Like MacIntyre, Benhabib, Kelly, and others, I think that you have to smuggle some provinciality into your universals before they do you any good. We think this for the same sorts of reasons as Hegel thought that you had to smuggle in some provinciality—some ethical substance—before you could get any use out of Kant’s notion of “unconditional moral obligation.” In particular, you have to smuggle in some rule like “No putative contribution to a conversation can be rejected simply because it comes from somebody who has some attribute which can vary independently of his or her opinions—an attribute like being Jewish, or black, or homosexual.”

Like MacIntyre, Benhabib, Kelly, and others, I think that you have to smuggle some provinciality into your universals before they do you any good.
PasAA p.80
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#RegulativeIdeal

I recognize, of course, that domination-free communication is only a regulative ideal, never to be attained in practice. But unless a regulative ideal makes a difference to practice, it is not good for much. So I ask: is there an ethics of discourse which lets me assign the books I want to assign but makes no reference to the local and ethnocentric considerations which I should cite to justify my pedagogic practices? Can you get such an ethics out of the notions of “reason, truth, and justification,” or do you have to load the dice? Can I invoke universalistic notions in defense of my action, as well as local ones?

I recognize, of course, that domination-free communication is only a regulative ideal, never to be attained in practice. But unless a regulative ideal makes a difference to practice, it is not good for much.
PasAA p.80
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#RegulativeIdeal

I have no trouble offering this reply, since I do not claim to make the distinction between education and conversation on the basis of anything except my loyalty to a particular community, a community whose interests required re-educating the Hitler Youth in 1945 and require re-educating the children of southwestern Virginia in 1993. I don’t see anything Herrschaftsfrei about my handling of my fundamentalist students. I think those students are lucky to find themselves under the Herrschaft of people like me, and to have escaped from that of their rather frightening and dangerous parents. But I think that the handling of such students is a problem for Putnam and Habermas. It seems to me that I am just as provincial and contextualist as the Nazi teachers who made their students read Der Stiirmer; the only difference is that I serve a better cause. I come from a better province.

I don’t see anything domination free about my handling of my fundamentalist students. I think those students are lucky to find themselves under the domination of people like me, and to have escaped from that of their rather frightening and dangerous parents.
PasAA p.80
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Education

Every day I'm amazed at the intransigence of his base, 85m people who protect him so that he can strengthen whiteness. A brute force project.

#Pragmatism

Davidson’s point is that the only sort of philosopher who would take seriously the idea that truth is relative to a context, and particularly to a choice between human communities, is one who thinks that he or she can contrast “being in touch with a human community” with “being in touch with reality.” But Davidson’s point about there being no language without triangulation means that this contrast cannot be drawn. You cannot have any language, or any beliefs, without being in touch with both a human community and non-human reality. There is no possibility of agreement without truth, nor of truth without agreement.

You cannot have any language, or any beliefs, without being in touch with both a human community and non-human reality. There is no possibility of agreement without truth, nor of truth without agreement.
PasAA p.70
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Truth

On the contrary, human beings usually divide up into mutually suspicious (not mutually unintelligible) communities of justification—mutually exclusive groups—depending upon the presence or absence of sufficient overlap in belief and desire. The principal source of conflict between human communities is the belief that I have no reason to justify my beliefs to you, and none in finding out what alternative beliefs you may have, because you are an infidel, a foreigner, a woman, a child, a slave, a pervert, or an untouchable. In short, you are not “one of us,” not one of the real human beings, the paradigm human beings, the ones whose persons and opinions are to be treated with respect.

The principal source of conflict between human communities is the belief that I have no reason to justify my beliefs to you, and none in finding out what alternative beliefs you may have.
PasAA p.68
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Justification

But, unlike Habermas, I should be unperturbed if the offers currently made by the human sciences were withdrawn: if Chomsky’s universalistic ideas about communicative competence were repudiated by a connectionist revolution in artificial intelligence, if Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s empirical results proved to be unduplicatable, and so on. I do not see that it matters much whether there is a universal pattern here. I do not much care whether democratic politics are an expression of something deep, or whether they express nothing better than some hopes which popped from nowhere into the brains of a few remarkable people (Socrates, Christ, Jefferson, etc.)* and which, for unknown reasons, became popular.

