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Netherlands: NVWA Announcement on Avian Flu Antibodies Detected In Dairy Cow #19,028 As we've discussed often in the past, there has been a decided lack of testing for avian flu in dairy cattle around the world, despite indications that the American spillover of HPAI H5N1 into dairy cattle might not be an isolated event. > Initially, only the North American **B3.13** strain was believed capable of infecting cattle, which was reassuring to many countries (see **DEFRA Risk Assessment Of HPAI H5N1 Occurring in Cattle In the UK).** That optimistic assumption was challenged in June of 2024, with a statement from Germany's FLI on the **Experimental Infection Of Dairy Cows With European** **H5N1 Virus**, and later by reports of **H5N1 antibodies found in Pakistani goats and sheep.** > A little less than a year ago, another genotype (**D1.1**) was discovered in dairy cattle in **Nevada and Arizona**, and more recently**in Wisconsin**, and over the course of the last year we've seen evidence of **HPAI H5 antibodies** in a **sheep from the UK** and **from Norway.** Last October - more than 18 months after the first detection of HPAI H5 in U.S. cattle - OFFLU released**an 11-page statement** (see **OFFLU Guidelines for High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Virus Risk Mitigation in Cattle**) which called for sweeping changes, including: * Implementing **risk-based bulk milk surveillance** * **Enforcing pasteurization and safe disposal of waste milk** * Applying flexible **movement controls** with testing and quarantines * **Improved biosecurity & milking practices** * **Protecting workers with PPE** A few weeks later, _WOAH_ issued their own statement (see **WOAH Statement (Oct 22nd): High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza (HPAI) in Cattle), **which closely aligned with the earlier OFFLU report. Late yesterday, the _Netherland's Ministry of Agriculture_ announced the first known detection of avian flu antibodies in European dairy cows, after test results of an apparently **healthy cow** came back positive. > Testing was conducted because **two cats on that dairy farm fell ill from HPAI H5N1 in December**. While no active virus was detected, these findings are indicative of previous infection with HPAI. For now, there is no evidence of further spread, **but additional testing is underway**. I've posted the (_translated_) press release below. **** > **Antibodies to bird flu virus found in dairy cow** > > News item | 23-01-2026 | 19:01 > > Avian influenza antibodies have been detected in a dairy cow at a dairy farm in the municipality of Noardeast-Fryslân, province of Friesland. No evidence of active viral circulation of avian influenza among the dairy cows on this farm has been found. There are also **no signs of avian influenza spreading to other dairy farms.** > > On December 24, 2025, the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA) received a report of**two sick cats**. One of these cats tested positive for avian influenza and died two days later ( **see the letter to Parliament here**). Following this report, the NVWA conducted source and contact tracing. This investigation revealed that the cat came from a dairy farm. > > **On January 15th, the dairy cattle on that farm were screened with a random sample.** There were no sick animals present at that time. Analysis of the milk samples by Wageningen Bioveterinary Research revealed that no active virus was present. **The presence of antibodies was also tested, which were found in the milk samples from one cow. This indicates a previous infection with the virus in that cow.** > > The Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA) visited the farm again on January 22nd. **Blood and milk samples were taken from all cattle present. These showed that there was no avian influenza virus on the farm. The results of the antibody tests are expected next week.** This will tell us whether more animals have come into contact with the virus. Other mammals on the farm, such as dogs, cats, and horses, are currently and have not shown any symptoms. **The people on the farm and the veterinarian are being tested by the Municipal Health Service (GGD).** > > **As far as we know, antibodies against avian influenza have not previously been demonstrated in dairy cattle in Europe.** However, there have been numerous avian influenza outbreaks among dairy cattle in the United States. Individual infection of a dairy cow with the avian influenza virus can occur. It is important to know whether this leads to spread within and between farms. There is no evidence that this has occurred. > > Read the**full message** on the Dutch government website We get a bit more detail, however, from **a letter from the MOA to Parliament**, and a separate **clarification note/addendum** to that letter. Below you'll find some translated excerpts from that letter, where we find that the **cow in question was sick with mastitis and respiratory symptoms** in December, and **5 PCR tests must be repeated** due to errors in the initial testing. > On December 24, 2025, the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA) received a report of _two sick cats_. One of these cats tested positive for avian influenza.**The cat in question died on December 26, 2025. The second cat tested negative and has fully recovered.** I informed your House of this in my letter of January 13, 2025, with Parliamentary document 28807, no. 322. Following this report, the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA) conducted source and contact tracing. This revealed a relevant contact with a dairy farm; **the cat in question originated from this dairy farm.** > On January 15th, the dairy cattle on this farm were screened. Milk samples were taken from several of the cows present, and a sample was also taken from the bulk milk. At the time of sampling, no animals showing symptoms of illness were present on the farm. The samples were sent to Wageningen Bioveterinary Research (WBVR) for analysis. **The results of the PCR tests, which detect the virus in milk, were negative for both the individual samples and the bulk milk sample.** This confirmed that no virus was present in the dairy cattle on the farm, > In addition, the samples were tested for the presence of antibodies. On January 20, the WBVR reported that one cow had antibodies against H5N1 avian influenza. The presence of antibodies indicates a previous infection with the virus.**The cow in question had suffered from mastitis and respiratory problems in December.** > These are symptoms that can be observed in a dairy cow infected with avian influenza. At the time of sampling, this cow had recovered. > Following this positive antibody test, the NVWA (Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority) revisited the farm on January 22nd. During this visit, blood and milk samples were taken from all cattle present. A bulk milk sample was also taken again. Today, January 23, 2026, the PCR results of these tests were received. > > **All but five samples tested negative for individual PCR tests**. The bulk milk was also PCR negative. **The five remaining individual milk samples resulted in a test error in the laboratory and will be retested this weekend**. Based on the PCR results available so far, from last week and today, there is no indication of active avian influenza virus circulation among the dairy cattle on the farm. **The final five PCR results will be available this weekend. If these unexpectedly result in a positive outcome, I will inform Parliament immediately.** While hopefully the remaining tests will continue to show this to be an isolated incident, the fact that **symptomatic cattle are still not being routinely tested** nearly two years after the first American spillover in Texas is concerning. > Had barn cats not fallen ill, and been serendipitously tested for avian flu, this incident might never have come to light. The Dutch government has acted swiftly once the initial report was received, but sadly testing - _even of symptomatic livestock_ - remains limited both here in the U.S., and and around the globe. A tactic that might work in the short term, but carries increasing risks as HPAI H5 continues to hone its skills.

