor, one who has our interests at heart, and having it manipulated by a quack chiropracter trying to make a quick buck.
Habermas says, correctly, that I am trying to substitute a neo-Darwinian description of human beings for one which distinguishes sharply between what animals do (causal manipulation) and what we do (offering rationally convincing arguments).
Rorty and His Critics p.59
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Truth
Habermas is willing to drop most of that problematic. But even after he has done so, he still insists on seeing the process of undistorted communication as convergent, and seeing that convergence as a guarantee of the "rationality" of such communication. The residual difference I have with Habermas is that his universalism makes him substitute such convergence for ahistorical grounding, whereas my insistence on the contingency of language makes me suspicious of the very idea of the "universal validity" which such convergence is supposed to underwrite. Habermas wants to preserve the traditional story (common to Hegel and to Peirce) of asymptotic approach to foci imaginarii. I want to replace this with a story of increasing willingness to live with plurality and to stop asking for universal validity.
Habermas wants to preserve the traditional story (common to Hegel and to Peirce) of asymptotic approach to foci imaginarii. I want to replace this with a story of increasing willingness to live with plurality and to stop asking for universal validity.
CIS p.67
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Pluralism
Romantic utilitarianism, pragmatism, and polytheism are equally compatible with enthusiasm for democracy and with contempt for democracy. The frequent complaint that a philosopher who holds the pragmatic theory of truth cannot give you a reason not to be a facist is perfectly justified. But neither can she give you a reason to be one. Once you become a polytheist in the sense I just defined, you have to give up on the idea that philosophy can help you choose among the various deities, and the various forms of life, which are on offer. The choice between enthusiasm and contempt for democracy becomes a choice between, for example, Walt Whitman and Robinson Jeffers, rather than between competing sets of philosophical arguments.
The choice between enthusiasm and contempt for democracy becomes a choice between, for example, Walt Whitman and Robinson Jeffers, rather than between competing sets of philosophical arguments.
PasAA p.30
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Democracy
Romantic utilitarianism, pragmatism, and polytheism are equally compatible with enthusiasm for democracy and with contempt for democracy. The frequent complaint that a philosopher who holds the pragmatic theory of truth cannot give you a reason not to be a facist is perfectly justified. But neither can she give you a reason to be one. Once you become a polytheist in the sense I just defined, you have to give up on the idea that philosophy can help you choose among the various deities, and the various forms of life, which are on offer. The choice between enthusiasm and contempt for democracy becomes a choice between, for example, Walt Whitman and Robinson Jeffers, rather than between competing sets of philosophical arguments.
Once you become a polytheist in the sense I just defined, you have to give up on the idea that philosophy can help you choose among the various deities, and the various forms of life, which are on offer.
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Religion
Romantic utilitarianism, pragmatism, and polytheism are equally compatible with enthusiasm for democracy and with contempt for democracy. The frequent complaint that a philosopher who holds the pragmatic theory of truth cannot give you a reason not to be a facist is perfectly justified. But neither can she give you a reason to be one. Once you become a polytheist in the sense I just defined, you have to give up on the idea that philosophy can help you choose among the various deities, and the various forms of life, which are on offer. The choice between enthusiasm and contempt for democracy becomes a choice between, for example, Walt Whitman and Robinson Jeffers, rather than between competing sets of philosophical arguments.
The frequent complaint that a philosopher who holds the pragmatic theory of truth cannot give you a reason not to be a fascist is perfectly justified. But neither can she give you a reason to be one.
PasAA p.29
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Democracy
Romantic utilitarianism, pragmatism, and polytheism are equally compatible with enthusiasm for democracy and with contempt for democracy. The frequent complaint that a philosopher who holds the pragmatic theory of truth cannot give you a reason not to be a facist is perfectly justified. But neither can she give you a reason to be one. Once you become a polytheist in the sense I just defined, you have to give up on the idea that philosophy can help you choose among the various deities, and the various forms of life, which are on offer. The choice between enthusiasm and contempt for democracy becomes a choice between, for example, Walt Whitman and Robinson Jeffers, rather than between competing sets of philosophical arguments.
Romantic utilitarianism, pragmatism, and polytheism are equally compatible with enthusiasm for democracy and with contempt for democracy.
PasAA p.29
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Democracy
The big difference, however, between Ryan’s and my own sense of what is important about religion is that for him a sense of sin and of the necessary inferiority of the finite and human to the infinite and non-human is necessary for an outlook to be called religious. I see Christianity as working its way from a form of religion in which the notions of obedience, sin, and immortality are central to one in which these notions have all but vanished. Christianity put forward, though it has never been very faithful to, the suggestion that the only form of obedience which God wants is for us to love one another, that worship of him consists precisely in kindness toward each other, and that the only reward we should expect from showing such kindness is that others will show it to us.
Christianity put forward the suggestion that the only form of obedience which God wants is for us to love one another, worship consists in kindness toward each other, and the only reward we should expect from showing such kindness is that others will show it to us.
PasAA p.43
#Rorty
#Religion
The big difference, however, between Ryan’s and my own sense of what is important about religion is that for him a sense of sin and of the necessary inferiority of the finite and human to the infinite and non-human is necessary for an outlook to be called religious. I see Christianity as working its way from a form of religion in which the notions of obedience, sin, and immortality are central to one in which these notions have all but vanished. Christianity put forward, though it has never been very faithful to, the suggestion that the only form of obedience which God wants is for us to love one another, that worship of him consists precisely in kindness toward each other, and that the only reward we should expect from showing such kindness is that others will show it to us.
I see Christianity as working its way from a form of religion in which the notions of obedience, sin, and immortality are central to one in which these notions have all but vanished.
PasAA p.43
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Religion
He tells us that non-human nature culminates in a community of free men, in their collaboration in building a society in which, as Dewey said, “poetry and religious feeling will be the unforced flowers of life.” Dewey’s God, his symbol of what he called “the union of the ideal and the actual” was the United States of America treated as a symbol of openness to the possibility of as yet undreamt of, ever more diverse, forms of human happiness. Much of what Dewey wrote consists of endless reiteration of a passage in “Democratic Vistas” at which Whitman says,* America... counts, as I reckon, for her justification and success, (for who, as yet, dare claim success?) almost entirely on the future...For our New World I consider far less important for what it has done, or what it is, than for results to come. So much for my contrast between James and Dewey, and for my claim that Dewey is the better exponent of a properly pragmatist philosophy of religion.
So much for my contrast between James and Dewey, and for my claim that Dewey is the better exponent of a properly pragmatist philosophy of religion.
PasAA p.41
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Religion
He tells us that non-human nature culminates in a community of free men, in their collaboration in building a society in which, as Dewey said, “poetry and religious feeling will be the unforced flowers of life.” Dewey’s God, his symbol of what he called “the union of the ideal and the actual” was the United States of America treated as a symbol of openness to the possibility of as yet undreamt of, ever more diverse, forms of human happiness. Much of what Dewey wrote consists of endless reiteration of a passage in “Democratic Vistas” at which Whitman says,* America... counts, as I reckon, for her justification and success, (for who, as yet, dare claim success?) almost entirely on the future...For our New World I consider far less important for what it has done, or what it is, than for results to come. So much for my contrast between James and Dewey, and for my claim that Dewey is the better exponent of a properly pragmatist philosophy of religion.
Much of what Dewey wrote consists of endless reiteration of a passage in Whitman’s “Democratic Vistas”.
PasAA p.41
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Religion
