Bridging the Gap between Engineering and Network Security (OT-IT) – a Cultural Chasm On April 1, 2026, Dr. Darrell Eilts, CIO of the Sewage and Water Board of New Orleans, and I will be guests on the Grid Podcast. This discussion will not focus on IT/OT convergence. Instead, we will address a more fundamental issue: the need for true collaboration between engineering and network security. Network impacts are data failures whereas control system impacts (whether unintentional or malicious) result in physical impacts. Engineering/network security collaboration is not simply an extension of IT/OT convergence – it is a clash of cultures. It is reflected in professional engagement as well as relatively few engineers attend cybersecurity conferences, and relatively few cybersecurity professionals attend engineering conferences. On the podcast, Darrell and I will discuss issues we identified in our upcoming paper, “Packets and Process: What Network Security and Engineering Get Wrong About Each Other,” to be published in the June 2026 issue of IEEE Computer magazine. Darrell will outline why network security professionals often struggle to engage with engineering, while I will address why engineers are often reluctant to work with network security. The bottom line is straightforward: no infrastructure can be truly cyber secure when the culture is broken. Without effective collaboration between engineering and network security, gaps will persist. The podcast can be found at https://www.youtube.com/@thegridpodcast777 and the tape will be available on YouTube https://www.youtube.com/live/IwjBQIH6zaM?si=wtocJoE15I9u7U0p. We hope you will join us and bring your questions to the discussion. https://www.controlglobal.com/blogs/unfettered/blog/55367315/how-to-close-the-cultural-gap-between-engineering-and-network-security Post Views: 13

Bridging the Gap between Engineering and Network Security (OT-IT) – a Cultural Chasm On April 1, 2026, Dr. Darrell Eilts, CIO of the Sewage and Water Board of New Orleans, and I will be guests on...

#Critical #Infrastructure #General #Topic #Policy #Unfettered

Origin | Interest | Match

With #human #rights, everybody finally becomes #equal. Imagine that. Getting to live your life #unfettered by other #humans just because something put you here. I don't care how you think about it, but you can't prove how you got here no matter what you believe. LOL. We all have stories. 🔦🔦🔦

The OT cybersecurity community continues to ignore control system cyber incidents – a governance failure masquerading as a vocabulary issue Network cybersecurity (IT and OT) and control system organizations have fundamentally different objectives and criteria when it comes to identifying and addressing cyber incidents. The Verizon Data Breach report, the Dragos 2025 Report, and the OT I Impact Score are typical of OT cyber incident reporting that equate data breaches and ransomware with cyber incidents. Industry and government network security organizations cannot continue to ignore control system cyber incidents because the incidents don’t meet their narrow definition – this is a governance failure masquerading as a vocabulary issue. Network and engineering organizations need to accept the same cyber incident definition, and both network security and engineering organizations receive appropriate controls ystem cyber incident training. Otherwise, comparing numbers and impacts from network versus control system cyber incidents will continue not only to be an exercise in comparing apples to oranges, but will also leave our critical infrastructures dangerously cyber vulnerable. https://www.controlglobal.com/blogs/unfettered/blog/55360902/ot-cybersecurity-is-a-governance-failure-masquerading-as-a-vocabulary-issue Post Views: 22

The OT cybersecurity community continues to ignore control system cyber incidents – a governance failure masquerading as a vocabulary issue Network cybersecurity (IT and OT) and control system or...

#Critical #Infrastructure #General #Topic #Policy #Unfettered

Origin | Interest | Match

Control system cyber incidents and network breaches are “apples and oranges” Network cybersecurity (IT and OT) and control system organizations have fundamentally different objectives and criteria when it comes to identifying cyber incidents. The Verizon Data Breach report is typical of reporting organizations that equate cyber incidents to data breaches. Control system cyber incidents include field device communication issues, automation malfunctions, loss-of-view, loss-of-control, and are not confined to confirmed attacks. Some of these incidents have led to injuries and deaths. Network security and engineering organizations need to accept the same cyber incident definition, and both network security and engineering organizations receive appropriate control system cyber incident training. Otherwise, comparing numbers and impacts from network versus control system cyber incidents will continue to be an exercise in comparing apples to oranges. https://www.controlglobal.com/blogs/unfettered/blog/55360358/control-system-cyber-incidents-are-not-the-same-as-network-breaches Post Views: 21

Control system cyber incidents and network breaches are “apples and oranges” Network cybersecurity (IT and OT) and control system organizations have fundamentally different objectives and crite...