Avian Flu Diary: Netherlands: NVWA Announcement on Avian Flu Antibodies Detected In Dairy Cow

afludiary.blogspot.com/2026/01/netherlands-nvwa...

#H5N1 #influenzavirus #avianflu

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Deze kaart laat het duidelijk zien.

De zachte, vochtige lucht is verdwenen. Zonder actieve bevochtiging blijft het binnenklimaat te droog.

Dit zijn de omstandigheden waarin luchtwegvirussen toeslaan. Neem het gebouwklimaat serieus.

#influenzavirus #H1N1 #H3N2 #hMPV #Rhino #RSV

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As most of the years I did my bit. If you are eligible get your flu vaccine this year and do your bit to protect yourself and your community. #vaccinesavelives #publichealth #fluvaccine #influenza #influenzavirus

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First human bird-flu death from H5N5 – what you need to know | The-14 First human H5N5 bird flu death in Washington. What this avian influenza case means, its source, current risks, and why experts say danger is still very low now

First human bird-flu death from H5N5 – what you need to know
#Health #BirdFlu #H5N5 #AvianInfluenza #GlobalHealth #PandemicRisks #VirusOutbreak #Influenza #HealthNews #The14Media #ProtectHumanity #GlobalSurveillance #InfluenzaVirus #EpidemicThreat
the-14.com/first-human-...

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1968 flu pandemic | History, Deaths, & Facts | Britannica 1968 flu pandemic, global outbreak of influenza that originated in China in July 1968 and lasted until 1969–70, killing between one and four million people. The 1968 pandemic was initiated by the emer...

