Like MacIntyre, Benhabib, Kelly, and others, I think that you have to smuggle some provinciality into your universals before they do you any good. We think this for the same sorts of reasons as Hegel thought that you had to smuggle in some provinciality—some ethical substance—before you could get any use out of Kant’s notion of “unconditional moral obligation.” In particular, you have to smuggle in some rule like “No putative contribution to a conversation can be rejected simply because it comes from somebody who has some attribute which can vary independently of his or her opinions—an attribute like being Jewish, or black, or homosexual.”

Like MacIntyre, Benhabib, Kelly, and others, I think that you have to smuggle some provinciality into your universals before they do you any good.
PasAA p.80
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#RegulativeIdeal

I recognize, of course, that domination-free communication is only a regulative ideal, never to be attained in practice. But unless a regulative ideal makes a difference to practice, it is not good for much. So I ask: is there an ethics of discourse which lets me assign the books I want to assign but makes no reference to the local and ethnocentric considerations which I should cite to justify my pedagogic practices? Can you get such an ethics out of the notions of “reason, truth, and justification,” or do you have to load the dice? Can I invoke universalistic notions in defense of my action, as well as local ones?

I recognize, of course, that domination-free communication is only a regulative ideal, never to be attained in practice. But unless a regulative ideal makes a difference to practice, it is not good for much.
PasAA p.80
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#RegulativeIdeal