I do not much care whether democratic politics are an expression of something deep, or whether they express nothing better than some hopes which popped from nowhere into the brains of a few remarkable people and which, for unknown reasons, became popular.
PasAA p.67
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Politics

Unlike Habermas, I do not think that disciplines like philosophy, linguistics, and developmental psychology can do much for democratic politics. I see the development of the social conventions in which Habermas and I both rejoice as a lucky accident. Still, I should be happy to think that I was wrong about this. Maybe the gradual development of those conventions does, as Habermas thinks, illustrate a universal pattern of phylo- or onto-genetic development, a pattern captured by the rational reconstruction of competences offered by various human sciences and illustrated by the transition from “traditional” to modern, “rationalized” societies.

I see the development of the social conventions in which Habermas and I both rejoice as a lucky accident.
PasAA p.67
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Politics

Unlike Habermas, I do not think that disciplines like philosophy, linguistics, and developmental psychology can do much for democratic politics. I see the development of the social conventions in which Habermas and I both rejoice as a lucky accident. Still, I should be happy to think that I was wrong about this. Maybe the gradual development of those conventions does, as Habermas thinks, illustrate a universal pattern of phylo- or onto-genetic development, a pattern captured by the rational reconstruction of competences offered by various human sciences and illustrated by the transition from “traditional” to modern, “rationalized” societies.

Unlike Habermas, I do not think that disciplines like philosophy, linguistics, and developmental psychology can do much for democratic politics.
PasAA p.67
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Politics

My problem, of course, is that I do not have the option of understanding them that way. Pragmatists like me can’t figure out how to tell whether we are understanding a justification as just a “justification for us” or as a “justification, period.” This strikes me as trying to tell whether I think of my scalpel or my computer as “a good tool for this task” or as “a good tool, period.”

Pragmatists like me can’t figure out how to tell whether we are understanding a justification as just a “justification for us” or as a “justification, period.”
PasAA p.65
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Truth

Peace requires patience to understand, a dedication to nuance, and above all, a willingness to compromise with a radical sense of pragmatism. These three qualities are the primary threats to extremism, second only to achieving peace itself. #Peace #Extremists #Pragmatism

Putnam, Apel, and Habermas all take over from Peirce an idea which I reject: the idea of convergence upon the One Truth. Instead of arguing that because reality is One, and truth correspondence to that One Reality, Peirceans argue that the idea of convergence is built into the presuppositions of discourse. They all agree that the principal reason why reason cannot be naturalized is that reason is normative and norms cannot be naturalized. But, they say, we can make room for the normative without going back to the traditional idea of a duty to correspond to the intrinsic nature of One Reality. We do this by attending to the universalistic character of the idealizing presuppositions of discourse. This strategy has the advantage of setting aside metaethical questions about whether there is a moral reality to which our moral judgments might hope to correspond, as our physical science supposedly corresponds to physical reality.

Putnam, Apel, and Habermas all take over from Peirce an idea which I reject: the idea of convergence upon the One Truth.
PasAA p.54
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Truth

So I take the appropriate pragmatist attitude toward truth to be: it is no more necessary to have a philosophical theory about the nature of truth, or the meaning of the word “true,” than it is to have one about the nature of danger, or the meaning of the word “danger.” The principal reason we have a word like “danger” in the language is to caution people: to warn them that they may not have envisaged all the consequences of their proposed action. We pragmatists, who think that beliefs are habits of action rather than attempts to correspond to reality, see the cautionary use of the word “true” as flagging a special sort of danger. We use it to remind ourselves that people in different circumstances—people facing future audiences—may not be able to justify the belief which we have triumphantly justified to all the audiences we have encountered.

We pragmatists use “truth” to remind ourselves that people in different circumstances—people facing future audiences—may not be able to justify the belief which we have triumphantly justified to all the audiences we have encountered.
PasAA p.52
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Truth

Pragmatism, Metaphysics and Method - Nordic Pragmatism Network Essays for Bjørn T. Ramberg Edited by Yvonne Huetter-Almerigi & Robert Sinclair Nordic Studies in Pragmatism 5 March, 2026 ISBN 978-952-67497-4-7 422 + viii pp. Description This collection honours Bjø...