Hongkong-Grippe
#Pandemie von 1968
#influenzavirus A #H3N2
❗️Die höchste Sterblichkeitsrate wurde bei den besonders gefährdeten Gruppen, nämlich Säuglingen und älteren Menschen, beobachtet.❗️

Neue Mutationen, aber dennoch
⚠️#ImpfenSchützt ❗️

https://www.britannica.com/event/1968-flu-pandemic

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Vogelgrippe: Wie gefährlich ist H5N1? Die Vogelgrippe ist zurück: Zurzeit grassiert ein aggressiver, hochansteckender Subtyp des Influenzavirus H5N1 in Deutschland. An diesem Vogelgrippe-Virus sind bereits tausende von Wildvögeln verendet, in Geflügelbetrieben mussten mehr als 400.000 Hühner, Puten, Enten und Gänse vorsorglich getötet werden. Experten schätzen das Risiko für eine weitere Ausbreitung als hoch ein. Doch wie gefährlich ist die Vogelgrippe für Vögel, Nutztiere und uns Menschen?

Vogelgrippe: Wie gefährlich ist H5N1? https://wp.me/p36Ae-1eaf Experten schätzen das Risiko für eine weitere Ausbreitung als hoch ein. Doch wie gefährlich ist die Vogelgrippe für Vögel, Nutztiere und uns Menschen? #Vogelgrippe #Influenzavirus #Wildvögel #Wirtschaft

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#Medsky🧪 #IDsky #immunosky #publichealth The recent resurgence of #SARSCoV2, #measlesvirus (MeV) & #influenzavirus highlights the ongoing threat of airborne viral infection. Some studies have demonstrated that particulate matter (PM) could act as potential environmental vectors

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H1N1pdm09 returns: a comparative study in Anhui, China | Microbiology Spectrum The H1N1pdm09-associated morbidity and mortality impact negatively on the socio-economic status of the affected population. Potential modification of the genetic and antigenic traits of the virus, as ...

#Medsky #iDsky #microsky #immunosky #publichealth
In the comparative study from Anhui, 🇨🇳 , analyzed the return of the H1N1pdm09 #influenzavirus in the 2022/2023 season & compared it with previous epidemic years. The study found

journals.asm.org/doi/10.1128/...

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#AusHealth2025 #influenzavirus

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Subtype-specific neutralizing antibodies promote antigenic shift during influenza virus co-infection
Gao, X., Hai, R. et al.
Paper
Details
#InfluenzaVirus #AntibodyResearch #ViralCoInfection

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Diagram showing the current infection rates for influenza viruses in Germany over different seasons. Incidence rates for the age groups 0–14 years: 0.08, 15–59 years: 0.09, 60 and above: 0.12, with an overall incidence of 0.1. In week 30, there were 81 infections, compared to 106 in the previous season.

Diagram showing the current infection rates for influenza viruses in Germany over different seasons. Incidence rates for the age groups 0–14 years: 0.08, 15–59 years: 0.09, 60 and above: 0.12, with an overall incidence of 0.1. In week 30, there were 81 infections, compared to 106 in the previous season.

This week's influenza infections for Germany. 🦠
This week, 81 infections per 100.000 citezens were detected.

Created on 2025-08-01.🗓️
CREDIT: Data was obtained from the Robert Koch-Institute under CC BY 4.0 licence. #InfluenzaVirus #Virology #Epidemiology #PublicHealth #Flu #EpiSky #IdSky #FluSky

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Diagram showing the current infection rates for influenza viruses in Germany over different seasons. Incidence rates for the age groups 0–14 years: 0.14, 15–59 years: 0.07, 60 and above: 0.14, with an overall incidence of 0.1. In week 29, there were 87 infections, compared to 108 in the previous season.

Diagram showing the current infection rates for influenza viruses in Germany over different seasons. Incidence rates for the age groups 0–14 years: 0.14, 15–59 years: 0.07, 60 and above: 0.14, with an overall incidence of 0.1. In week 29, there were 87 infections, compared to 108 in the previous season.

This week's influenza infections for Germany. 🦠
This week, 87 infections per 100.000 citezens were detected.