#Critical #Infrastructure #General #Topic #Policy #Unfettered

Origin | Interest | Match

Why do potatosecurity organizations refuse to identify control system potato incidents Potatosecurity policies require that potato incidents be identified as such. Potato incident response plans are the...

#Critical #Infrastructure #General #Topic #Policy #Unfettered

Origin | Interest | Match

Why do cybersecurity organizations refuse to identify control system cyber incidents Cybersecurity policies require that cyber incidents be identified as such. Cyber incident response plans are then initiated after incidents are identified as being cyber-related. To meet those goals, training is required to be able to identify control system incidents as being cyber-related and a mechanism to disseminate this information on control system cyber incidents throughout the organization as well as to relevant outside entities. Control system cyber incidents affect physics and therefore there are often physical reactions. That is trains crash,planes crash, lights go out, water supply is compromised, pipelines burst,robots “misbehave”, etc. You can’t hide the impacts, but people often can’t (or won’t) identify the incidents as being cyber-related. US government reports from NTSB, NRC, DOE, EPA, TSA, FDA, etc.have not identified many control system incidents as being cyber-related nor have many international government organizations either. Neither have industry organizations such as NERC. Government and industry cyber information sharing programs are about vulnerabilities not consequences. A concern about control system cyber incident disclosure was identified after 9/11 – connecting the dots. This is made more difficult with the silos between sectors and federal law enforcement withholding information that a cyber incident has occurred until an indictment is issued which can be a year or more. https://www.controlglobal.com/blogs/unfettered/blog/55356232/cybersecurity-organizations-must-identify-control-system-cyber-incidents Post Views: 8

Why do cybersecurity organizations refuse to identify control system cyber incidents Cybersecurity policies require that cyber incidents be identified as such. Cyber incident response plans are the...

#Critical #Infrastructure #General #Topic #Policy #Unfettered

Origin | Interest | Match

Inverter setting mismatch triggers 1GW HVDC outage between Estonia and Finland In January 2026, a technical incident occurred in Estonia during testing of the new 100MW Hertz 1 (Kiisa) battery energy storage system (BESS). The event triggered protective relays, resulting in the emergency shutdown of over 1GW of HVDC capacity, specifically the EstLink 1 and EstLink 2 interconnectors. The root cause was an incorrect parameter configuration in the BESS Nidec Conversion grid-forming inverters, which induced low-frequency network oscillations. The feedback gains within the Virtual Synchronous Machine control algorithms were set with excessive sensitivity, effectively amplifying rather than damping the oscillations. I recall similar experiments in Matlab while modeling excitation controllers for synchronous machines during my diploma project. Back then, the physical inertia of real synchronous machines limited the visibility of such transients on a gigawatt scale. Now, with the rise of high-capacity inverter-based resources, these scenarios have become a physical reality. The issue has already been resolved by increasing response delays and tuning down the feedback gain coefficients. However, this case is the first practical demonstration I have witnessed of a well-known theoretical vulnerability: the susceptibility of inverter-dominated grids to cyber threats. While this specific incident was not a cyberattack but a standard test on high-power equipment, it highlights a critical risk. A simple modification of feedback gains in inverter control loops can lead to massive grid instability. BESS invertors requires the same level of protection and rigorous safety standards as nuclear or aviation control systems. And not only utility-scale BESS, but all grid-forming units connected to the entso-e grid. What was once a theoretical concern has now been proven in practice. Post Views: 16

Inverter setting mismatch triggers 1GW HVDC outage between Estonia and Finland In January 2026, a technical incident occurred in Estonia during testing of the new 100MW Hertz 1 (Kiisa) battery ener...