I'm delighted to have a piece, along with many friends, in this lovely open access collection. The volume is superbly edited by Yvonne Huetter-Almerigi and Robert Sinclair, as a birthday treat for Bjørn Ramberg. Happy Birthday, Bjørn! #philsky #nordic #pragmatism

nordprag.org/nordic-studi...

So I take the appropriate pragmatist attitude toward truth to be: it is no more necessary to have a philosophical theory about the nature of truth, or the meaning of the word “true,” than it is to have one about the nature of danger, or the meaning of the word “danger.” The principal reason we have a word like “danger” in the language is to caution people: to warn them that they may not have envisaged all the consequences of their proposed action. We pragmatists, who think that beliefs are habits of action rather than attempts to correspond to reality, see the cautionary use of the word “true” as flagging a special sort of danger. We use it to remind ourselves that people in different circumstances—people facing future audiences—may not be able to justify the belief which we have triumphantly justified to all the audiences we have encountered.

We pragmatists, who think that beliefs are habits of action rather than attempts to correspond to reality, see the cautionary use of the word “true” as flagging a special sort of danger.
PasAA p.52
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Truth

So I take the appropriate pragmatist attitude toward truth to be: it is no more necessary to have a philosophical theory about the nature of truth, or the meaning of the word “true,” than it is to have one about the nature of danger, or the meaning of the word “danger.” The principal reason we have a word like “danger” in the language is to caution people: to warn them that they may not have envisaged all the consequences of their proposed action. We pragmatists, who think that beliefs are habits of action rather than attempts to correspond to reality, see the cautionary use of the word “true” as flagging a special sort of danger. We use it to remind ourselves that people in different circumstances—people facing future audiences—may not be able to justify the belief which we have triumphantly justified to all the audiences we have encountered.

It is no more necessary to have a philosophical theory about the nature of truth, or the meaning of the word “true,” than it is to have one about the nature of danger, or the meaning of the word “danger.”
PasAA p.52
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Truth

This latter idea can be made to sound unattractive by dubbing it "Nietzschean" and construing it as a form of the ruthless will to power which was incarnate in the Nazis. I should like to make it sound attractive by dubbing it 'American' and construing it as the idea common to Emerson and Whitman, the idea of a new self-creating community, united not by knowledge of the same truths but by sharing the same generous, inclusivist, democratic hopes. The idea of communal self-creation, of realizing a dream which has no justification in unconditional claims to universal validity, sounds suspicious to Habermas and Apel because they naturally associate it with Hitler. It sounds better to Americans, because they naturally associate it with Jefferson, Whitman and Dewey. The moral to be drawn, I think, is that this suggestion is neutral between Hitler and Jefferson.

The moral to be drawn, I think, is that the idea of communal self-creation—of realizing a dream which has no justification in unconditional claims to universal validity—is neutral between Hitler and Jefferson.
PasAA p.50
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Antifoundationalism

In this paper I shall consider the prospects for defending democratic politics while denying any of the three premises I have listed. I shall be arguing that what philosophers have described as the universal desire for truth is better described as the universal desire for justification.’ The grounding premise of my argument is that you cannot aim at something, cannot work to get it, unless you can recognize it once you've got it. One difference between truth and justification is that between the unrecognizable and the recognizable. We shall never know for sure whether a given belief is true, but we can be sure that nobody is able to summon up any residual objections to it, that everybody agrees that it ought to be held.

We shall never know for sure whether a given belief is true, but we can be sure that nobody is able to summon up any residual objections to it, that everybody agrees that it ought to be held.
PasAA p.48
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Truth

När höger och vänster bytte planhalva | Dagens Arena När regeringen väljer att köra vidare med sin straffrättsreform handlar det om en djupare förskjutning i synen på rättsstaten.

#rättsstat #människovärde #statsnytta #pragmatism

www.dagensarena.se/essa/nar-hog...