Created on 2025-07-27.🗓️
CREDIT: Data was obtained from the Robert Koch-Institute under CC BY 4.0 licence. #InfluenzaVirus #Infections #Virology #Epidemiology #PublicHealth #Flu

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#Medsky🧪 #IDsky #immunosky A bird flu #antibody spreads its wings! H7N9 avian #influenzavirus is a zoonotic influenza virus of #publichealth concern, with a 39% mortality rate in humans. H7N9-specific prevention or treatments for humans have not been approved .

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#H5N1 #AvianInfluenza #Antarctica #WildlifeHealth #OneHealth #InfluenzaVirus #GenomicSurveillance #Virology #Ecology #Biosafety #ResearchPreprint (8/8)

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An Il12 mRNA-LNP adjuvant enhances mRNA vaccine–induced CD8 T cell responses IL-12 is dispensable for CD8 T cell responses to mRNA vaccination, but an Il12 mRNA-LNP enhances CD8 T cell memory and protection.

LNP–IL-12 increased CD8 T cell responses against #SARSCoV2 & #influenzavirus antigens improved protection against #Listeriamonocytogenes

www.science.org/doi/10.1126/...
@science.org
Pdf

www.science.org/doi/epdf/10....

www.science.org/doi/10.1126/...

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Unter dem Super-Mikroskop: Wie Influenzaviren Wirtszellen kapern Forschende des HZI und des Universitätsklinikums Freiburg decken neue Mechanismen beim Zelleintritt von Influenzaviren auf

Das #Influenzavirus zählt zu den wahrscheinlichsten Auslösern künftiger Pandemien. Ein Forschungsteam von @helmholtzhzi.bsky.social und @uniklinik-fr.bsky.social hat eine Methode entwickelt, die das Eindringen der #Viren in Wirtszellen detailliert darstellt.

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4/9 Pre-existing immunity from seasonal influenza exposure may protect against severe H5N1 illness. Cross-reactive antibodies against H5N1's neuraminidase can be found in humans, as current H1N1 viruses possess a related N1 neuraminidase.
#ImmuneProtection #InfluenzaVirus

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Worst flu season: Influenza virus spread, new bird flu cases in the US, plus measles outbreak update
Worst flu season: Influenza virus spread, new bird flu cases in the US, plus measles outbreak update YouTube video by American Medical Association (AMA)

#AMA
#BirdFlu
#InfluenzaVirus
It’s up to us to stay on top of what’s happening in this volatile environment.

Here is a great YouTube channel so you can stay on top of what’s really happening since we have a failed government.
The American medical Association
#StayWoke
youtu.be/Wi6BpP3GQHc?...

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محکمہ صحت سندھ نے ایچ ون این ون وائرس سے متعلق ایڈوائزری جاری کر دی

مزید پڑھیے: www.aaj.tv/news/30441443/

#AajNews #InfluenzaVirus #SindhGovtAlert #HealthAdvisory

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The lessons learned from the wastewater surveillance can detecting & tracking the #SARSCOV2
infections, variant diversity & shifts in #influenzavirus transmission dynamics at community
level. The #viralload captured #COVID spreading patterns

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Evidence of an emerging triple-reassortant H3N3 avian influenza virus in China - BMC Genomics The H3 subtype of avian influenza virus (AIV) stands out as one of the most prevalent subtypes, posing a significant threat to public health. In this study, a novel triple-reassortant H3N3 AIV designa...

#MedSky🧪#IDSky #publichealth Another one to watch: H3N3 #influenzavirus
bmcgenomics.biomedcentral.com/articles/10....

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Knowing that people are still drinking raw milk when there is an ongoing H5N1 avian influenza virus is just 😬

#H5N1 #influenzavirus #rawmilk

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New study warns of potential pandemic risk from α-H1N2 swine flu virus The α-H1N2 influenza virus in swine poses a higher pandemic risk due to its ability to evade human immunity and transmit between species, highlighting the need for vigilant monitoring.