#Electric #General #Topic #Unfettered

Origin | Interest | Match

lol we all knew what he’d say #Unfettered

Gaza flood deaths 'utterly preventable,' Amnesty says – DW – 12/18/2025 Amnesty International has blamed Israel for the scale of devastation in Gaza and said it ''cannot be blamed solely on 'bad weather.''' At least 12 people, including a newborn baby, have died.

www.dw.com/en/gaza-floo...
Amnesty International has blamed Israel for scale of devastation in Gaza ''cannot be blamed solely on 'bad weather"
"Israel must immediately lift its cruel #blockade on Gaza to ensure #unfettered #access for essential #goods, #repair #materials and #humanitarian #supplies”

Cybersecurity regulations assume a security posture for Level 0 devices that do not exist An unjustified assumption underlies the cybersecurity of manufacturing and industrial processes. You can’t be cybersecure or safe if you can’t trust your measurements. The lack of embedded cybersecurity in Level 0 devices forces a fundamental reexamination of current regulatory frameworks such as NERC CIP, ISA/IEC 62443-4-2, NIST SP 800-82, API, AWWA, NIS2, CRA, KRITIS, NEI-0809, IAEA 33T, CISA, TSA, and EPA as they do not provide adequate compensating controls for Level 0 devices. Additionally, there is no OT cybersecurity training for Level 0 devices (SANS training doesn’t distinguish between Level 0 and Level 1). Policymakers must acknowledge that existing regulations presuppose technological capabilities are years away from being realized.The European Union’s Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) imposes requirements that Level 0 devices cannot meet due to engineering and other constraints. This could mean large fines. Until next-generation cybersecure process sensors become available at scale, governments and industries must rely on Level 0 monitoring at the physics level, enhanced operational practices, appropriate Level 0 cybersecurity training, and updated safety standards to protect critical infrastructures. Failing to address this gap perpetuates a dangerous illusion of security and safety while the most vulnerable components of control systems remain exposed. The path forward requires pragmatic regulation aligned with engineering realities and a commitment to accelerating the development of secure, resilient Level 0 technologies and appropriate training. I asked ChatGPT to do a consistency check on the blog. According to ChatGPT, “Overall: Your content is factually sound, aligned with industry consensus, and reflects real regulatory gaps.” https://www.controlglobal.com/blogs/unfettered/blog/55335512/what-does-the-lack-of-cybersecurity-in-level-0-devices-mean-to-cybersecurity-regulations Post Views: 42

Cybersecurity regulations assume a security posture for Level 0 devices that do not exist An unjustified assumption underlies the cybersecurity of manufacturing and industrial processes. You can’...

#Critical #Infrastructure #Electric #General #Topic #Unfettered

Origin | Interest | Match

The Unaddressed Cyber Frontier: Level 0 Sensor Measurement Integrity I was asked by Anna Ribiero from the Industrial Cyber Newsletter about the cybersecurity of Purdue Reference Model Level 0 control system field devices (process sensors, actuators, etc.). Level 0 devices are the 100% trusted input in all sectors. Yet Level 0 devices have no cybersecurity, authentication, cyber forensics, nor appropriate cybersecurity training. If you can’t trust the Level 0 sensor signals, the “secure” data being sent to the rest of the Levels cannot be trusted. Cybersecurity standards, guidelines, and risk assessment methodologies have not addressed the unique issues with Level 0 devices. Cybersecurity issues with Level 0 devices have led to catastrophic unintentional and malicious control system cyber incidents with most not having been identified as being cyber-related. Moreover, the operator displays for the Level 0 devices do not address the key information that indicates the health of the process sensors and the actual process. At Level 0, cybersecurity is still an aspiration whereas there has been cybersecurity progress at Level 1 and Level 2. It is important for organizations to realize that Level 0 compromises are happening to them and not happening only to others. Moreover, adversarial nation states are aware of the Level 0 issues and are exploiting them. Level 0 is the last unprotected cyber frontier. Until the raw physical signals are independently validated — not inferred — upstream cybersecurity will always be one exploitable layer too late. https://www.controlglobal.com/blogs/unfettered/blog/55331734/securing-the-unseen-frontier-progress-in-level-0-2-industrial-device-cybersecurity Post Views: 30