I have given you this sketch of Dewey’s attempt to appropriate Christianity for his own pragmatic purposes in order to reply to the suggestion that pragmatism begs the question against religion. As I see it, the only question it begs is whether we are in a state of Sin: whether we need to rely on something non-human for our salvation. Anyone who thinks the consciousness of Sin essential to religious faith will have no use for James’s and Dewey’s way of reconciling science and religion. But for those who are willing to use the term “religious faith” to cover both a religion of obedient submission to non-human power and a religion of love between human beings, this project of reconciliation may have some attractions.

For those who are willing to use the term “religious faith” to cover both a religion of obedient submission to non-human power and a religion of love between human beings, James’ and Dewey’s project of reconciliation may have some attractions.
PasAA p.46
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Religion

Meloni’s referendum defeat shows the cost of the Trump factor | Riccardo Alcaro The Italian PM has won plaudits for her tightrope-walking pragmatism. But have voters now had enough, asks international relations expert Riccardo Alcaro

#Meloni ’s referendum #defeat shows the cost of the Trump factor

The #Italian PM has won plaudits for her tightrope-walking #pragmatism

But have voters now had enough?

Riccardo Alcaro
share.google/hUI9Chk4CFF6...

If this humanistic version of Christianity seems strange, that may be because it leaves no room for the doctrine which was closest to Kierkegaard’s heart: the doctrine of sin. That we are in sin, Kierkegaard tells us, is something so hard for us sinners to realize that only the operation of Grace can make it possible. For Dewey, on the other hand, there is no such thing as sin, no such thing as radical evil. Every evil, Dewey thought, is a name for a lesser good—a good considered and rejected in the process of deliberation. … The Enlightenment rationalists substituted the idea of redemption from ignorance by Science for this theological idea, but Dewey and James wanted to get rid of that notion too. They wanted to substitute the contrast between a less useful set of beliefs and a more useful set for the contrast between ignorance and knowledge. For them, there was no goal called Truth to be aimed at; the only goal was the ever-receding goal of still greater human happiness.

For Dewey and James, there was no goal called Truth to be aimed at; the only goal was the ever-receding goal of still greater human happiness.
PasAA p.46
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Truth

Pragmatism - Wikipedia

Pragmatism questions the value of abstract rituals in urgent, material contexts. Brima’s nursing and rebuilding are "true" expressions of compassion because they successfully solve the problems at hand.

#Pragmatism #shonmehta

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pragmat...

If this humanistic version of Christianity seems strange, that may be because it leaves no room for the doctrine which was closest to Kierkegaard’s heart: the doctrine of sin. That we are in sin, Kierkegaard tells us, is something so hard for us sinners to realize that only the operation of Grace can make it possible. For Dewey, on the other hand, there is no such thing as sin, no such thing as radical evil. Every evil, Dewey thought, is a name for a lesser good—a good considered and rejected in the process of deliberation. … The Enlightenment rationalists substituted the idea of redemption from ignorance by Science for this theological idea, but Dewey and James wanted to get rid of that notion too. They wanted to substitute the contrast between a less useful set of beliefs and a more useful set for the contrast between ignorance and knowledge. For them, there was no goal called Truth to be aimed at; the only goal was the ever-receding goal of still greater human happiness.

Dewey and James wanted to substitute the contrast between a less useful set of beliefs and a more useful set for the contrast between ignorance and knowledge.
PasAA p.46
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Truth

If this humanistic version of Christianity seems strange, that may be because it leaves no room for the doctrine which was closest to Kierkegaard’s heart: the doctrine of sin. That we are in sin, Kierkegaard tells us, is something so hard for us sinners to realize that only the operation of Grace can make it possible. For Dewey, on the other hand, there is no such thing as sin, no such thing as radical evil. Every evil, Dewey thought, is a name for a lesser good—a good considered and rejected in the process of deliberation. … The Enlightenment rationalists substituted the idea of redemption from ignorance by Science for this theological idea, but Dewey and James wanted to get rid of that notion too. They wanted to substitute the contrast between a less useful set of beliefs and a more useful set for the contrast between ignorance and knowledge. For them, there was no goal called Truth to be aimed at; the only goal was the ever-receding goal of still greater human happiness.