New study warns of potential pandemic risk from α-H1N2 swine flu virus 🐷🦠🌍 www.news-medical.net/news/2024062... #InfluenzaVirus #SwineFlu #Pandemic #VirusTransmission #Zoonotic #Disease #PublicHealth #ViralEvolution #Immunity #FluResearch @natureportfolio.bsky.social

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Could Bird Flu Lead to the Next Pandemic? | The-14 Australia's first H5N1 bird flu case raises pandemic concerns. Low human transmission risk, but potential mutations stress the need for global vigilance.

Could Bird Flu Lead to the Next Pandemic?
#BirdFlu #Pandemic #H5N1 #Australia #GlobalHealth #Vigilance #PublicHealth #AvianInfluenza #Virus #HealthAlert #MutationRisk #Biosecurity #DiseaseSurveillance #WHO #HealthCrisis #InfluenzaVirus #Pandemic
the-14.com/could-bird-f...

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Figure 1  Overview summarizing the research applications of the resurrection of the 1918 virus. Abbreviations: ACE2, angiotensin-converting enzyme 2; BSL-3, biosafety level 3; E, envelope; HA, hemagglutinin; Luc, luciferase; M, matrix; N, nucleocapsid; NA, neuraminidase; PA, polymerase acid; PB, polymerase basic; SARS-CoV-2, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2; TMPRSS2, transmembrane serine protease 2; VLP, virus-like particle. Photo of formalin-fixed samples from Reference 168. Photo of a scientist working in a BSL-3 enhanced laboratory from Reference 169; photo credit: James Gathany–Public Health Image Library #7989. Figure adapted from images created with BioRender.com.

Figure 1  Overview summarizing the research applications of the resurrection of the 1918 virus. Abbreviations: ACE2, angiotensin-converting enzyme 2; BSL-3, biosafety level 3; E, envelope; HA, hemagglutinin; Luc, luciferase; M, matrix; N, nucleocapsid; NA, neuraminidase; PA, polymerase acid; PB, polymerase basic; SARS-CoV-2, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2; TMPRSS2, transmembrane serine protease 2; VLP, virus-like particle. Photo of formalin-fixed samples from Reference 168. Photo of a scientist working in a BSL-3 enhanced laboratory from Reference 169; photo credit: James Gathany–Public Health Image Library #7989. Figure adapted from images created with BioRender.com.

Figure 2  Reassortment events and deaths associated with historical pandemic influenza A viruses. Phylogenetic analysis suggests that the 1918 virus was most likely directly introduced into the human population (i.e., in the absence of reassortment) from an avian predecessor, unlike the 1957, 1968, and 2009 pandemic viruses, which were derived by reassortment between animal influenza virus(es) and previously circulating human influenza virus, acquiring genes as shown. Colored horizontal bars depict the years of annual epidemics of seasonal influenza that occurred after each pandemic, indicated on the x axis. In 1957 the seasonal H1N1 virus reassorted with an avian H2N2 virus to generate the Asian pandemic H2N2 virus. Similarly in 1968, the seasonal H2N2 virus reassorted with an avian H3Nx virus to generate the Hong Kong pandemic H3N2 virus. In 1977 the H1N1 virus re-emerged in the human population likely by accidental release of an older human strain. Subsequently, human H3N2 viruses c

Figure 2  Reassortment events and deaths associated with historical pandemic influenza A viruses. Phylogenetic analysis suggests that the 1918 virus was most likely directly introduced into the human population (i.e., in the absence of reassortment) from an avian predecessor, unlike the 1957, 1968, and 2009 pandemic viruses, which were derived by reassortment between animal influenza virus(es) and previously circulating human influenza virus, acquiring genes as shown. Colored horizontal bars depict the years of annual epidemics of seasonal influenza that occurred after each pandemic, indicated on the x axis. In 1957 the seasonal H1N1 virus reassorted with an avian H2N2 virus to generate the Asian pandemic H2N2 virus. Similarly in 1968, the seasonal H2N2 virus reassorted with an avian H3Nx virus to generate the Hong Kong pandemic H3N2 virus. In 1977 the H1N1 virus re-emerged in the human population likely by accidental release of an older human strain. Subsequently, human H3N2 viruses c