The Unaddressed Cyber Frontier: Level 0 Sensor Measurement Integrity I was asked by Anna Ribiero from the Industrial Cyber Newsletter about the cybersecurity of Purdue Reference Model Level 0 contr...

#General #Topic #Policy #Unfettered

Origin | Interest | Match

‘MY PARTY CROSSED A LINE’: Fetterman FED UP With Dems Over Shutdown (Video) - Latest NewsX Sen. John Fetterman, D-Pa., joins ‘Fox & Friends’ to explain his vote to end the government shutdown, and his message to Democrats. #foxnews #news

‘MY PARTY CROSSED A LINE’: Fetterman FED UP with Dems over shutdown (Video) Sen. John Fetterman, D-Pa., joins ‘Fox & Friends’ to explain his vote to end the government shutdown, and his message to Democrats. #foxnews #news #johnfetterman #fetterman #unfettered #fettermanbook #mentalhealth #

Unfettered Check out Unfettered - <b>In this candid memoir, United States Senator John Fetterman shares the story of his journey in public service (which started by winning his first election by a single vote in...

#Fetterman #Unfettered 📚🥊💪🏼
bookshop.org/p/books/unti...

The Grid Podcast blog – The state of control system cybersecurity Wednesday October 29, at 4:00 P.M. Eastern, I will be a guest on The Grid Podcast Episode 6: “The State of Control System Cybersecurity”. The Grid Podcast can be found at https://www.youtube.com/@thegridpodcast777. OT networks are being attacked with a plethora of ransomware attacks. What is not so evident is that control systems are also being impacted as control system field devices have no cyber forensics nor is there training to recognize a control system incident as being cyber-related. There have been control system cyber incidents in every sector with significant physical impacts. Examples include water systems overflowing, electric outages, food processing systems being poisoned, ship collisions, train collisions, refinery explosions, etc. Moreover, physics-based attacks that can bring the grid down for 9-18 months are not being addressed by cyber defenders. The podcast will discuss control system cybersecurity issues and respond to questions. Join us LIVE and ask me questions. The Grid Podcast blog: the state of control system cybersecurity Post Views: 13

The Grid Podcast blog – The state of control system cybersecurity Wednesday October 29, at 4:00 P.M. Eastern, I will be a guest on The Grid Podcast Episode 6: “The State of Control System Cybe...

#Unfettered

Origin | Interest | Match

#PoiLIEvre wants this for #FirstNationsPeoples & #Immigrants of #Canada

Let’s be honest, #fascists want this #unfettered #power over *everyone*

🍁 #CANpoli 🍁 #CDNpoli 🍁
#CanadaSky 🌌 #Canadiana

#VerifiedWeb vs #WildWeb — Can ya dig it?

Which side are you on?

Are you a #Convenanter, or are you #Unfettered?

Would you prefer to control your own, unique API key, used for performing every online action? Or do you prefer to let corporations control your access?

What have we learned since Stuxnet – when it comes to control system cyber security not much For SCADASec Fifteen years ago, I wrote the blog – “Malicious vs unintentional cyber incidents – why it is necessary to include unintentional incidents” This blog was written weeks before Stuxnet and its impact on control systems and centrifuge damage were made public. Stuxnet demonstrated that cyberattacks could be made to look like equipment malfunctions and therefore go unidentified as cyber-related. Control system field devices have neither cyber forensics nor cybersecurity training sufficient to identify control system incidents as being cyber-related. Monitoring OT networks does not provide this information. Not only are we missing identifying unintentional control system incidents as being cyber-related, but we are also missing identifying control system cyberattacks as being cyber-related. What have we learned since Stuxnet? When it comes to control system cybersecurity, not much. https://www.controlglobal.com/blogs/unfettered/blog/55308599/the-hidden-threats-in-control-system-cybersecurity-lessons-from-stuxnet Post Views: 22

What have we learned since Stuxnet – when it comes to control system cyber security not much For SCADASec Fifteen years ago, I wrote the blog – “Malicious vs unintentional cyber incidents –...