Every evil, Dewey thought, is a name for a lesser good—a good considered and rejected in the process of deliberation.
PasAA p.46
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Religion

If this humanistic version of Christianity seems strange, that may be because it leaves no room for the doctrine which was closest to Kierkegaard’s heart: the doctrine of sin. That we are in sin, Kierkegaard tells us, is something so hard for us sinners to realize that only the operation of Grace can make it possible. For Dewey, on the other hand, there is no such thing as sin, no such thing as radical evil. Every evil, Dewey thought, is a name for a lesser good—a good considered and rejected in the process of deliberation. … The Enlightenment rationalists substituted the idea of redemption from ignorance by Science for this theological idea, but Dewey and James wanted to get rid of that notion too. They wanted to substitute the contrast between a less useful set of beliefs and a more useful set for the contrast between ignorance and knowledge. For them, there was no goal called Truth to be aimed at; the only goal was the ever-receding goal of still greater human happiness.

For Dewey, in contrast to Kierkegaard, there is no such thing as sin, no such thing as radical evil.
PasAA p.46
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Religion

If this humanistic version of Christianity seems strange, that may be because it leaves no room for the doctrine which was closest to Kierkegaard’s heart: the doctrine of sin. That we are in sin, Kierkegaard tells us, is something so hard for us sinners to realize that only the operation of Grace can make it possible. For Dewey, on the other hand, there is no such thing as sin, no such thing as radical evil. Every evil, Dewey thought, is a name for a lesser good—a good considered and rejected in the process of deliberation. … The Enlightenment rationalists substituted the idea of redemption from ignorance by Science for this theological idea, but Dewey and James wanted to get rid of that notion too. They wanted to substitute the contrast between a less useful set of beliefs and a more useful set for the contrast between ignorance and knowledge. For them, there was no goal called Truth to be aimed at; the only goal was the ever-receding goal of still greater human happiness.

If a humanistic version of Christianity seems strange, that may be because it leaves no room for the doctrine which was closest to Kierkegaard’s heart: the doctrine of sin.
PasAA p.46
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Religion

For he is treating Christianity, utilitarianism, and pragmatism as so many different ways of getting human beings to stand on their own feet, to rely on each other rather than hoping for help from the non-human. They are, in his eyes, three different forms of the attempt to substitute love for obedience. He sees Christianity not as a matter of exchanging worship for a promise of protection from a power not ourselves, but as a way of freeing us to exchange awe for hope and love. He sees utilitarianism and pragmatism as ways of freeing us from the idea that something non-human—be it the mysterious Will of God or the mysterious True Nature of Reality—deserves respect simply because it is so different from us and so unconcerned with our needs. For Dewey, Kierkegaard’s Wholly Other is demonic rather than divine, and the worship of the Wholly Other is idolatry, a betrayal of everything which Christ stood for.

For Dewey, Kierkegaard’s Wholly Other is demonic rather than divine, and the worship of the Wholly Other is idolatry, a betrayal of everything which Christ stood for.
PasAA p.46
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Religion

If one does see the claim that love is the only law as central to Christianity, then it is plausible to describe the historical development of Christianity in terms of the gradual substitution of love for power as the essential attribute of God. A god of power is an authority; a god of love is a friend. If one thinks of our relation to God as one of awe, worship, & obedience, one will insist that utilitarianism & pragmatism have their limits: limits set by God’s commands. If God has commanded us to worship him under one name rather than another, or commanded us not to suffer a witch to live, or commanded that women be silent in churches, or that a man shall not lie with a man as with a woman, then no pragmatic or utilitarian consideration should have any force to persuade us of any different opinion. Insofar as Christians see their duty of obedience to God as including more than the duty to serve their fellow human beings, they are worshipping a god of power rather than a god of love.

Insofar as Christians see their duty of obedience to God as including more than the duty to serve their fellow human beings, they are worshipping a god of power rather than a god of love.
PasAA p.45
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Religion

#Peirce #pragmatism
🔓 Kato, T. (2026). Pragmatism: What is the meaning of symbols? In T. Taniguchi (Ed.), Symbol emergence systems (pp. 15–19). Springer. doi.org/10.1007/978-...