Figure 3  Reconstruction and characterization of the 1918 pandemic virus. Viral RNA from the 1918 virus was obtained and used to construct plasmids expressing the coding sequence of the eight viral gene segments. Reverse genetics was then used to generate an influenza virus bearing all eight gene segments of the 1918 pandemic virus to study the properties associated with its extraordinary virulence. Plaque assays in MDCK cells showed the virus could replicate in the absence of trypsin, caused death in mice and embryonated chicken eggs, and replicated to high titer in human bronchial epithelial (Calu-3) cells. Despite trypsin-independent replication in vitro, there was no evidence of systemic spread of the virus in mice. However, the virus spread to tissues outside of the respiratory tract in ferrets and macaques. Coordinated expression of all eight 1918 virus genes conferred the unique high-virulence phenotype of the pandemic virus with the 1918 HA and polymerase genes in particular as

Figure 3  Reconstruction and characterization of the 1918 pandemic virus. Viral RNA from the 1918 virus was obtained and used to construct plasmids expressing the coding sequence of the eight viral gene segments. Reverse genetics was then used to generate an influenza virus bearing all eight gene segments of the 1918 pandemic virus to study the properties associated with its extraordinary virulence. Plaque assays in MDCK cells showed the virus could replicate in the absence of trypsin, caused death in mice and embryonated chicken eggs, and replicated to high titer in human bronchial epithelial (Calu-3) cells. Despite trypsin-independent replication in vitro, there was no evidence of systemic spread of the virus in mice. However, the virus spread to tissues outside of the respiratory tract in ferrets and macaques. Coordinated expression of all eight 1918 virus genes conferred the unique high-virulence phenotype of the pandemic virus with the 1918 HA and polymerase genes in particular as

Figure 4  Technological advances enabling reconstruction of SARS-CoV-2 and/or reducing the biosafety risk of handling viral pathogens. (a) Generation of SARS-CoV-2 by CPER. Schematical representations of the SARS-CoV-2 genome and overlapping CPER fragments amplified from cDNA are shown. During assembly these fragments are circularized with a linker fragment containing the last 20 nucleotides of SARS-CoV-2 3′ UTR, 30As, HDVr, SV40 pA signal for transcription termination, spacer sequence, CMV promoter, and the first 37 nucleotides of SARS-CoV-2 5′ UTR. The SARS-CoV-2 CPER product is then directly transfected into HEK293T cells cocultured with Vero E6 cells allowing virus recovery. Panel a adapted from Reference 131 (CC BY 4.0). (b) Production of lentiviral pseudotyped viruses. HEK293T cells are transfected with a plasmid expressing the SARS-CoV-2 S protein, plasmids expressing the other viral proteins needed for virion formation (e.g., HIV Tat, Gag-Pol, and Rev), and a plasmid encoding a

Figure 4  Technological advances enabling reconstruction of SARS-CoV-2 and/or reducing the biosafety risk of handling viral pathogens. (a) Generation of SARS-CoV-2 by CPER. Schematical representations of the SARS-CoV-2 genome and overlapping CPER fragments amplified from cDNA are shown. During assembly these fragments are circularized with a linker fragment containing the last 20 nucleotides of SARS-CoV-2 3′ UTR, 30As, HDVr, SV40 pA signal for transcription termination, spacer sequence, CMV promoter, and the first 37 nucleotides of SARS-CoV-2 5′ UTR. The SARS-CoV-2 CPER product is then directly transfected into HEK293T cells cocultured with Vero E6 cells allowing virus recovery. Panel a adapted from Reference 131 (CC BY 4.0). (b) Production of lentiviral pseudotyped viruses. HEK293T cells are transfected with a plasmid expressing the SARS-CoV-2 S protein, plasmids expressing the other viral proteins needed for virion formation (e.g., HIV Tat, Gag-Pol, and Rev), and a plasmid encoding a

MedSky🧪 #IDSky #Microbiology For the Scientific research evidences there is never too old to read or learn from the past & beyond influenza🦠& SARSCoV2🦠. What Have the scientists Learned by Resurrecting the 1918 #InfluenzaVirus?

www.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10....

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