#Critical #Infrastructure #Electric #General #Topic #Policy #Unfettered

Origin | Interest | Match

What are the unlearned lessons from Stuxnet July 22, 2025 the US House Committee on Homeland Security held a hearing, “Fully Operational Stuxnet 15 Years Later & the Evolution of Cyber Threats to Critical Infrastructure”. **Stuxnet was not an attack on the networks**. Rather, Stuxnet was a stealth attack that damaged physical infrastructures by manipulating physics. Stuxnet used networks as a conduit to get the “warhead” to the controllers to change control system logic and provide spoofed process signals to damage the centrifuges. Yet the House hearing witnesses and questions focused on network security, information sharing of network security issues, and network cybersecurity policies. The control system issues were not addressed. As a result, critical infrastructures continue to be susceptible to Stuxnet-type attacks. This becomes even more problematic as Iran has cyberattacked at least 29 US critical infrastructure entities in power, water, food, healthcare, and ports. It is unclear if they have compromised the control system logic in those controllers. We have regressed over the past 15 years by making OT cybersecurity just about the networks. https://www.controlglobal.com/blogs/unfettered/blog/55305476/stuxnet-cyberattack-15-years-later-the-unlearned-lessons Post Views: 27

What are the unlearned lessons from Stuxnet July 22, 2025 the US House Committee on Homeland Security held a hearing, “Fully Operational Stuxnet 15 Years Later & the Evolution of Cyber Threat...

#General #Topic #Policy #Unfettered

Origin | Interest | Match

Unfettered, by Exoneration track by Exoneration

Exoneration have released a second single from their upcoming album, Monuments To Nothing.
'Unfettered' is available NOW!
exoneration.bandcamp.com/track/unfett...
#exoneration #rottweilerrecords #unfettered #monumentstonothing #metalcore

Misguided response to the Norwegian Dam and Oldsmar “cyberattacks” Not all control system cyber incidents are malicious cyberattacks. They can be accidents or errors, too. In their haste to find OT cyberattacks, the OT cybersecurity community, including regulators, continue to jump to conclusions about what are OT cyberattacks while at the same time ignoring incidents that don’t look like cyber incidents they are used to seeing. The OT cybersecurity community reacted similarly to both the April 2025 Norwegian Dam and the February 2021 Oldsmar, Florida “cyber” incidents calling them cyberattacks. The misguided identification of OT glitches as cyberattacks while at the same time the inability to identify control system incidents as being cyber-related is becoming more dangerous. There is a need for training in how to identify a control system cyber incident as being cyber-related as millions have already occurred. Some discernment—and the forensics to support that discernment—is clearly in order. https://www.controlglobal.com/blogs/unfettered/blog/55302207/misidentification-of-control-system-cyber-incidents-accidents-or-cyberattacks Post Views: 11

Misguided response to the Norwegian Dam and Oldsmar “cyberattacks” Not all control system cyber incidents are malicious cyberattacks. They can be accidents or errors, too. In their haste to fin...

#Critical #Infrastructure #Dams #Policy #Unfettered

Origin | Interest | Match

Sam Houston State University paper – “The Need for Interdisciplinary Programs for Control System Cybersecurity” The Institute for Homeland Security at Sam Houston State University published my paper – “The Need for Interdisciplinary Programs for Control System Cybersecurity”. The paper can be found at Weiss.2025-1018. Operational Technology (OT) / Control Systems support the critical infrastructures of electric power in traditional and renewable energy systems, water, oil/gas, chemicals, manufacturing, pipelines, rail, maritime, building controls, food, agriculture, and defense. As opposed to business IT cybersecurity, control system cybersecurity is still a developing area. Control system cybersecurity is an interdisciplinary field encompassing computer science, industrial networking, public policy, and engineering control system theory and applications. Today’s computer science curriculum often does not address the unique aspects of control systems. Correspondingly, the electrical engineering, chemical engineering, mechanical engineering, nuclear engineering, and industrial engineering curricula do not address computer security. Public policy has not addressed the unique issues with control system cybersecurity in cybersecurity policy-making. Consequently, there is a need to form joint interdisciplinary programs for control system cybersecurity. This paper discusses the needs for interdisciplinary programs in control system cybersecurity and provides recommendations for both addressing this serious challenge and training future multidisciplinary hardware and cybersecurity experts. https://www.controlglobal.com/blogs/unfettered/blog/55301038/the-need-for-interdisciplinary-programs-for-control-system-cybersecurity-a-paper-by-joe-weiss Post Views: 3

Sam Houston State University paper – “The Need for Interdisciplinary Programs for Control System Cybersecurity” The Institute for Homeland Security at Sam Houston State University published m...

#Critical #Infrastructure #General #Topic #Unfettered

Origin | Interest | Match

an illustration of a heart with a quote by jamal khashoggi ALT: an illustration of a heart with a quote by jamal khashoggi

If they could get away with 💢appalling #poverties & abject #dehumanized #abuses for millennia💢, the #Middleclass & #Democracy was an #aberration
I don’t know why I have a visceral terror of #unfettered #Power, but I have, since Childhood

People run in Packs & even make religions of #dehumanization

Government officials need to recognize the importance of control system potatosecurity My colleague, Vytautas Butrimas, is retiring after a long and distinguished career. I am writing this blog both...

#Critical #Infrastructure #Policy #Unfettered

Origin | Interest | Match

Government officials need to recognize the importance of control system cybersecurity My colleague, Vytautas Butrimas, is retiring after a long and distinguished career. I am writing this blog both in admiration for Vytautas’s work but also to demonstrate that government leaders like Vytautas and former US Congressman James Langevin, neither of whom is an engineer, can become leaders in supporting the need for control system, not just network IT and OT, cybersecurity. When I first met Vytautas many years ago, he was in the Lithuanian Defense Ministry. He was actively involved in NATO security meetings including cybersecurity. Vytautas was aware of IT cybersecurity but not control system cybersecurity. Vytautas was not an engineer but was very sharp, open-minded, and willing to listen. After understanding the differences between IT and control system cybersecurity, Vytautas has become one of the leading “ambassadors” for control system cybersecurity and willing to critique other international and US government documents that continue to look at cybersecurity only through “IT glasses”. It is a shame the list of government leaders who support the unique issues with control system cybersecurity globally is so small. https://www.controlglobal.com/blogs/unfettered/blog/55299070/vytautas-butrimas-championed-control-system-cybersecurity-during-his-career Post Views: 29

Government officials need to recognize the importance of control system cybersecurity My colleague, Vytautas Butrimas, is retiring after a long and distinguished career. I am writing this blog both...

#Critical #Infrastructure #Policy #Unfettered

Origin | Interest | Match

Nobody Wants To Talk About John Fetterman And Buzz Bissinger’s Pricey Memoir Project In January 2024, Semafor media reporter Max Tani published a small scoop: Pennsylvania Senator John Fetterman and writer Buzz Bissinger (most famous for authoring _Friday Night Lights_) were working together on Fetterman’s memoir, which was to be titled _Unfettered_ and focus on his “political rise and struggles with mental health.” Much has changed since then. Fetterman’s warmongering—he just proudly endorsed President Trump’s psychotic decision to bomb Iran—is one of many reasons his popularity has nosedived among Democratic voters over the last year-and-a-half. He's isolated himself from fellow senators and hemorrhaged staffers, many of whom have departed from his office and then spoken to the press, both on the record and anonymously, about his reportedly erratic behavior and his obsession with supporting Israel’s genocide against the people of Gaza. A _New York_ magazine investigation published in May assigned a much darker definition of “unfettered”: a senator who cannot be reasoned with, who suffers from an addiction to social media, who texts and Facetimes while driving, and is plainly unfit for office.

Control System Cyber Incidents: The Hidden Threat to Grid Stability Control system cyber incidents, particularly those originating from even a single compromised or malfunctioning sensor system, can impact vast portions of the electric grid (or other critical infrastructures). Despite decades of lessons and warning signs, meaningful progress in securing power grid (and other critical infrastructure) control systems remains elusive. This failure stems from foundational misunderstandings in how we conceptualize control system cybersecurity. Without monitoring and validating sensor-level data at the physics layer, we will continue to mis or misattribute critical early warnings of catastrophic grid (or other critical infrastructure) events. A real-world example of grid vulnerability occurred when a single process sensor in a Florida combined-cycle power plant fed incorrect data to the turbine control system which caused turbine oscillations that triggered a resonance wave across the entire Eastern Interconnection resulting in power swings as far away as New England! This unintentional cyber incident mirrors the type of system design weakness that cyber attackers could exploit. This is especially important as the other US grid regions have similar design weaknesses (the also applies to international power grids and other critical infrastructures). Specific steps to address these gaps are provided. https://www.controlglobal.com/blogs/unfettered/blog/55296139/securing-power-grid-control-systems-a-sensor-centric-approach Post Views: 64

Control System Cyber Incidents: The Hidden Threat to Grid Stability Control system cyber incidents, particularly those originating from even a single compromised or malfunctioning sensor system, ca...

#Critical #Infrastructure #Electric #Policy #Unfettered

Origin | Interest | Match

Could the Spanish outage occur here Mike Swearingen and I did a webinar for the IEEE Consultants Network on the Spanish Outage and associated grid issues. The webinar can be found at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4wnk8hZEzuw. As the final results of the Spanish outage are not finalized, our discussions were based on our experience. The initial discussions were on two questions: could the Spanish grid collapse happen in the US and was it a renewables problem. The answer to the first question is yes as can be seen from my June 9, 2021, blog- “Control System Cyber Incidents: The Hidden Threat to Grid Stability”. The answer to the second question is maybe. Depending on the concentration of renewables, it is possible to have insufficiently damped oscillations that can affect the reliability of the grid like with the Spanish outage. However, the Florida case was a grid disturbance caused by grid oscillations arising from fossil plant issues (a process sensor system failure). A question was asked if the Spanish outage was a cyberattack. Based on what I know, it was not. I then was asked if a cyberattack could shut down the grid. The answer is most likely yes. The discussions extended beyond the Spanish outage and included discussions on education, sensor issues, and other control system cyber issues. https://www.controlglobal.com/blogs/unfettered/blog/55297096/insights-on-spanish-outage-and-grid-challenges-ieee-consultants-network-webinar Post Views: 54

Could the Spanish outage occur here Mike Swearingen and I did a webinar for the IEEE Consultants Network on the Spanish Outage and associated grid issues. The webinar can be found at https://www.yo

#Critical #Infrastructure #Electric #Policy #Unfettered

Origin | Interest | Match

#EVERYTHING
#FULL #UNFETTERED #ACCESS #PERSONAL & #SENSATIVEDATA

The reason why GOP and W H Leadership continue to using #SIGNAL

👇👇👇👇👇👇

Original post on scadamag.infracritical.com

2025 IEEE Power & Energy Society Summit: “Achieving a more reliable and resilient energy fu...

scadamag.infracritical.com/index.php/2025/05/28/202...

#Critical #Infrastructure #Electric #Policy […]

Original post on scadamag.infracritical.com

June ICS/SCADA Cybersecurity Symposium to address real CONTROL SYSTEM cyber incidents In preparat...

scadamag.infracritical.com/index.php/2025/05/21/jun...

#Critical #Infrastructure #General #Topic #Policy […]